

THE GERMAN SECRET SERVICE

By

COLONEL W. NICOLAI

(Chief of the German Secret Service during the World War)

Translated, with an Additional Chapter, by
GEORGE RENWICK, F.R.G.S. —

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To
MY COUNTRY

as a Warning,

and

as a Lesson

to

All who would Help
Her to Win back Her
Freedom, and who are,

for that Reason,

Threatened by Her Foes

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PREFACE

IN an account of my activities during the World War,¹ I devoted comparatively little space to the Intelligence Service, though my sole duty from 1912, and my first and chief duty on the General Staff during the War, was to direct the Military Intelligence Department and the organisation to combat espionage in Germany. The "Press Service," which has often been, and still is, in Germany confused with the "Intelligence Service," first devolved on the General Staff after the outbreak of the War, because no Government department had made any preparations for its establishment. The Imperial Government had not comprehended that without such a service even military operations were impossible.

If, therefore, only the General Staff was in a position to accumulate experience of a Press Service and to arrive at an estimate regarding its usefulness in war-time, this was to an even greater extent the case as far as the Intelligence Service was concerned. Unlike her opponents, Germany had not at her command a political, economic, and military service of information conducted in co-ordinated fashion by the Government. She did not, that is to say, take any advantage of political conditions in enemy

¹ *Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg.*
Berlin : E. S. Mittler & Sohn. Published in the spring of 1920.

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countries or influence the neutrals by means of propaganda. Her Intelligence Service was run almost exclusively by the military, and only by them was any use made of its information.

I have often been begged to give a description of my experiences as head of the Secret Service of the High Command of the Germany army, but up to the present time I have believed—and especially so when the above-mentioned book was published—that reticence was best.

Events, however, have brought me round to another opinion.

Everywhere, especially in my Fatherland, I see at work that modern Intelligence Service which the War first let loose on the world.

In the meantime, too, Germany's opponents have been boasting of the successes of their services. But up to the present they have taken care not to raise the veil of secrecy which conceals the gigantic organisation of their military, economic, and political propaganda and espionage, that organisation to which they owe their triumphs, and in which they were, even decades before the War, greatly in advance of Germany.

Germany cannot, unfortunately, lay claim to the credit of having, at the right time, recognised the importance and noted the development of the Intelligence Service or of having, by means of it, taken sufficiently into account the political situation before and during the War. For that reason it is all the more necessary that we should frankly admit the mistakes we have made.

But even the experiences of the World War do not

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appeared to have brought about any change in Germany. What the General Staff created under given circumstances within its own jurisdiction, and what it reaped in the way of experience, was demolished as a result of the outcome of the War, and therefore was not utilised.

If the end of the War had corresponded to the achievements of the German people and its military leadership, the General Staff would have strongly insisted on the Government making use of the accumulated experiences. The Intelligence Services of foreign nations in Germany would again have been pulled up by the roots instead of being allowed to destroy the foundations of the Reich and the future of the German race.

It appears to me, therefore, that a general knowledge of the ways and means of such services in Germany is imperative, lest it should be necessary for us to act independently again or to counteract any foreign espionage successfully.

This matter is also of interest to those States which, because they have no I.S., have no real notion of its importance, and therefore do not suspect that their political freedom and their nationality are threatened by those powerful States which have come out of the War as masters of secret service and of that political propaganda which is born of espionage.

Secrecy increases the mischief, and so there are good reasons for giving the public a description of this evil from the German side, which, having had to struggle against a greatly superior service, has become thoroughly acquainted with it. Of the victorious States, France has a special interest in

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concealing the means which helped her to victory. But England and, more especially, America should be on their guard against the French secret service, which they promoted as they promoted France's military predominance.

A knowledge of events in the region of secret service is necessary, too, for the historians of the World War. Without that knowledge it will be impossible for them to arrive at reasonable judgments, and the full political lessons of the War will remain unlearned.

NICOLAI.

(Colonel on the Retired List.)

BERLIN, *June* 1923.

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CHAPTER I

THE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF ESPIONAGE

The military origin of espionage—France as the creator of the politico-military secret service—Napoleon III's spies—The news which led to Sedan—Enter Russia—England's rôle—The coming of the new warfare.

ESPIONAGE is of military origin. At all times and in all places, accurate information, supplemented by means of espionage among the enemy, has been an indispensable auxiliary help in military struggles. Ignorance and error regarding the enemy's intentions and the conditions in the hostile camp meant the peril of surprises, and with that the loss of the battle which often decided the destiny of a state and a people. For this primitive kind of intelligence service it sufficed to have a couple of audacious young fellows whose dash and trustworthiness could be depended on. The incentive generally lay in a big money reward, and they were eagerly got rid of when their work was done, so that the glory of military success had not to be publicly attributed to the results of cunning or treason. As a consequence of the help of the notorious spy, Schulmeister, for

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instance, Napoleon I quickly and bloodlessly carried the fortress of Ulm. But this first of the famous modern spies experienced the thanklessness of his profession. A Baden smuggler, he was, for the services he rendered to the Corsican, made Police President of Vienna and Lord of the Manor of Neudorf, near Strassburg. But he died in utter poverty. His grave is to be found in the St Urban Cemetery of the German city of Strassburg, which, by treason, had already been delivered into the hands of Louis XIV.

But only politically weak or young States could limit themselves to intelligence service solely in war-time or be content with military secret service alone. Even in the wars of Louis XIV and those of the Napoleonic era such services began to concern themselves with political questions ; espionage nested in the secret cabinets of diplomacy and became a definite part of political action.

France was the creator of the permanent politico-military intelligence service. A permanent form was given to the military intelligence service by Napoleon III, who was forced to do this by the rise of Prussia under Bismarck. In 1855 he created and stationed all over France a uniformly trained special police which was the chief factor in the espionage of the Franco-Prussian War. After that war the French Government handed over the control of this police to the General Staff, the "Deuxième Bureau," which then took over the work of the systematic extension of the "Service de Renseignements" with reference to Germany. To-day, at the height of her military power, France is the finished exponent

HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF ESPIONAGE

and the absolute autocrat in this field of activity. Leadership lies firmly in the hands of that country with her clear-sighted policy of force.

Only when Germany had at her command statesmen of similar political purpose were the germs to be noticed of an espionage working in the service of policy. It existed in the time of Frederick the Great and of Bismarck. The first mentioned did not rely wholly on the reports of his officially accredited representatives abroad nor on the assurances of the foreign diplomats at his court. By means of his own trustworthy agents he obtained an independent and reliable knowledge of events. In the same way he kept himself informed regarding the military strength of his political opponents. And Bismarck did the same. In the wars under his political leadership there arose—particularly between the political and military chiefs—that complete co-operation in the news services of the army and of the Government which then helped Germany and, in the World War, her enemies along the way to victory. As Bismarck surveyed and controlled the situation, so Moltke's military orders could be systematically carried out on the trustworthy basis of accurate news regarding the enemy. His decision to divert to the battlefield of Sedan those German armies which were in full march on Paris, was arrived at because of a piece of news agency intelligence from Paris, reporting the move of Marshal MacMahon from Chalons and his intention to outflank the right wing of the German army in the direction of Metz.

•While initiating myself into the work of the I.S., I was introduced to veterans of the secret service of

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that period. I entertained at that time the popular belief that the spy's was an inferior calling, so I was surprised to find these veterans in high and cultured society. In them I made the acquaintance of men of perfect society manners, of highest culture, and of all-round general and political education. Inter-course with them was of the greatest psychological and historic interest, aroused an understanding of the greatness of a past age, and pointed to the conditions under which alone an intelligence service in the future could be successful. As these conditions were fulfilled in Germany's "Wars for Unity," the German secret service could then be kept within narrow personal bounds; its aims were restricted, and its forces, thanks to Bismarck's statescraft, had only to be concentrated against one enemy at a time.

Work in all directions and attacks from all sides the Germany of Bismarck did not know. Relations with England and, especially, with Russia were friendly. Therefore a military secret service over and above the official sources of information was not established against either of these countries. Russia, threatened less by foreign than by domestic foes, formed, mainly against the latter, a purely political secret service in the shape of that police organisation which was spread all over Europe, the notorious

Ochrana." Though this was not originally intended for the purpose of military espionage, it was possible at any moment to adapt it to that work. It was the Russo-Japanese War which first brought Russia into the ranks of those countries constructing a military intelligence service with a definite aim.

HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF ESPIONAGE

Her alliance with France furnished her with the great experiences of that country, and, at the same time, made the Russian I.S. the mercenary of that of France in the espionage campaign against Germany.

Germany did not take this development into account. Her political I.S. languished in the hands of diplomats who were chosen in too many cases for social reasons and were guided in action by society points of view. These diplomats held scrupulously to the correct path and were satisfied with doing just what presented itself. With their privileged and gentlemanly attitude of mind they were simply concerned with the businesslike conduct of their duties. "Right or wrong, my country," did not grow on our side with the competition against England. The military I.S. eventually lost the political guidance and was, therefore, increasingly deprived of the understanding and support of the political factors. It was no substitute for this loss that Germany everywhere maintained political attachés dovetailed into her diplomacy, and that with the increase of the German navy there grew an Admiralty I.S. which was political to a greater extent than the military secret service, but, nevertheless, had mainly military aims. It developed independently of and only in loose contact with the army's I.S., because both lacked a joint as well as a political head.

Great damage was done to Germany's interests by her poor political imagination leading her to become the military instructor of foreign nations, particularly Japan. What Japan received in this

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way, without trouble, was sufficient for her; she needed no other I.S. than that which was built up for her by Germany.

And in that era of the decline and break-up of the German Intelligence Service and, in consequence, of damage to Germany's ability to conduct war, France devoted her whole strength to the preparation of "Revenge" and won Russia over to her side. Then England, threatened by Germany's economic growth, appeared on the scene. She broke with the long-maintained principle of the "balance of power" and opened the way for the French policy of revenge against Germany.

Great Britain, as a world-wide Empire, had always to maintain an extensive intelligence service, the importance of which she had seen and appreciated in her struggle for world-rule. Lord Fisher, who was First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910—simultaneously with the rearing of the Entente Cordiale by King Edward VII—writes in his *Memoirs* :

It is very deplorable, not only in the late War but also in the Boer War especially, how utterly our spies and our Intelligence Departments failed us. I was so impressed with what the Sultan told me that I set to work on my own account; and through the patriotism of several magnificent Englishmen who occupied high commercial positions on the shores of the Mediterranean, I got a central forwarding station for information fixed up privately in Switzerland; and it so happened, through a most providential state of circumstances, that I was thus able to obtain all the cypher messages passing from the various foreign embassies, consulates, and legations through a certain central focus, and I also obtained a key to their respective cyphers.

When England joined in, a world-wide economic

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I.S. was added to the purely continental, politico-military, Franco-Russian secret service. England took over, especially within the Entente, the command in this service. She was, as far as could be seen, relieved from military anxiety by France and Russia, so she limited her activities in the main to the economic preparations for the World War, and confirmed her leadership by means of that political propaganda in which she was the instructor of her allies and also of America.

Before the War the United States had, in general, only paid attention to the naval armaments of the great Powers of the Continent. As far as the German land force was concerned, it sufficed for the United States to note the progress of that army, the best but not the largest in Europe. America could, therefore, limit her interest to broad considerations and to the official reports, of which Germany allowed her to have considerable knowledge. She could renounce the delicate work of espionage. But, above all, the American I.S. before the War lacked the incentive of a hostile sentiment towards Germany which inspired the services of England, France, and Russia.

With such developments, the age of purely military wars of decision was over for Germany, as were also the times in which a military I.S. sufficed for the preparations for and the conduct of a war. Armies and policies had been joined by technics, industry, and science. In the domestic life of the State arose new social problems which for the I.S. were subjects for inquiry as well as propaganda.

The World War provided the proof that a struggle

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between nations had grown out of the narrow limits of decision by arms and had become a contest in which the whole national strength was engaged on the political, economic, and military territories, and, not least, even in the very soul of the people. In the place of a military I.S. there arose a State secret service against surrounding countries. It concerned itself with all that might give the State an advantage over another, and equally with economics, politics, and armaments. It did not limit itself any longer to the purely negative activity of inquiry, but engaged in positive action in the economic struggle and in home and foreign political propaganda.

CHAPTER II

THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—I

The training of a staff officer—Russian espionage at close quarters—The fate of a friend of the Kaiser's—German espionage difficulties—The Jew as spy—Germans in the service of the enemy.

IN 1904, after three years at the War Academy, I was called to the High General Staff. At the Military High School I had learned Russian, had listened to lectures on military science, on the geography of distant lands, on the history of long-past centuries, and on national and international law. But I heard nothing about the fundamental things of our era or about the politics of the time. Not even the consecutive events of the Bismarckian age were described to us officers who were destined for the General Staff; our opinions regarding domestic political questions were in no way influenced. As for foreign politics, our attention was never particularly directed to any one of the political or economic rivals of Germany. We were just soldiers and nothing more; we felt that we should be called upon, like the great military men who were our models, to do our duty in an hour, the coming of which we only surmised. Our interests were mainly in the past; only militarily were they in the present. Our regard was never directed towards the future. The

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armies which were encamped around Germany and those in the allied monarchies of the Triple Alliance were quite subordinate subjects of instruction.

France was the enemy.

We were as yet unaccustomed to the idea of Russian hostility. England and America were looked upon as sea powers. We often discussed the peculiarities of a war on two fronts ; but we never talked of a World War.

My first task as a General Staff officer was to map a region in the valley of the Vistula near the fortress of Graudenz. After months of close acquaintance with the land and the population in that eastern German frontier region, I saw how alarmed the people were by the constant spectre of Russian espionage and by the tenacity of the Poles who, with large financial resources at their disposal, sought to penetrate into German territory by buying up and settling on the land there. The Poles held themselves aloof from the Prussian officer, and were almost hostile towards him when he came into contact with them, as was often the case, during the carrying out of his official duties.

In the Far East at that time ambitious Japan was struggling with Russia for supremacy on the Asiatic continent. Far from its German instructor, the Japanese army achieved victory over the Russian. The principles of German strategy and tactics and the latest technical inventions had been applied by a determined race and tested for the first time by two great military powers. The German General Staff considered the matter of sending German officers to Japan in order to learn something about

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the war experiences of the Japanese army. A number of officers was, therefore, chosen to learn the Japanese language and I found myself among them. As the result of eighteen months' study at the Oriental Seminary, and by private tuition from the numerous Japanese who, in spite of the War, were in Germany, we managed to obtain a working knowledge of the language. Our comrades envied us our chance of going out into the world, and eventually three of us joined the officers' corps of the Japanese army. Their task proved later to be anything but enviable. They did not have a very hearty reception in Japan, and, unlike the countless Japanese officers who were received and educated in Germany, they were not permitted to have a real insight into anything—quite the contrary.

I was the only married man among the officers detailed to learn Japanese, and one day I received a curt communication to the effect that there was no chance of my being sent to Japan and that I was to abandon my study of Japanese. That the hard work of a year and a half should turn out to be useless was a bitter blow even to the selflessness of a Prussian officer. My departmental chief, Major von Lauenstein, formerly military attaché in St Petersburg, consoled me, however, by giving me a new job. An intelligence service against Russia was necessary, for that country, now that she had lost the war against Japan, was beginning to direct her armaments against Germany. As chief of the officers who were being trained on the General Staff I was to be transferred to an eastern command for the purpose of endeavouring to set up an I.S. and,

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at the same time, an organisation to counteract the Russian espionage which was growing apace on the frontier.

So in the summer of 1906 I went to Königsberg. Before taking up my duties there I had a trip into Russia, where the echoes of the revolution of 1905 were still sounding. I wanted to learn something of the land and the people, which, up to that time, were personally strange to me. Without some knowledge of them, the new problem I had to face would not, to my mind, be soluble. In Russia I had no reason for concealing the fact that I was a German officer. The result was that everywhere I met with the belief that I had come to the country for the purpose of military investigation. When I stayed in fortified towns I was watched. In any other big city people whom I met were exceedingly surprised that I should stay there at all, as the place was not a fortress ! A high official, to whom I brought greetings from his relatives in Germany, took me aside at once and asked me what I wanted to know. Russian officers, whose acquaintance I made, showed a comradely anxiety about my fate. The idea that an officer travelled abroad only for purposes of espionage was generally accepted everywhere in Russia. The explanation became obvious when, on my return from Russia, I addressed myself to my new duties of organising the measures against Russian espionage in East Prussia and as I gradually succeeded in exposing it.

Up to the time of the Russo-Japanese War, Russian espionage had been almost inactive against Germany, for the two countries had long been

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friendly. During that war, however, it began to be energetic again, out of the fear that Germany's attitude would become hostile. This fear was nourished politically by France, and it brought the Russian and the French secret services together. Then the reorganisation of the Russian army under French directions and with the aid of French money, had the effect of placing the Russian I.S. wholly under the influence of France and made accessible to it all the lessons learned by an espionage service, which for such a long and unbroken period had been working against Germany. Russia, the autocratic state of police and officials, was adapted, better than any other, to accommodate herself to the new conditions prescribed for her. In addition, the funds furnished by France for military purposes were sufficient to provide most liberally for espionage. The sums promised to spies and traitors were enormous compared with what thrifty Germany could offer. Of course, in many cases the matter got no further than promises, and in reality those who were in Russian pay received but paltry rewards.

The greater part of the available funds was swallowed up by organisation expenses at home and abroad. The direction and control of the system was defective on account of the corruption of the officials, police, and even officers connected with it. The Russian I.S., indeed, owed its successes less to its proficiency than to the circumstance that the institution of espionage on the eastern frontier took the German military and police authorities by surprise, for, up to the opening of the century, they had only been accustomed to a French I.S.

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The inadequate German defence bestowed tangible successes on our opponent and encouraged him constantly to increase his activity.

The General Staff in St Petersburg controlled the organisation. It kept in touch with the military attachés and the consulates, and, in that way, Berlin, Vienna, and foreign countries generally were "controlled." Every military district on Russia's western frontier had its own branch I.S. with from six to ten officers under a member of the General Staff. The bureaux in St Petersburg and Wilna devoted their attention to Germany, that in Kieff to Austria, and that in Warsaw to both countries. They endeavoured, too, to influence the staffs of the German and Austro-Hungarian troops garrisoning the frontier regions. They had under their command the frontier guards and the frontier gendarmerie who acted as go-betweens, and who were also concerned with a minor espionage in those probable theatres of war, the border provinces. In all European capitals the Russian secret police, the "Ochrana," recruited agents who were placed at the disposal of the military attachés. The military attachés in Germany also paid attention to Austria, and found in the national differences there much fruitful ground to cultivate.

The German population on the frontier was thoroughly degraded by smuggling and by the bribery of the Russian I.S. In an indescribably free-and-easy way the Russian espionage agents worked far into German territory. Indeed, the real boss of the German border districts was the Russian frontier officer. One of the most successful of these

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was the chief of the frontier gendarmerie at Wirballen, Major von Mjassojedoff. That he was every year the guest of the German Emperor when his Majesty was hunting in Rominter embarrassed him as little in his activities as the Russian military attaché was embarrassed by the fact that he was attached in a peculiar fashion to the person of the Kaiser. On the contrary, this assisted them in their doings, because it gave them a certain prestige in the eyes of our authorities. It was very difficult to fight against that.

German authorities always demanded conclusive proofs before they would take action, instead of preventing at least every possibility of espionage by moving vigorously when the slightest suspicion was aroused and so obtaining proofs. The activity of the German police, too, suffered from the fact that they were eager to catch and convict spies, and did not regard themselves as called upon, in the first place, to obstruct espionage. So, that the hostile espionage should not know that anyone was on its track, all spy cases in court were heard behind closed doors. In this way, of course, it was possible to mete out severe punishment to numerous spies and traitors, but the protection of the secrets remained incomplete. The enemy I.S. was bent but not broken.

The daring of Russian agents in Germany went so far that they often demanded from the German police protection against detectives who were observing instead of arresting them, and against suspicious crowds.

Fate, for this reason, overtook the above-men-

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tioned Major von Mjassojedoff not on German territory but, much later, in his own country. During the War he was executed in St Petersburg for treason in favour of Germany.¹ The judgment, like so many which resulted from similar charges, was a miscarriage of justice. He never rendered any service to Germany. The case interested me and I endeavoured to find out the reason for the sentence. It appears that the Major was the victim of his liking for women, and that the charge against him was merely an excuse, very effective in war-time, to get him out of the way, as he was the rival in a lady's affections of another highly placed personage.

Up to 1906 there was in opposition to the Russian secret service a German I.S. which consisted of a General Staff officer in Berlin and a few completely inactive intelligence officers on the frontier. While the Russian service had almost unlimited means at its disposal, the German Reichstag voted yearly a sum of M.300,000 (£15,000) for the whole espionage and counter-espionage organisations of the General Staff. Every authority in Russia was in the service of the Intelligence Department, but the higher a German authority, the more sceptical it was regarding the work of the General Staff. If it was an authority at all connected with the Foreign Office, it refused to have anything to do with this work, regarding espionage, as well as counter-espionage, in the light of factors which disturbed the "friendly relations" between Germany and foreign powers.

At first glance the circumstances were favourable for the setting up of a German I.S. in Russia.

¹ See Note at end of chapter.—TRANS.

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Among the Jewish population, which was predominant in the Russian frontier regions, it was possible to find without trouble numerous individuals who were willing to carry out espionage commissions and to act as go-betweens in cases of approaching officials and officers in high positions. But the Jewish trader and money-lender had a disastrous influence in these circles. Then there was the point that the reaction of the extensive Russian espionage organisation made itself felt, in that the frontier population as well as the officials and officers had espionage in their very blood.

It was here, therefore, that for the first time I saw what injury one's own race suffers when a whole population is, without plan or system, used for the purpose of espionage. I grasped later why it is that England and France prefer to employ the neutral foreigner for the work. While Russia infected herself, they kept their own people free from the poison of espionage and spread the contagion among neutral and hostile races, especially those of Austro-Hungary and Germany.

If, therefore, the authorities in Germany would credit nothing about espionage, and if our people who did not live near a frontier had fantastic ideas about it, it had come to be regarded in Russia, by authorities and people alike, as something natural and commonplace. It would, however, be wrong to believe that the German I.S. benefited to any extent by these circumstances. It had not the means to satisfy all the demands put forward from Russian quarters, in which the whole business was regarded more as a means of earning large sums

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easily than of performing real and, perhaps, dangerous work for Germany. Espionage in Russia was clearly looked upon, first and foremost, as a source of income, and it was a matter of indifference whether this source could be drawn upon in the service of Russia or for work against her.

The Jew who could be used in Russia as a spy was not militarily trained, and therefore lacked judgment. And as a go-between he was often cheated of his recompense by Russians whom he approached for treasonable purposes. In most cases he got into touch with persons who were known to him by their levity and their gay lives, and who were, therefore, dependent on him for loans. Such persons often got rid of their debts by threatening to hand over these spy-usurers to the authorities. Over the whole vested interest which exploited secret service there was an attentive police, and draconic espionage laws threatened every traitor.

But apart from all that, the Russian corps of officers and the Russian officials showed a strong patriotic feeling in spite of the serious moral risks to which their own espionage system exposed them. Notwithstanding all the relations established with them, it was exceedingly rare that they performed any real service for the German I.S.; they were generally attempting to deceive us.

On the other hand, it could be established that Germans who had been won over to the Russian service worked reliably and energetically for their taskmasters and were moderate in their demands. Of course, the threat that they would be handed over to the German authorities if they proved

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unreliable, disobedient, or unreasonable kept them well disciplined and put them completely at the mercy of the Russian I.S. The large number of traitors in Germany made it possible to carry out this threat without seriously injuring the interests of the Russian secret service. In this way, too, the carrying out of promises which had become unpleasant or unprofitable was avoided.

Seeing that the military and civil authorities, the entire police and the foreign representatives of Russia were all employed in the secret service, they were particularly sensitive to any sign of a counter-espionage by Germany against Russia. As a result of this, it was as good as impossible to send Germans to Russia on missions of investigation. Military events were hidden behind a thick veil of secrecy, and he had to be a very smart and discerning observer to bring back useful information. Foreigners were conspicuous in Russia. They lived there only in comparatively small numbers and almost exclusively for business purposes. It was quite otherwise in Germany, the great highway of international travel, with her centres of learning and her holiday resorts. Foreigners, therefore, were also of no use for investigations in Russia, though they played a great rôle in the work of the Entente I.S. in Germany.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

Some light has now (May 1924) been shed on the Mjassojedoff case by the memoirs of a former Russian officer which appear in No. 14 of the *Archives of the Russian*

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Revolution. This officer was the chief witness at the court-martial which took place in Warsaw (not St Petersburg) in February 1915.

The court-martial, says the writer, consisted of two General Staff officers and one regimental officer. No representatives for the prosecution of the defence were admitted. The chief witness was concerned only with the first charge, that of betraying the strength of positions of the Russian forces in East Prussia to the Germans. This, it was maintained, materially helped the Germans to win the decisive Battle of Tannenberg.

This witness told the court-martial that one day the prisoner came to the Dembowa-Buda section of the front and made full enquiries regarding the situation. This struck the witness as unusual, and he had the impression that the officer was engaged in espionage. (The nature of the country, which left great gaps in the front, made it comparatively easy for anyone, whose coming was arranged, to convey news to the enemy.) Mjassojedoff was arrested on his return from the front.

The charge against him states that he was a staff officer employed in the Intelligence Service at Kowno. The sentence passed was : Degradation and death by hanging.

There were also two other charges about which the writer is not very clear. The second was that of having stolen two terra-cotta statuettes from a deserted house in the East Prussian war area. This was described as "plundering under arms," and on that count, too, the witness believes that the death sentence was passed. The third charge is not definitely given, but appears to be something in the nature of a corollary to and an extension of the first. The writer describes it as incomprehensible. In connection with it, the information was provided that, on his arrest, the prisoner made a bad impression by his distracted answers to questions. It is not stated if any sentence was passed in this instance.

The writer of the article says that Mjassojedoff denied his guilt and explained his distracted answers by saying

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that the charge of betraying his country was so amazing that he was utterly taken aback.

At the end of the "trial" the prisoner asked for permission to telegraph to the Czar and to take leave of his mother. Both requests were refused. He then attempted to cut his throat with a piece of glass broken from his pince-nez. He was hanged within two hours of the rising of the court.

CHAPTER III

THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—II

Chief of the secret service—A visit to France—Espionage in Alsace-Lorraine—Daring French agents—A military school ransacked—German deserters—Where the various secret services worked.

AFTER I left East Prussia I had two years as a company officer in Central Germany. Then in July 1912 I was posted to the General Staff, and at the beginning of 1913 was appointed "Chief of the Intelligence Service of the High General Staff." In that position I had also, with the help of the police, to direct the fight against the hostile secret services. The choice of an officer who, for such a post, was very young, furnished proof that the organisation he had to take over was no very extensive one. But at the same time it showed that the General Staff was determined to employ fresh vigour to make up for lost opportunities, for General Ludendorff, as head of the Operations Section, had a predominating influence on the General Staff.

Before I took over my new duties I went on a brief visit to France in order to obtain an impression at least of the land and the people before the frontiers of that country, too, were closed against me, the only country against which, in addition to Russia, our

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General Staff had set up an I.S. I obeyed very strictly the French registration regulations regarding German officers, and that drew upon me the attention of the authorities to an extent never experienced by foreign officers in Germany. My position as a General Staff officer increased the amount of attention bestowed upon me. But the authorities did not fail to be specially polite. I was much impressed by the provocative agitation against Germany which I observed everywhere, especially in the theatres. It was designed, on the one hand, to keep the thought of Alsace-Lorraine in people's minds and, on the other, to emphasise Germany's warlike preparations. I cannot remember any similar activity on the part of the German Government before the War.

Back in Germany, I went to Metz and Strassburg, and was informed, by those combating the French espionage, how matters stood there. Along the frontier on the French side there was a great cloud of "special commissioners" who sought out agents for the service, assigned to them their tasks, and controlled them generally. Behind all this were the Intelligence Departments of the general staffs of the fortresses of Belfort and Verdun and of the XX Army Corps at Nancy. As early as 1887 the "Schnabele Case" led to dangerous political results. This special commissioner so greatly neglected the ordinary precautions on his numerous visits of investigation to Germany that, at last, he drew upon himself the attention of the authorities, and one day was arrested on crossing the frontier. The sensation caused in France by this unusual German action

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was worked up by the War Minister, Boulanger, and it grew until there was danger of war. To put a stop to this agitation, Bismarck ordered the commissioner to be released. Schnabele continued his activities with the French I.S. under the guise of a teacher of languages at Nancy. It was revealed that the commissioner was an active member of the Royalist Party, but that did not prevent him from serving in the secret service of the Republic, nor did it prevent the Republic from protecting and rewarding him.

The German police in Alsace-Lorraine were wholly insufficient against the invasion of French spies. This was not to be wondered at. The money vote for the police had to be passed by the Landtag (or local parliament), to which such individuals at Wetterlé, Blumenthal, and others belonged. They were even suspected of rendering treacherous service to the French; at least they had no interest in the strengthening of the German police. So it was that the German police on that frontier were faced with ten times their numbers on the French side.

The French I.S. on that frontier was set up in 1875; it was abundantly supplied with officers. Not, however, till 1910-13 was a German I.S., headed by officers from the three general commands in Alsace-Lorraine, set up against it. These officers, thrown on their own resources, had, under the direction of the High General Staff and in conjunction with the Central Police Department in Strassburg, to carry out the counter-measures against French espionage as well as do their own intelligence work.

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The population, especially in Alsace, greatly helped French efforts. Countless Alsatians went to live in France when they were nearly of military age. As they had received a German education and had German relatives and acquaintances, they were given employment in the French secret service. Numerous French officers, too, had grown up in German schools and were specially valuable for investigations in Germany. Many shootings in Alsace-Lorraine were let to Frenchmen. Thus it was that there was a permanent and numerous French population in these provinces, a population which was increased by the presence of the French owners of estates, country residences and other houses. They were, of course, kept at a certain distance from fortified places by the "Radius Laws." German monasteries in Alsace-Lorraine, too, were dependent on their mother-foundations in France.

Unlike the Russian I.S., which had all the blemishes of a young and overstrained organisation, demoralised by foreign money, the French secret service displayed, even at that time, the mastery which it had acquired as a result of its century-long experience. It was distinguished by a brutality which conformed to the hate and the political energy shown by France. Burglaries at the offices of officials and at officers' homes were not infrequent, and it was proved that the implements were provided by the French secret service. Its agents in such cases did not hesitate to make use of narcotics and poison. Spies such as one reads of in novels and sees in film-plays find their prototypes in the passionate and energetic French secret-service agents of pre-war times.

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We had proofs that, since 1894, the French I.S. had had a footing in the Germany army. As we only had a weak counter-espionage police on the frontiers, the collection of such evidence was, in the main, limited to Alsace-Lorraine, and we seldom succeeded in proving that French espionage had crossed the frontier regions and taken root in the interior of Germany. But a few instances demonstrated that this was so. How far the French General Staff threw its net is shown by the case of Special Commissioner Tomps. His father settled in Munich as a dealer in French wines after the war of 1870-1. The son was given a German education. Later, he entered the service of the International Sleeping Car Co. and so learned a great deal about Germany. When he reached military age the French military authorities called him up and put him in the I.S. He had to see to it that his German acquaintances were spread all over the country. His young lady friends in Munich were persuaded to move to Berlin, where they established relationships with young officers, especially those at the military academies. Two cases came to light in which German officers succumbed to the systematic pressure of this one organisation. Under French direction they stole everything worth having from the Artillery and Engineers' School. What could not be carried off was photographed with French assistance.

A particularly abundant supply of military news from Germany was furnished to the French I.S. by the German army deserters who fled to France. In pre-war days special care was taken to obtain the fullest advantage from this source of information.

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By a joint order of the Ministries of the Interior, War and Marine, dated 1st June 1913, all previous orders were annulled and new regulations put into force. According to the new scheme, special care was to be taken that every deserter should be searchingly examined, *au point de vue militaire*, by an officer specially deputed for the task, and that the deserter should be sent to the War Ministry in Paris if it so happened, *qu'il sera à même de fournir des renseignements particulièrement intéressants*. Full instructions were given in the orders regarding the methods of questioning, especially for deserters from the German army after 1909. The "examination paper" had to include numerous and searching questions, framed according to the arm of the service to which the deserter belonged, and it was quite possible that the answers might provide much valuable information regarding the organisation of the German army. It is worthy of mention that the French did not forget to persuade the deserters to give up their military and other papers; these were handed over to the secret service for the use of French agents visiting Germany.

The ease with which espionage could be carried on in Germany increased the zeal of all who were employed in the French I.S. In addition to high pay they also received decorations. Unlike the Russian service, the French did actually pay big sums, and, in consequence, did score big successes. The Russians achieved such, more by reason of their recklessness and their disregard for human life. But even French spies were sometimes careless. French officers were not afraid of personal activity

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on German territory. In December 1910 a secret service man from Belfort, a Captain Lux, was arrested, as he could not resist temptation, in the shape of the Zeppelin Works in Friedrichshafen, on account of his ambition to carry out himself the collection of the required information. By a German court he was condemned to honourable detention in the Upper Silesian fortress of Glatz, but he escaped with the help of agents of the French I.S. in Eastern Germany and in Bohemia. This shows that the French had a firm footing there long before the War. On the other hand the Russian secret service appeared in Western Germany, working in close unison with the French. To direct this a special bureau was set up in Switzerland and a number of high officers were put in charge of it. Far from Russia, the officers felt themselves quite safe and threw their abundant money about. In this way their activity became known to everybody, and the damage they did to Germany was not very great.

For a long period Switzerland, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg were the rendezvous of the anti-German services and, after 1910, of the united I.S. of the Entente. These countries offered to the Entente representatives agreeable places of residence with the possibility of pleasant changes, and gave their agents better opportunities for paying inconspicuous visits to Germany. As the direction of Entente espionage was more and more transferred to neutral countries, so the people at home were more adequately protected and spies were more often sought from among the inhabitants of these countries.

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In Switzerland, France maintained the largest espionage bureau. It was at Geneva, and was, at first, under the direction of Captain Languier, later of Lieutenant-Colonel Parchet. About ninety persons were employed in it. Basel was for a long time the seat of a branch bureau which concerned itself with South Germany. At the beginning of the War the Swiss police there surprised a "nest" of French espionage agents whose job was to destroy railway bridges, etc., in Germany in case of war. The "Intelligence Department" of the English General Staff had its largest espionage bureau in Brussels, at 7 Rue Garchard, under the direction of Captain Rengnart of the War Staff. Outwardly an engineer, Herbert Dale Long, was prominent and successful in the control of the bureau; under the names of Lessing, Lane, Dale-Herbst, and Lenox, Long appeared in many other posts in the I.S. In Holland, especially in Amsterdam, this English espionage bureau had branch offices, and in that city most of the conferences with spies took place. Belgium, Holland, and the northern countries were themselves the objects of English I.S. investigations. For this reason the English service worked with extraordinary caution there. It even used Germans for espionage purposes in these lands. It was easy to find agents in Germany and among those Germans who travelled in the British Empire or who resided in England, because such persons believed that, as they were not doing anything derogatory to the Fatherland, they were guilty of no dishonourable action when they earned the excellent pay of the English spies. Some of them felt honoured that

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England thought them worthy of her confidence. As far as the English I.S. was concerned, the employment of these persons had this advantage: they could be disavowed if they were caught. Indeed, the English secret service went so far in this policy as to endeavour to tempt German officers to do espionage work for it in foreign countries, because it could have the greatest faith in their judgment and their trustworthiness. This was extraordinarily clever tactics on England's part, because it concealed her own espionage and directed suspicion on Germany. Long before the War broke out England was doubtless fully aware of the naval and military strength of Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, had fixed her plans for the eventuality of these states being forced into active participation on the World War, and knew the conditions in these countries for the trade and economic war against Germany. Only Russia competed a little with England in secret service in these states of the north. The head bureau of her foreign espionage was in Copenhagen, and her activity there was favoured by the friendly relationships between the Danish and the Russian courts. The chief was General Ignatieff and, in the last years before the War, Lieutenant-Colonel Assanowitsch. The latter was more successful than his predecessor, and often changed the scene of his activities to Stockholm. He was a clever scholar of the English secret service, for, just before the War, he, too, began to employ Germans as spies in the northern countries.

Abroad, the French I.S. was supported by the military and naval attachés and by the less con-

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spicuous consuls. Thus M. Robin, the French consul at Bremen, could co-operate with the naval attaché, Farramond, in Berlin. In 1910 George Fuchs was appointed French consul in Berlin in spite of the fact that in 1892 he was, as one of the most energetic of French agents, expelled from Alsace-Lorraine. Germany objected to the appointment, but was satisfied by Fuchs' being transferred to Nuremberg. There he was always suspected of espionage, and a search in his house on the outbreak of the War proved the suspicions to be correct. All the enemy consuls in Switzerland were employed on I.S. work. Consul Wickström, of Malmö, deserves special mention on account of his energy.

A Belgian secret service directed against Germany first appeared in 1912. It had all the appearance of being a young and inexperienced organisation, notwithstanding French support. Its aims did not go beyond the nearest frontier district, and its achievements were obviously trifling. It is more to be regarded as a sign of preparations for early war, and it is, therefore, of interest that Belgium was, before the outbreak of the struggle, ranged in the ranks of the Entente.

Inside this framework of organisation the different countries of the Entente I.S. had separate rôles. To Russia fell almost exclusively the task of military investigation in Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Balkans. France devoted her attentions to military and political I.S. work in Germany and Italy. England, released from military anxieties, restricted her activities to gathering information regarding naval warfare. She looked after politico-

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economic matters and prepared the political propaganda against Germany.

A remarkable feature of the military secret service of the Entente was its aggressive tendency. It was not satisfied with inquiry into the strength of the German army and navy and their power of attack. The English service investigated much more the possibilities of landings on the German and Danish coasts, and it was also active in Belgium and Holland. In 1910 and 1911 Lieutenants Brandon and Trench and Mr Stewart, a lawyer, were arrested. They had to spy out the Kiel creeks and the Kiel Canal. English intelligence officers, in company with French colleagues, thoroughly explored the Belgian and French frontier regions, and a branch intelligence bureau was set up at Spa.

The Russian secret service had acquired complete knowledge of Germany's eastern fortresses as well as of the whole rail and road network in Eastern Germany. In Austria and in the Balkans she had firmly established herself among the Slav nationalities, and in the northern countries and Switzerland her I.S. was interwoven with the English and French organisations.

The French service controlled Belgium, Luxembourg, and Switzerland. It interested itself in the whole German system of fortresses on the western frontier, in the Rhine bridges, and especially in the possibilities of crossing the Moselle between Diedenhofen and Trèves. In Holland carrier-pigeons were trained for use all along the Rhine to the Swiss frontier. At the bridges across that stream there were observers whose duty at the outbreak of war

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was to report to what extent the German troops were directed to the East and to the West. The conduct of a war on two fronts by Germany was the main point about many questionnaires for espionage agents. Along the line Hanover-Scheidenmühl-Thorn there was also a service of carrier-pigeons based on Holland, and on that line, too, observers had been placed to report the division of the German forces between the eastern and the western theatres of war.

Such things could be proved by the German I.S. from the material which came into its possession before the War in increasing volume by reason of the tremendous growth of hostile espionage. The first happenings in the War destroyed the enemy's plans of attack and nullified all the results of this espionage. One German victory after another carried the struggle in the West at the beginning into enemy country, and also in the East superior German leadership threw back the threatening masses of the Russian army. In enemy fortresses and capitals, in Brussels, Warsaw, Wilna and Bukarest, in the offices of French military authorities and special commissioners, reports and documents were found which described the organisation, the co-operation and the aims of the secret service of the enemies then openly fighting against Germany. The booty at the Battle of Tannenberg especially brought us a great volume of proof of the offensive character of Russia's preparations for war in the sphere of her intelligence service.

CHAPTER IV

THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR—III

The growth of spying in Germany before the War—A traitor in a fortress—A colonel's treason—The traffic in German secret documents—A military attaché cornered—What Russia and Germany spent on secret service—No German I.S. in England—The difficulties of espionage in France—The Dreyfus case—Official hostility in Germany towards secret service.

THE number of persons arrested on espionage charges in Germany and that of those found guilty by German civil courts increased very rapidly.

	Persons Arrested.	Persons Sentenced.
1907	3
1908 . .	66	9
1909 . .	47	6
1910 . .	103	10
1911 . .	119	14
1912 . .	221	21
1913 . .	346	21
1914 (half-year)	154	51
Total . .	1056	135

Of those sentenced, 107 were Germans (including 32 Alsatians and Lorrainers), 11 Russian, 5 French,

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4 English, 3 Austrian, 2 Dutch, 1 American, 1 Swiss, and 1 Luxemburger. The espionage was in 74 cases for France, in 35 for Russia, in 15 for England, in 1 case for Italy, in 1 for Belgium, and in 9 cases for several countries together.

These figures show a tremendous increase in spying up to the War. But it must be remembered in this connection that espionage is very cautiously performed, and the caution was increased as the German counter-measures became stricter. The cases which could be established, therefore, can only be reckoned as a very small fraction of the acts of espionage which really took place. In addition, the most serious cases of treason, in which members of the German fighting forces had rendered services to the enemy, were judged by military courts and are not included in the above statistics.

The details regarding the nationality of the spies and traitors show to what an alarming extent spying had been taken up by Germans and how the people of Alsace-Lorraine especially had helped French espionage. If only a few neutrals are included in the statistics, that is accounted for by the fact that they were most easily able to elude German observation.

France is at the top of the list with 74 cases. This high figure is particularly noteworthy, for the French I.S. was the cleverest, and yet we were able to demonstrate its activity by means of that high figure. Russia, with her very clumsily conducted service, did not reach the half of that number! In the case of big enterprises the whole skill of the French I.S. was applied. Here are a few cases in which Russo-French I.S. agents were unearthed and punished.

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In 1912, when the Russian I.S. was redoubling its efforts with regard to Germany's eastern fortresses, the bureau of the Chief Clerk of the Government (or district) of Thorn was removed to the headquarters of the Government so as to insure greater safety for the secret plans and documents. It did not take the Russian I.S. long to discover this. The Intelligence Department of the Governor-General of Warsaw, which was under the particularly energetic and successful General Staff major, Batjuschin, managed to win over this clerk to its service, though he was being specially guarded. He was given a photographic apparatus and was able to deliver to the Russians copies of everything to which he had access. Major Batjuschin was not afraid to go to Thorn to give his personal instructions, and to Breslau, where he also had a military clerk in his service. The Thorn traitor went on a journey to Warsaw and Paris, via Austria-Hungary and Switzerland, and this proved fatal to him. On the way back from Paris he was arrested in Germany and was condemned to fifteen years' hard labour. The Russian money found on him only made a comparatively small sum, but the pay he had received from the French was considerable.

Early in 1914 a letter, with the *poste restante* address of "Nicetas, Vienna," was returned to Berlin, as it had not been called for. It was opened and found to contain Russian money. From the contents it was obvious that this was intended for purposes of treason. The Austrian General Staff was informed, and it arranged for the particular post office in Vienna to be kept under observation.

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One evening a *poste restante* letter with the same address was called for by a man whose identity, owing to unfavourable circumstances, could not be established at once. He went off in a taxi-cab, and the watching detective could only note the number of the vehicle. He followed in another taxi-cab but could not overtake the first before its fare had disappeared. A pocket-knife, discovered in the first taxi-cab, was the only clue. It was found to belong to Colonel Redl, Chief of the General Staff of the Prague command. He committed suicide after he had confessed that he was guilty of treason on behalf of the Russian secret service. He was under instructions from the Russian military attaché in Berlin.¹

Almost at the same time letters reached the General Staff in Berlin from an unknown person in Geneva who sent parts of documents which, according to his statements, were transcripts of secret German military records sold to Russia and France. At first the whole thing was looked upon as a swindle. But subsequent letters proved that it really was a question of documents relating to German preparations for the outbreak of war. The writer refused all further information, and would not agree to come to Germany for the purpose of giving us information. The affair cast suspicions of treason on a considerable number of officials and on certain military circles. In the end the burden of proof accumulated against a high official who had once been in Königsberg and was at the time attached to the Posen garrison. He was the chief clerk, who, after performing his

¹ The full story of this case is told in Chapter XVII.—TRANS.

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military service, had risen to the official position of confidence which he then occupied. With him the clerk to a cavalry regiment was also suspected. In order to clear up the matter, the I.S. officer at Königsberg visited the unknown correspondent in Geneva and found that he was the former Russian Consular Secretary, von Eck. He was using a false name, but it so happened that the I.S. officer had once made his acquaintance. In his official position in the Russian consulate at Königsberg, von Eck had, from 1911 to 1913, persuaded Germans connected with the army to commit treason, and the two clerks mentioned were among his victims. He then went to Geneva and was endeavouring for the second time to turn his knowledge into money. The two clerks were condemned to the full penalty: fifteen years' hard labour. Only one of them had received large sums; the other had come practically empty-handed out of the affair, for, after a first accommodation from the Russian I.S., he had been made use of without payment. The tempter, von Eck, also met his fate. He was arrested in Bavaria during the War, having come over the frontier from the Tirol.

In April 1914 our I.S. in St Petersburg reported that the General Staff there was negotiating about the purchase of plans of fortresses in Eastern Germany. Inquiries were made, and from the results it was obvious that the act of treason had been committed by an official in Berlin. Within twenty-four hours it was established that the guilty person was a senior military clerk. He confessed that he had acted at the instigation of the Russian military attaché, Major von Basarow, and that, through him,

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he had had the plans sent to St Petersburg. The General Staff immediately reported the matter to the Foreign Office and insisted that the Russian military attaché should go at once. This demand aroused obvious displeasure in the Foreign Office, all the more so because Major von Basarow refused to make any statement regarding the matter, beyond saying that it was an insult to him and to his position to bring up against him the evidence of a sergeant-major. A second note to the Russian Embassy was necessary. It stated that the messenger who, on behalf of the Russian military attaché, had taken the plans to St Petersburg was already on his return journey. He was on a German ship which made no call on her voyage between St Petersburg and Stettin; she had no wireless installation on board; there was, therefore, no means of communicating with the messenger, and the German captain of the ship had already been made aware of the importance of his passenger. If Major von Basarow wished to await the return and arrest of the messenger, he would be permitted to do so. The Russian military attaché gave up his post that same day and left Berlin. He went the same way as his predecessor, Colonel von Michelsen, who had also taken part in a piece of treason. The sergeant whom Major von Basarow had led astray was also given the maximum penalty. His reward from the Russians was M.800.

The German General Staff, it is clear, was persuaded, by its fight against hostile espionage, that it was necessary to increase the funds at its disposal and to strengthen its I.S. organisation. It did not

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share the belief in peace which was held in political circles. The Army Estimates for 1912 were drawn up under the personal influence of Colonel Ludendorff, and they included a demand for an increase in the vote for the I.S. of the General Staff. The vote was increased from M.300,000 to M.450,000. The costs of both espionage and counter-espionage services were to be defrayed from that amount. Out of this small sum M.50,000 was saved in 1913 for use in the event of extraordinary political tension. The Entente made a secret of the amounts from State funds devoted to intelligence service. Only regarding Russian expenditure did particulars fall into our hands. In the year 1912 Russia spent about 13,000,000 roubles, and in the half-year before the War nearly 26,000,000 roubles.

Even if it were not proved that there was very little money at the disposal of the German I.S., it is clear from the general circumstances and on account of the advantage which our opponents had already obtained, that the German Secret Service was not in a position to grow to anything like the extent of that of the united Entente States. These States were, however, clever enough so to describe the situation through their propaganda on the outbreak of war that the German I.S. appeared to be greatly superior to theirs.

The fact is that when war came the German General Staff was only provided with a secret service against Russia and France. Time and means had not sufficed to extend this organisation to England. That was, indeed, to have been the next step in the organisation of our I.S., but that was hindered by

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the War. From this it is obvious that there was no talk even of a service to deal with America or the neutral States. As things were, it required the utmost concentration of our forces to carry on reliable work of investigation in France and Russia.

The methods which our I.S. was forced to adopt were quite different from those resorted to by the Entente States. Relying on but a few trustworthy persons, we did not succeed in overtaking the start which others had had. The German I.S. had to work with the utmost caution and to employ its weak forces in a systematic way only on very definite work. Free from subordinate and useless hangers-on, it did, perhaps, excel the secret services of all other General Staffs in the work of getting hold of essentials. The conditions of work in Russia have already been described. In France they were quite different. Superficial observations were possible without great difficulties in a country crossed by innumerable railways and having a lively international traffic. But espionage is mainly concerned with the discovery of real military secrets, and in France such secrets were completely safeguarded, and this was managed with less difficulty than in Russia. In the fortresses, in the bureaux and military works and among the troops, there was a completely effective surveillance. It was clear that state and people had long been aware of the importance attaching to military secrets, of the existence of espionage and of its dangerousness. The special police stationed throughout the whole country formed a compact organisation of skilled men who had been trained by the French General

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Staff, and who had also been given the benefit of the experiences which the French Government had had in intelligence work.

And yet it was possible even in France to carry on an intelligence service which yielded more than merely superficial observations. Not only in Paris but in other large cities a rising standard of living had an evil effect. French society suffered from the effects of being international, just as the French corps of officers did because it was not drawn from a single, united class. The individual regard for the Republic did not seem to be so strong as the loyalty of the Russian officers to their monarch. Women, too, often played a great rôle in France. In short, the conditions under which secret service work could be carried on in France may be described as "refined" when compared with those in Russia. Yet treason in France was not rare in times of peace.

The case which aroused the greatest sensation, on account of its political accompaniments, was the Dreyfus affair. It will not be out of place to recall this case, because it is characteristic of the rôle which espionage played in France and of the way it was exploited there for other than military purposes.

In September 1894 there came into the possession of the counter-espionage authorities in Paris a "bordereau," in which a traitor offered to provide certain military documents of an important and secret nature. The "bordereau" was intended for the German military attaché in Paris, Major von Schwartzkoppen, who, however, had not seen it. The manner in which the "bordereau" had come into the hands of the French was described in two

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different ways during the course of the subsequent investigations. On one occasion it was stated that the document was obtained *par la voie ordinaire*—"through the usual channels"—that is to say, from the waste-paper basket of the attaché. The charwoman was bribed to hand the contents of the basket regularly to a secret service agent. This explanation is false, because the attaché had never had the document in his hands. The second explanation is the correct one—that the document was purloined before the military attaché saw it. The French I.S. maintained a secret service agent, an Alsatian named Brucker, to "shadow" the attaché. Brucker sought, and found, something more than friendly relationships with Madame Bastian, the wife of the concierge of the attaché. The attaché and his correspondence were, therefore, very closely watched. Brucker, examining the correspondence one day, came across the "bordereau," and saw from its contents that he had secured a very valuable document. He took it to the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, and demanded an especially large reward for having made such an important discovery. Now that Brucker knew of the document, Henry could not make away with it, as he would gladly have done. He placed it before his superior officers, the deputy-chief and the chief of the General Staff, Generals Gonse and Boisdeffre. Experts decided from the contents of the "bordereau" that the writer of it must be an artilleryman, because he mentioned a new and secret recoil brake, and that he must also be a member of the General Staff. So the suspicion

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fell on Dreyfus, who was a Jew, and who was, moreover, extremely unpopular on the General Staff. The War Minister, Mercier, was informed, and he charged Major du Paty de Clam with the investigation. Specimens of Dreyfus's handwriting were obtained and compared with that of the "bordereau." The handwriting expert of the General Staff, Gobert, could not decide that the handwriting was that of Dreyfus, but, on the other hand, Bertillon, chief of the Paris detective service, strongly insisted that the "bordereau" and the specimens of Dreyfus's handwriting were identical. Dreyfus was, therefore, arrested about the middle of October. A search in his house brought nothing incriminating to light. No paper was found like that used for the "bordereau." This paper, particularly thin and light, could not be bought in any shop, and was used by only one officer as notepaper—Major Esterhazy, of the Intelligence Bureau—and no one knew this save Henry, who kept silent about it. Whether the "bordereau" was written for the purpose of provocation or as a serious offer was a matter which was not cleared up.

Further military investigations led to no definite result, and the War Minister thought of dropping the whole proceedings. But at the end of October 1894 Henry caused the *Libre Parole* to move in the matter, and a Press campaign began which forced Mercier to make a court case out of the military investigations. The main proceedings took place at the end of December behind closed doors. The chief of the Intelligence Bureau, Henry, made his statement in the absence of the accused and the

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defending counsel so that they did not know what the charge was which was brought against the prisoner. Dreyfus was condemned to life-long banishment, to imprisonment on Devil's Island, and to degradation. The degradation ceremony took place on 5th January 1895 in full publicity and with all the usual French theatrical show.

On 1st July 1895 Picquart became chief of the Intelligence Bureau. Into his hands fell the "Petit Bleu"—an express letter—to the German military attaché. He compared the handwriting with that of the "bordereau" and with specimens of Esterhazy's. He was astounded. Henry fought the suspicions which were gaining ground. In Basel he had a conference with an emissary of the German General Staff who had sought the meeting in order to declare that Dreyfus was innocent. The German representative gave such definite particulars regarding the guilty person that the French would have been able, without further trouble, to see that Esterhazy was the culprit, had not Henry cut the German representative short whenever he wanted to refer to the real criminal.

In order to emphasise the guilt of Dreyfus, Henry caused to be forged a document which became known as the "faux Panizzardi." Panizzardi was the Italian military attaché in Paris. From a number of old letters of his a document was put together and in it Dreyfus was precisely described. This forgery was used against Picquart, who had to suffer for his suspicions against Esterhazy. He was sent from the General Staff to the command of a battalion in Tunis after he had completed lengthy journeys

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on the frontier and in the south. Before he went to Africa he got into touch with the advocate, M. Leblois, and put him in possession of all the facts lest something should happen in Tunis.

M. Leblois, together with Senator Scheurer-Kestner and M. Mathieu Dreyfus, brother of the condemned man, now took up the matter. M. Mathieu Dreyfus publicly accused Esterhazy of being the culprit. In November 1897 legal proceedings were begun against Esterhazy, but in January 1898 he was acquitted, the president of the court stating that the Dreyfus case was finally disposed of, and it had merely been a case of deciding whether Esterhazy was a traitor or not.

Then came Zola's *J'accuse*. It led to a court case against him. In the letter only one sentence was used as the basis of the charge: that Esterhazy had been acquitted on orders. Henry was a witness; Zola was condemned.

The consequent sensation caused the War Minister to order an examination of all the documents to be made by Major Cuignet. Major Cuignet definitely established that the "faux Panizzardi" was a forgery. This was not particularly difficult, because the documents from which the alleged proof was composed were written on different sorts of paper—which should not have escaped notice before if investigation had been serious. On 30th August 1898, Henry appeared before the War Minister, M. Cavagnac, and on the following day committed suicide. Esterhazy fled to England.

A revision of the case followed, first in the *Chambre Criminelle*, and then, as that failed, in the *Chambres*

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Réunies. The result was that Dreyfus was brought back to France. In August and September 1899 the court at Rennes had the case before it. There the opponents of Dreyfus brought up a "bordereau annoté de Guillaume"—a document with marginal notes by the German Emperor. It was a forgery, of course, but it led to Dreyfus being found guilty again.

It was the War Minister, M. André, who brought about an appeal in the case which in January 1906, eleven years after the condemnation, led to acquittal. Dreyfus was decorated and made a major. He retired of his own free will from the army, but served again during the World War.

The German I.S. at home had to take pains to see that the necessary interests of the General Staff were protected as against the political factors, and the same state of affairs prevailed abroad. The more our knowledge of hostile espionage demonstrated systematic, definite work with war in view, the clearer it became that the ring of foes would, in the case of war, shut Germany off from the rest of the world as by an iron curtain. The German Empire did not have a central Intelligence Bureau; the General Staff, therefore, had to set about things in its own way. The frequent political crises gave me a reason for many journeys into neutral countries after 1912, in order, with the support of the foreign representative of Germany, to establish connections whereby the General Staff would be furnished with reliable foreign news in the event of war. The reception I experienced from our representatives abroad was, from a social point of view, unexception-

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able. But the serious purpose of my visit seemed to disturb them. So the General Staff was left with practically no support. While the secret services of England, France, and Russia, all round Germany, were vigorously supported and helped by all official authorities, the German I.S. was left to find its own advisers abroad. Even that task was represented to me by our official representatives as a hopeless one, and I was persuaded against it so as not to bring Germans abroad into trouble, for the General Staff could not expect Germans abroad to risk their business interests. Without official help, of course, the General Staff could not set up abroad an I.S. resting on German support. During the War our people in foreign countries belied, to some extent, the lack of trust shown in them by our representatives abroad; but their efforts to help the hard-pressed Fatherland and its military leaders were worthless, because they were without guidance and for that reason were fatal to many.

The Entente I.S. threatened Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy equally. The common danger led to joint defence. Between the Austrian and the German General Staffs there had been since 1910 a limited exchange of news regarding Russia. It was not till 1914 that there was any I.S. agreement between the German and Italian services regarding France. In May of that year I went to Rome on the invitation of the Italian General Staff for the purpose of a consultation. The reception given me showed that the Italian General Staff was imbued with honest friendship. Especially was this so in the case of General Pollio, Chief of the General Staff, and his

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departmental chiefs. The relations between the Austrian and the Italian General Staffs, on the contrary, were strained and constantly endangered by the I.S. which each maintained against the other. It was, therefore, impossible to say that the centralisation of the intelligence services of the Triple Alliance could be compared with that of the Entente.

The continuous political crises of pre-war times were a good school for the young German military secret service. The distribution of the armies of Russia and France, their armament, training, and equipment, the extension of their fortress systems, of their strategical railways, and of their networks of roads, as well as the probable direction of the march of both armies—all these things were known to the German General Staff on the outbreak of war.

Because the activity of the General Staff regarding the intelligence service could develop independently, success was possible in spite of all hindrances and restrictions. But in the matter of counter-espionage things were different. A sharpening of the espionage laws and the use of specially trained police in anti-espionage work was only brought about by the warnings and demands of the General Staff and the Admiralty over a long period. Politics worked only for peace, and therefore forgot to prepare for war. The conduct of war and everything connected with it were regarded as purely military concerns, while the political personages watched anxiously lest the high military authorities should concern themselves with politics. The trial of spies and traitors had always taken place behind closed doors, but later representatives of the General Staff, the Prussian

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War Ministry, and the Admiralty took part in the proceedings as experts. Thus these "unpolitical" authorities gained a direct insight into the war preparations of neighbouring States. The Reichstag, however, looked on these warnings with deep distrust. It set itself against any influencing of the police by the military authorities in the fear that that might serve political purposes. Germany had an Imperial Army, an Imperial Navy. Espionage cases were taken before the Imperial Courts. But Germany had not a political police. The Federal States controlled the police, and they were not inclined to give up anything in this connection. The frontiers of five great, federal police districts cut through Germany. Under such conditions, the German police could busy itself with certain individual espionage cases, but a largely conceived organisation, such as our opponents had, was quite impossible. Before the War, therefore, Germany owed the exposure of espionage less to her good counter-organisation than to the profusion of spying.

CHAPTER V

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

“Kiel week”—The crime of Serajewo—In Berlin before the War: the Kaiser and General von Moltke—The Kaiserin’s “I told you so!”—His Majesty as spy-decoy—Absence of German propaganda—Secret service under difficulties—Extraordinary muddle in Press control—Germany’s weak spot—Spy fever interferes with mobilisation—The host of would-be spies.

AT the end of June 1914 I was at “Kiel Week.” People of all countries had come together for friendly competition, and the presence of an English squadron lent more than usual importance to the sporting events promoted by the German Emperor. The Kaiser’s cruise in northern waters, arranged for this year also, was to follow. On the afternoon of Sunday, 24th June, I came back to Kiel from a motor-boat trip through the Kiel Canal. The picture of Kiel Bay, which had a few hours before been bright, stirring, festive, had undergone a remarkable change. On the German warships flags were flying at half-mast. On shore I got the news of the murder of the Austrian heir to the throne and his consort, who had fallen victims to the bullet of a Serbian student in Serajewo that morning. The Kaiser, who was taking part in the day’s racing on board the *Meteor* in the outer bay, received the news

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from the Chief of the Marine Cabinet. He came alongside the Imperial boat and flung the message aboard. The Kaiser immediately dropped out of the race and went back on board the *Hohenzollern*. All festivities and engagements were cancelled. That evening deep silence brooded over the bay. Black were the outlines of the English warships, which early next morning slipped their moorings and steamed off. Light streamed only from the portholes of the Hamburg-America steamer where the Kaiser's guests were staying. Under the shadow of the murder of the Archduke, "Kiel Week" had come to an untimely end.

The Kaiser went back to Berlin. He intended to take part in the funeral ceremonies at Vienna before going on his northern cruise. But the Austrian Government informed him that they could not fully guarantee his personal safety. The view of the Allied Government concerning the extent of the plot, the report that the tracks of the murderers led to official Serbian circles, and the opinion of Austrian diplomacy regarding the steps to be taken, showed how serious the situation had become. In these circumstances the Kaiser made up his mind to put off his northern cruise altogether. But von Bethmann, the Chancellor, pointed out to him that this would add to the political tension. So, against the Kaiser's will, the arrangements made for the trip held good. On 6th July the *Hohenzollern*, escorted by the cruiser *Rostock* and the despatch-boat *Sleipner*, left for Norwegian waters. The political barometer in Berlin was set at "Peace."

For many years the General Staff had been accus-

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tomed to political crises. True, the present one was particularly serious, owing to various circumstances. That in the murdered Archduke a thoroughly dependable friend of Germany had passed away was not the general belief. But stubbornly the opinion held its ground that with him there had been removed a strongly marked and firm-willed personality such as would be needed when the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph, which was to be expected within measurable distance of time, should gravely disturb the complicated national life of allied Austria-Hungary. The next heir, the Archduke Karl, was young and inexperienced. In addition, reports were to hand from Russia concerning movements of troops from Siberia to Russia in Europe, and trial mobilisations to enhance the readiness of the Russian army for war. These reports were, for the time being, difficult to confirm, and were denied by the Russian Government. But, nevertheless, for the General Staff the order issued by our Government held good, that all further excitement of the public mind was to be avoided.

None of the summer fixtures was changed. Preparations for the Imperial manœuvres in the Rhineland between the VII and VIII Army Corps were completed. Furlough on the General Staff was allotted; and Major-General von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, kept to the July date of the cure prescribed for him at Karlsbad. The opinion prevailed, in such a state of affairs, that this political crisis too, like those before it, would pass over without an appeal to arms. No intensification of I.S. work against Russia was thought necessary

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yet ; and my leave from the beginning of July to the middle of August was not cancelled.

I spent it with my family in the Harz Mountains. I was, of course, kept *au courant* with the official view of the situation. This was much calmer than the Press opinions, though both the military I.S. and the consulates reported war preparations from Russia. Up to 24th July the advices sent to me expressed the view that there was no reason for my cutting short my leave. Only on 25th July was I recalled to Berlin to take part in a conference with General von Moltke, who had come back from Karlsbad. But even then it was still intended that I should go back to my family next day. I went to Berlin with the merest necessities. The conference with the Chief of the General Staff was confined to a critique of the available news, which was not yet looked on as uncommonly serious. But to me, in my position, it was, however, serious enough to cause me to stay on in Berlin and give effect to the order that the intensified I.S., intended for times in which war was imminent, should be put into effect simultaneously against Russia and France.

In the next few days reports from Russia piled up and showed the rapid progress of Russian mobilisation. Nevertheless, I left my wife and children in the Harz till 31st July, because I was witness both to the will and the efforts of General von Moltke, the Imperial Chancellor, and the Kaiser, to keep peace. Only when on the morning of 31st July an intelligence officer from the Russian frontier reported that Russia was fully mobilised, and against Germany, too, did war seem inevitable. But even then I still found

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that General von Moltke harboured doubts born of his feelings of responsibility. The positive assurance of this intelligence officer that he would be personally responsible for the truth of his report, was necessary before his information was finally credited. General von Moltke then telephoned it to the Kaiser at Potsdam.

The Kaiser had been on board the *Hohenzollern*, which, since 11th July, had been at anchor in Sonjefjord, near Balholm. Coming back from a walk on shore, he learnt from a Norwegian paper of the war preparations in Serbia and the removal of the Serbian Government to Nisch. Without waiting for any reports from the Foreign Office, he gave orders to weigh anchor; and on 27th July he was back in the New Palace in Potsdam. On receipt of the above-mentioned report that the full Russian mobilisation against Germany was now complete, he set out for the Imperial Chancellor's in Berlin. General von Moltke took a motor-car, meaning to go to the Chancellor's and await him there. But on the road the General was overtaken at full speed by the Imperial suite of cars, in the first of which sat the Imperial couple. They went, not to the Chancellor's, but to the Royal Palace.

The conference, which dealt particularly with the military position, took place in the Marble Room. The advance of the Russian forces, already beginning, conjured up extreme danger for Germany. The advantage which the German army had over the Russian, in that the Russian was widely scattered and dependent on a few railway lines in its advance, dwindled daily, hourly. In the case of Germany's

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having to wage war on several fronts the military danger would be enormously increased. News from France reported only military measures such as Germany also had already been forced to carry out ; recall of men on furlough, massing of troops at their depots, and the like. But the political news from France left no doubt that our General Staff had to reckon with a war on two fronts.

The reports being hourly received kept me in constant personal touch with the Chief of the General Staff. I witnessed the struggle which the love of peace and the sense of responsibility waged within him. Only with the help of unusual strength of will did General von Moltke order that on 31st July at midday the state of "imminent danger of war" (*drohende Kriegsgefahr*) was to be decreed. This implied the opening of a twenty-four hour period of preparation for the eventuality of mobilising. He called the officers of the Imperial General Staff together in the Library Hall of the General Staff Headquarters, informed them of the threatened danger of war, and added : " This means, if the feeble hope of maintaining peace is not fulfilled, mobilisation to-morrow and war thereafter. Now go each of you to his post. The Fatherland knows that it can rely on the General Staff." His emotion made these last words almost inaudible. In solemn earnestness the officers left the Library Hall.

It was the last time that he had the officers of the Imperial General Staff together—officers who had learnt from him so often the lessons of Count Schlieffen and von Moltke; the great Field-Marshal. After the War the General Staff did not go back

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to this building, which became the Home Office. A meaning symbolical of the course of the War and the future is to be found in this fact.

The General Staff set to work to put the finishing touches to the arrangements already made for mobilisation. From politics it stood apart. It had certainly followed the political happenings abroad, but not by it was the foreign policy of Germany fashioned. It had an influence on foreign policy only in as far as the Chief of the General Staff stood in close touch with authoritative persons at the Foreign Office and was heard, at critical moments, on the military situation, together with the Minister for War. Side by side with the War Ministry, it was responsible for seeing that Germany's military preparations were in accord with her political position. Its own view was that the economic and political competition of the nations would force a decision by war within measurable time. But its last military proposals of 1912 had only been agreed to in part by the Reichstag. Thus it had lost the chief of the operations section, Colonel Ludendorff. He obtained a regimental command at the front. The most important post in the event of war was no longer held by the best man on the General Staff.

Yearly in the spring the mobilisation plans for the year before were burnt, in order to make room for next year's plans, which had to harmonise with the progressive military and political developments. Thus every year by unobtrusive, loyal work the General Staff made ready for the hour when the military leadership of the German people should devolve upon it. But never did it actually aim at

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war, least of all under General von Moltke, its last pre-war chief, who was the honoured model of all the General Staff officers in his devotion to duty. And thus it was even in the last twenty-four hours of peace.

On the afternoon of 1st August the time-limit expired in which it had to be decided whether the Russian mobilisation should continue to be watched or whether the German army, too, should be put on a war footing. The I.S. reports from Russia, growing more and more numerous, showed the progress of the Russian advance, and already reported the beginning of hostilities on the Prussian frontier. In the gateway of the Royal Palace General von Moltke met the Kaiser and gave him the news that the military situation made postponement of the mobilisation order no longer possible. The Kaiser was faced with the final decision. After a short inward struggle he drew himself up, and, with an energetic and characteristic gesture of his right hand, he gave the general his consent, saying shortly, "Very well, then." (*Na gut denn*). In the adjutant's room at five o'clock in the afternoon he signed the mobilisation order. His chief advisers stayed with him till eight at night. One of them gave me the following description: "The Kaiser directed everything himself, confronting with incomparable tact, keen understanding, great calm, and proud determination the often contradictory views of his chief advisers. These days have thrust his absolutely surprising characteristics forward into the limelight. Among us, his entourage, he has roused unanimous admiration."

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The hastily summoned Reichstag held its first war session on 4th August. At its opening in the White Hall of the Royal Palace the Kaiser, impressed by the national unanimity, uttered these words : " No longer do I recognise parties. I only know Germans." The party-leaders (including those of the Social Democrats) and the Reichstag Presidency, Kaempff, Paasche, and Dove, solemnly promised him a united front. In the evening the British Ambassador asked for his passports. At the same time there came from von Kleist, the Kaiser's aide-de-camp, who had been dispatched to the Italian Court, a message to the effect that the King personally was heart and soul with Germany, but to join in with Austria would let loose a storm of anger in Italy ; his Government dared not risk civil commotion. It had become clear that with Austria alone Germany must enter the fight against much stronger forces. To all outward appearances the Kaiser remained calm and firm, even when next day in the Hall of Stars at the Royal Palace he received the news of the British declaration of war. On the other hand, the Kaiserin, who in these days never left the Kaiser's side, took this declaration in passionate excitement. From the words she spoke to the Kaiser—" I always told you so !"—it could be gathered that the Imperial couple had, up to then, differed in opinion on England's rôle.

A peculiarly naïve view held by the Russian authorities was reported by the German military representatives accredited to the Russian Court, who came home by the difficult route *via* Stockholm. They reported that Germany's mobilisation and

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declaration of war had taken St Petersburg by surprise. Germany ought to have seen that more time was needed for the Russian mobilisation than for the German. So Germany ought to have waited before declaring war ! In general, the news pointed to very little enthusiasm in Russia for war with Germany.

Early on 16th August the Kaiser started on his journey to the army in the field. His cars could hardly get along the road to the Anhalt station through the crowds of people, who hailed him enthusiastically. After a grave parting with the Kaiserin, he travelled by way of Würzburg and Mayence to Coblenz. This roundabout route was chosen in order to hide from the numerous enemy spies that the High Command was behind the right wing of the army, which would form the central point of the first operations. However, the passing of the Imperial train became known to the people ; and at many places they swarmed on to the line to pay their homage. Their dignified, grave bearing—in harmony with that of the Kaiser and the High Command—formed a contrast to the extravagant enthusiasm which had surged round him and the General Staff in the Berlin streets during the previous few days. In Coblenz the temperament of the Rhinelanders broke out into passionate enthusiasm.

I have lingered somewhat longer on these memories because they show how very successful the enemy secret service was. In the propaganda against the Kaiser soon to be broadcasted under English auspices it was stated that Germany would secure an acceptable peace if she would hand over the Kaiser ; and this statement was believed. The belief wormed

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its way through to the highest quarters and led finally to the Kaiser's withdrawal to Dutch territory. But how this development affected disinterested foreigners a highly placed neutral told me: "We have admired the German people in their struggle to defend themselves. That they should sacrifice their Kaiser in order to secure a better peace seems to us contemptible." What a French newspaper wrote on 2nd April 1917 was fulfilled: "The Allies would achieve a master-stroke if they impressed on the simple-minded German masses that they could hope for mercy if they would sacrifice a family which, undoubtedly, is generally disliked and only rules by terror."

I shall only glance at propaganda in my statement, although it formed a substantial part of what we must understand by the enemy intelligence service. But it did not belong to my sphere of work. Propaganda and a service of political news were lacking in Germany, and there was not a strong Government, a Government determined to fight and win, to set them up at the outbreak of war. It was an irretrievable blunder that, when war came, when there could be no more doubts and events had to take their course, this neglect was not made good and the whole news service of the country taken charge of by the Government. The War was looked upon as wholly a military affair, and therefore remained in the Military Intelligence Department. But it only dawned gradually on the General Staff how defective the Intelligence Service of the Government actually was. In Charleville one morning I had to deliver a message from General von Falkenhayn,

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then Chief of the General Staff, to von Bethmann, the Imperial Chancellor. He asked me to sit down for a minute: "Do tell me how things are with the enemy. I hear nothing at all about that." A different picture from that which, I believe, was presented by the Intelligence Service under Bismarck!

The tasks set to the military I.S. in peace had been completed on the outbreak of war. In peace this service had been the sole means of getting information about the military position of the enemy states. Now the hostile armies were facing the German on the field of battle. The army's means of reconnoitring seemed well designed for obtaining the information necessary for the actual operations. What went on behind the battling lines seemed to be more matters of political and economic concern.

The vastness of the military operations, not approached in any other war, shifted the centre of the leadership very largely to the front and put it in the hands of those eminent commanders whom the General Staff in Germany had trained in the responsibility of ready initiative. From time immemorial Staff-Corps officers had preferred practical service on regimental staffs to life in Berlin and the more theoretical work there. So when war broke out, the best of them were found filling General Staff posts at the front.

A centre of gravity, so necessary in these particular circumstances, was lacking. Recognising the importance of defensive forces, the Kaiser had energetically furthered the development of the German army, but, though the historic picture of his Majesty represents him as having a marked military

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appearance, he was not, by disposition or training, a soldier. His early accession to the throne had interrupted his army education. In youth he had taken his place at the head of the army ; the General Staff enjoyed his complete confidence and received many marks of it, but the interests of the young Kaiser lay in other directions than in quiet, unexciting staff work. Only a few General Staff officers were to be found in his pre-war entourage, and these were there because they had other than military talents. In the manœuvres and strategic war-games of the General Staff a rôle was assigned to the monarch which was not well designed to give him any thorough knowledge of the art of war. On the contrary, it caused him rather to underrate generalship. It was all the more praiseworthy, therefore, that the Kaiser, from the first hour of the War, subordinated himself to responsible military commanders and adjusted himself to war conditions. By his side at General Headquarters there stood, almost alone, General von Moltke, a personal friend and, since 1906, Chief of the General Staff. Energy was, in itself, not the strong point of the general's personality which was so highly appreciated by the General Staff in peace and also on the outbreak of war, and his store of energy was, at the very beginning of the struggle, still further reduced by an insidious disease.

These circumstances reacted on the secret service. Its central organisation, too, was transferred to the front. Of the few officers trained in this service the best were rewarded by being released for work on the regimental staffs, and the remainder were shared among the army commands as I.S. officers.

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There was a general idea that secret service, espionage, would find its field of action primarily in the theatres of war. But on account of the rapid progress of the early happenings in the West, where a military decision was first sought, strong scepticism prevailed in the army commands regarding the possibility and the usefulness of espionage. This went so far that one army command, on the advance through Belgium, left the intelligence officer behind in Liège as needless ballast. Nowhere did these officers find any special employment or support. It was also not without significance in an army in which the feeling of subordination was very strongly developed that the chief of the I.S. was, in years of service, by far the youngest departmental chief of the High Command and considerably younger than the chiefs of the General Staff at the front and the departmental heads at the War Office. The civil authorities, too, were accustomed to a more powerful representative on the General Staff than a major. I must emphasise these personal considerations because they help to make credible the difficulties which our I.S. met with in its work, and why it remained such a long way behind what the enemy had achieved by long pre-war training and by being supported by statesmen determined to fight and win. Conscious of the lack of preparedness in the secret service, the authorities had, before the War, certainly tried to find out, by means of great strategical war-games, what demands would be made on this service if war occurred. But these theoretical studies were kept within tactical and strategical, or at least within military, bounds. They were concerned neither with

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the investigation of economic and political conditions in enemy States nor with propaganda there. A world-wide intelligence service had never been the subject even of theoretical consideration. Reality, therefore, put every past conception in the shade.

The General Staff was justified in supposing that only the military conduct of the War would fall to it. With home politics especially it had in peace-time no sort of connections. But on the opening of hostilities it noticed that political war-leadership was bad and did not develop along with the military. On 2nd August 1914, Major General von Moltke gave orders for ascertaining what preparations had been made for instructing public opinion at home, especially through the Press. I had to report to him that our preparations were limited to a sheet of notes, stating only what must not be said in war-time, but for the actual instruction of public opinion nothing had been arranged.

General von Moltke ordered me at least to make it certain that the High Command should remain in close touch with public opinion on military events. This new task was but loosely connected with my other duties. As seen at first, its scope was limited ; and it was not anticipated that the German War Press service would directly develop from it. Weightier than the burden of this new duty was the advantage that at least to some extent a connection would be set up between the military and political authorities. It was such a connection that particularly distinguished the concerted espionage activities of the enemy. The difference lay in this only : among the enemy the common leadership was

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vested in the Government, with us in the High Command. Necessity involved General von Moltke in this error ; General Falkenhayn put up with its compulsory development only against his will ; Hindenburg and Ludendorff protested with great energy against it.

When they demanded that the Government should undertake to instruct public opinion, the representative of the Imperial Chancellor refused, saying that von Bethmann, the Chancellor, wanted nothing to do with the Press. And when, in 1918, their demands were solidly focussed on the one point that a German Minister of Propaganda must be set up to combat enemy propaganda, they received, in June 1918, this answer from Count Hertling, the Imperial Chancellor. Count Hertling designated the reasoned request of the High Command as a valuable contribution to the preliminary task, on which work had been going on for some time, of getting into working order the unification of all the official organisations intended for the instruction of public opinion at home and abroad. Count Hertling wrote : “ I have put the work of preparation into the hands of my Press chief. He will make use of fourteen days’ leave which he thinks of taking on 23rd August to complete his scheme for setting up the new organisation. His scheme will then, after it has been passed by me, be submitted to the High Command and to the Government departments for examination and for the purpose of suggesting any changes or extensions. In addition to this, I mean to further the final establishment of the completed plan—in case of emergency by the help of provisional conferences—

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to such an extent that it will be finished at very short notice and the practical execution of it be carried into effect without delay." The High Command did not share the optimism of the last sentence. Before the governmental scheme came into existence, the military leaders were obliged to give up the hope of forcing the enemy to declare his readiness for peace. The illusion, fostered by the enemy, of an acceptable peace without the decision of arms, had triumphed.

I must mention these details, and mention them at this point, because they make intelligible the description of the German Intelligence Service which follows, and guard against the suspicion of my exaggerating on the one side and, on the other, being silent about many of Germany's actions, in order to exonerate her and discredit the enemy. This would be a false hypothesis, inasmuch as I am of the opinion that the reproach of neglect against Germany is much heavier than the reproach that the enemy governments worked towards victory with all available means, if this, indeed, can be a reproach.

It was obvious that the weak spot in Germany's conduct of the War did not remain hidden from the enemy. With ever-increasing force the pressure of their propaganda was directed against this point. It came as a godsend to them that Germany declared war on Russia, and, therefore, issued the first declaration of war, and that Germany first invaded Belgium and herself admitted that to be an injustice. While their secret service let loose throughout the world all the prepared propaganda against Germany lying defenceless behind far-stretching land frontiers, the enemy states were at the same time hermetically

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sealed against her. The iron ring round the Central Powers, which began to be formed by the consolidation of the front, was closed in the north by the English-ruled ocean. Only on the Franco-Swiss frontier was there left one small sally-port for German espionage.

In Germany, on the outbreak of war, the executive power at home devolved on the military commands, the acting district commands, and the governors-general of fortresses. Among their duties was the prevention of enemy espionage. The measures they adopted to this end should have had, in order to be effective and actually to block the path of the enemy, a centralised control. But this was wanting. The General Staff, which had guided and influenced the activity of the counter-espionage police in peacetime, found its sphere of work away from home in the theatres of war. There, too, the few police officials trained in counter-espionage were employed as military police with the armies. The homeland was wholly deprived of all expert protection against espionage. The gap was filled by measures well-intentioned, perhaps, but drawn up by wholly ignorant local authorities. These measures consisted mainly of public warnings. The public first heard of these things, therefore, from official sources. The result was a wild spy-fever throughout Germany, which led to laughable, but also to very serious, spectacles. The insanest rumours spread like wild-fire in those days of tense national excitement. The story that motor-cars were crossing Germany with gold for the purposes of the enemy secret service did particular damage. Every automobile was held up

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and the occupants fired on. High officials on duty lost their lives in this way. Within a few days there arose a situation which threatened to interfere with the carrying-out of mobilisation. The General Staff had to act promptly to put an end to this anti-espionage campaign, which had degenerated into public disorders. Then numerous blunders took place and had to be rectified. Many distinguished personages, for some reason or other, fell under suspicion and complained about the injustice done them. A general reaction was the result. The authorities, in as far as they had up to then stimulated the agitation, completely stopped their activity and stood helpless. Very soon the military and civil authorities at home turned for advice to the General Staff as to the one expert quarter. The result was a new and heavy burden for the High Command. In addition to this work and that connected with the budding Press service, the chief of the German I.S. received, as his third great task, that of the control of the counter-espionage in war-time. As a certain advantage lay in a connection between espionage and the Press service, so, too, a close unity between our espionage and counter-espionage work was right in itself from the standpoint of organisation. But here again it must be set down as a fault that the control was vested in the High Command, especially as this had its headquarters outside the homeland.

Conditions in this matter were otherwise in enemy countries. There the police were not only used against the German espionage but took part in espionage work for their own country and materially helped it. Among police officials of all grades there

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was a far-reaching acquaintance with the nature of secret service. The first measures for the protection of State secrets, therefore, took their course there more calmly and more successfully than was the case in Germany. This was so in spite of the fact that there, too, popular feeling cried out against the German secret service; but right from the beginning of the War it was led along the proper lines. The appeal to popular feeling was made less to the fear of danger than with the object of national propaganda which threw the blame for the War on Germany. This war-policy was, from the first day of the struggle, carried on with remarkable energy in Belgium also, as was shown not only in the participation of the people in the fighting, but also in their proceedings against the German intelligence service. For instance, a Hamburg merchant named Ehrhardt, who had been sent to Antwerp before the outbreak of war with instructions to get news there about England's attitude, was arrested before Belgium's entry into the War, and—although he had undertaken nothing hostile to Belgium or to any power already allied with her—he was condemned to death and shot. He died like a hero, and was one of the first of Germany's war victims.

As a matter of fact, counter-espionage measures were necessary neither in France nor Russia, for strong popular feeling there caused all relationships which the German secret service had formed among the subjects of these States to be broken off. No Russian, and no Frenchman either, showed himself capable of betraying his people to the enemy, now that battle had been joined. When the German

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troops were encamped before a certain fortified town, with the commander of which we had had pre-war dealings, it was thought that he might surrender the place if called upon to do so. A German intelligence officer known to him was sent with the demand. The commander refused. When, very much later on, the place was taken by assault, an army order was found commending and promoting this very commander for his brave defence.

However, new ties were successfully formed at last in the enemy's camp, for the length of the War weakened the spirit of resistance among the other peoples also. But when in the first instance, and then in France, we were successful in this matter, the number of Germans condemned by the courts in Germany for betrayal of their country had risen to more than thirty.

On the other hand, the General Staff experienced at the outbreak of war a rush of all sorts and conditions of people who wanted to serve as spies. Urged on to some extent by quite fantastic ideas, the majority was wholly useless. The tough peace-training of the German secret service made it easy to sift the wheat from the chaff. In addition to obvious imposters and fashionably dressed swindlers of the international type, there were Germans of both sexes who, like the fighting forces in their courage and devotion to the Fatherland, placed their lives at the service of the I.S. There flourished, too, like the spy-fever, an espionage on private responsibility in which, on account of the lack of proper organisations, much national willingness was uselessly spent. Information about the enemy was not lacking

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in Germany on the outbreak of war ; but this news was almost without exception difficult to estimate, and offered to the prompt propaganda organisation of the enemy, with its bluff news, a possibility of reaching its goal, as it could find a free way to the broad masses of the people.

Impressions confirmed the fact that the enemy governments had long beforehand considered the circumstances of the outbreak of war. It was also confirmed that the Siberian army corps had already been moved to European Russia before the general Russian mobilisation. In the normal course of mobilisation they could only have reached the front in the middle of September, whereas they were actually in position there on 20th August. In the west German battle areas Russian spies, mostly Dutch Jews, were arrested who brought information from Holland in a pre-arranged cypher. Their great number and their methods of work showed that here was no improvisation but systematic work, and that war against Germany on two fronts had been the foundation of the enemy plans.

CHAPTER VI

SECRET SERVICE IN THE NEUTRAL LANDS

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The secret services come into their own—Work in Switzerland—A clock factory as I.S. headquarters—How seventy-eight messages were got out of Germany—Holland as a secret-service centre—Rendezvous for German deserters—The I.S. in Scandinavian countries—The secret service of the German General Staff abroad—The failure of the Germans in neutral countries—Impossibility of espionage in the United States.

THE advance of the various armies and the first operations in the World War were carried out on the lines of peace-time plans. The German mobilisation and the forward movement of the German forces were carried out so completely according to arrangements that the Prussian War Minister, General von Falkenhayn, once declared that he could quite well go on leave. The intelligence service was at first of comparatively little account to any of the belligerents, for the advance of modern armies cannot be made dependent on information that comes in at the last moment. Only when the trench warfare began, and it was seen that the World War would last for years, did the secret service come to its own again.

In the theatres of war there arose a spy system which, on account of its distinctive features, must be dealt with in a separate chapter. But the great international secret service worked on other prin-

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ciples. As its path across the extensive battle-fronts was blocked, it had to press in over the neutral countries lying between the belligerents. At first there was still, in the ring round Germany and Austria-Hungary, a broad gap in the south. But it, too, was closed when Roumania, Bulgaria, and Italy came into the War, and there towered up, not only from the Channel to the Alps, not only from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but also from Salonika in the south across the Tyrol right to the Swiss frontier, an unbroken, unbreakable wall. Within this wall lay the Central Powers, ringed in by the enemy league, whose spy service worked concentrically towards the centre of the circle. The German General Staff had a secret service against Russia and France, the Austrian against Russia and Italy, the Bulgarian against Turkey and the neighbouring Balkan States. Consequently the intelligence work against the most powerful of the enemies, France, England, and, later, America, fell to Germany's share. And she had to do the bulk of the work against Russia, too, because only the northern path over Sweden and Finland was left open; to the south the way was all but entirely barred.

It is obvious that the secret service of the three great military powers, France, England, and Russia, had the advantage when it was a question of capturing the neutral thoroughfares, and all the more so because their services were in full working order at the outbreak of war. In accordance with the rôles cast before the War and in the first stage of the struggle, France and Russia were responsible in chief for the military intelligence about Germany. England

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looked after the German coast and the German navy. This division of labour in the joint conduct of the War removed the last barriers to united general staff-work, and meant a concentration of individual effort and, therefore, an increased power of execution. The system was based on geographical position : France worked in Switzerland, England in the Netherlands, Norway and Denmark, Russia in Sweden. Investigations which the occupation of Roumania made possible established the fact that in that country, too, even while it was still neutral and at peace, a secret service against the Central Powers had been at work to an extent which it was not possible to ascertain earlier. As the War went on, the connections of the Entente in the neutral countries grew wider and wider. It is difficult to describe with any clearness the enormously involved system of Entente espionage at work among the neutrals. Description must be attempted country by country. And out of the abundance of the evidence only the salient facts can be quoted.

Immediately after the outbreak of war the Swiss Government, warned by their experiences in peacetime and rightly appraising the importance of their country to the belligerents, took strong legislative action to try and prevent the abuse of their neutrality and to minimise the dangers to it arising from secret-service work by the belligerents on Swiss territory. The decree regarding the measures to be taken for the protection of the country and the maintenance of Swiss neutrality dates from 3rd August 1914. It was followed by an enactment concerning applicable articles of the penal code and

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by another dealing with the publication of military information. At the beginning of the year 1917 Switzerland had to protect herself by an enactment on the safeguarding of military secrets. For in spite of all legal measures the belligerents had succeeded in establishing their secret service on a big scale. As it was not altogether impossible that Switzerland, too, might be forced into the War, an immediate danger sprang up. In advance of the rest, the French secret service had realised how to overcome the legal obstacles by setting up smaller, unostentatious, but numerous espionage organisations. They were under the control of the military attaché in Berne, Colonel Pageot, who, temporarily discredited through isolated incidents having become known, was succeeded by Colonel Moriet. In close connection with the military attaché worked M. Pascal d'Aix, the consul-general in Geneva; but he too was compromised and had to leave his post. MM. Peron and Monjour, the vice-consuls under him, as well as M. Pelinnier, French consul in Berne, Baron Fougères in Lausanne, M. Robin in Zurich, and M. Farges in Basel, took advantage of their extra-territorial rights to maintain close relations with the French espionage. Not only did they collect information independently about Germany for the military attaché; they also acted as intermediaries between the agents actually in Germany and the intelligence bureaux on French territory, which were established on the Swiss frontier at Annemasse, Evian, and Pontarlier under the control of regular officers of the French secret service. And chief agents of the French secret service were

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also attached to individual consulates, under cover of the consular secretariat.

Under this control there worked, mostly independent of one another, often unknown to one another, numerous groups of spies. Let me mention a few particularly successful ones. Count Mougeot, a French dragoon officer, banker in Lyons and millionaire several times over, was the head of an information bureau in Berne which showed great activity in Switzerland and Germany from 1916 to 1918. To further his plans he bought the watch factory at Bevillard in Switzerland ; and its travellers were used wholly as spies. His chief colleagues were M. Georges Clairin, a banker ; M. Breuvart, a prominent industrial ; M. Dreyfus, a clerk ; von Schweizern, director of the riding-school in Berne ; a number of Swiss merchants, the proprietor of an inquiry office, and, in addition, employees in Swiss hotels, who served as go-betweens and hunted through the letters of the hotel guests for news about Germany. This group also tried to destroy the Longa Works at Rheinfelden, to wreck with fire-bombs trains going to Germany, and to put poison into the vans which were to take cattle from Switzerland across the German frontier. The work on Swiss territory was carried on so boldly that it could not have been kept secret long. The chiefs of the enterprise were arrested ; Count Mougeot himself was released on parole. Breaking it, he fled to the French shore of the Lake of Geneva, whence he continued his activities. In May 1918 twenty-one of his collaborators were brought up before the Swiss courts, among them being Dr Rudolf Brustlein,

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a Bernese lawyer who had taken charge of the organisation after Count Mougeot's flight. On account of the espionage carried on at the same time against Swiss interests a number of the accused were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.

A second group, which was controlled from Geneva, was composed solely of Swiss civil servants. The threads of their intrigues were held in the hand of the adjutant to the French military attaché.

In 1917 the postal censorship in Germany secured evidence that communications of enormous importance were being forwarded in chemical ink on newspapers going from Germany to Switzerland. The first of these despatches to be discovered bore the number seventy-nine, so that seventy-eight messages had already passed unchecked into the enemy's hands. Once the receiver's address was known, the authorities succeeded in intercepting subsequent messages which followed at short intervals. But only after tedious inquiry did they succeed in tracking down the enemy organisation. It consisted of Dr Ross, a retired assistant judge at Frankfurt-on-Main, and two military men, one of whom worked on the West front for the French secret service, the other in the telegraph office at Mayence. These three were condemned to death. Their tempters and go-betweens at Geneva were sentenced to imprisonment by the Swiss courts.

In West Switzerland sympathisers backed up French interests. It was particularly important for the French I.S. that it succeeded in finding, among the police, officials who were in a position to warn such sympathisers and help them in

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opportune flight to France when their activities had become known to the authorities. Nevertheless, it was possible in the first three years of the War to expose fourteen groups of French spies in Switzerland, to establish that 145 persons were acting as spies for France, and, by means of ample evidence supplied by Germany, to deliver them up to Swiss justice.

As far as England was concerned, Switzerland lay quite outside the sphere of interest bounded by her military espionage. All the livelier was her interest in Switzerland as a sphere for economic espionage and political propaganda. Purely with this idea, consulates were created on the frontier between Switzerland and Germany, and there the trade with Germany was watched and blocked. The legation was in control. England's organised military I.S. did not venture on to Swiss territory. In 1916 English military information bureaux sprang up on the French frontier; and, first from Evian and later on from Pontarlier, they supplied the English legation in Berne with suggestions for military investigations in Germany. England's military espionage in Switzerland, however, bore an unofficial character. Only one information bureau was set up; it was cleverly disguised as a language school in Berne, with branches in Basel and Zurich. The reason why England could not quite do without a military information bureau in Switzerland seems to have lain in the interest she had, on account of the German air raids, in watching the Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen. In this matter both the consulate at Basel and the consulate-general at

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Zurich showed their interest. Dr Angst, the consul-general, kept in close touch with engineers at Friedrichshafen whom he had won over to his purposes. But on the whole the English secret service in Switzerland was far behind the French.

Found wanting in peace-time, the Russian I.S. in Switzerland broke down in war. It lacked system. Moreover, there was deficient control on account of the great distance from the homeland. As far as possible, this last defect was made good by the Russian Mission at the French War Office, but this really did no more than represent the Russian secret service in Paris. And the Russians suffered a severe loss through the fact that Gurkow, the military attaché in Berne, had compromised himself so badly through his very reckless espionage at the beginning of the War, that he had to leave his post ; he was replaced by General Golowane, a novice in secret-service work. Then, too, the forces of the Russian I.S. were divided because it had to turn at one and the same time against Germany and Austria, while France and England concentrated wholly on Germany. As espionage in Austria was easier than in Germany—at least, it could be carried on there without risk and with the help of Slav kinsfolk—the Russian work from Switzerland was chiefly done there. Very few Russian spies from Switzerland could be discovered in Germany during the War, whereas in Austria considerable numbers were rendered harmless.

In the first part of the War the United States had no reason to take part in the Entente secret service. As America was neutral, her official representatives

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had the opportunity of getting an insight into anything which interested the Washington Government. It must be added that a very accommodating spirit was shown towards the Americans in Germany, as our Government strove to maintain that country's neutrality. When, in 1917, America came into the War on the side of the Entente, it was only necessary for her to join up with the secret services already in existence among the Allies. It was noticeable that America's support of the belligerents stimulated secret-service work. It seemed as though the Allies only then gained a clear picture of Germany and found out where specially to set to work with their secret service and above all with their propaganda. America did not fail to set up her own secret-service system. In Switzerland it was controlled by the military attaché at Berne on direct instructions from General Pershing's headquarters. He was supported by the consulates in Berne and Zurich.

In secret service against Germany, Italy did not play a notable part. Her whole strength was turned against Austria. In consequence of this, Switzerland as a field of operations for the Italian secret service was almost wholly eliminated.

What Switzerland meant to France, the Netherlands meant to England. A base there for secret-service work was all the more important because the homeland was separated from the Continent by the Channel. The English espionage bureau there was at first placed under the military attaché at the Hague, but this was very soon found to be insufficient, and Lieutenant-Colonel Oppenheim was appointed chief director of the joint information

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and counter-espionage services against Germany. Under him worked the consul-general in Rotterdam, and, also in Rotterdam, but in addition to his, there was a bigger espionage bureau, directly responsible to the War Office in London and run by the director of a steamship company, Tinsley. In Tinsley's bureau the English secret service had its most important centre. It employed much more than 300 people and was divided into four departments. The first department controlled the naval espionage; the second, under Tinsley's personal control, concerned itself with the German army. The third department was engaged on the technical side, and also provided the spies with false passes and identification papers. The fourth, the Press department, was in closest touch with the Dutch newspaper *De Telegraaf*, a pro-English daily, and issued the anti-German propaganda for Holland. The number of agents sent out daily by Tinsley's bureau was enormous. They were got for him by confidential persons which the bureau kept in big hotels as in the meanest public-houses, among the Dutch official class as among the police, the frontier officials, the porters and cabmen on railway stations. Besides Tinsley's bureau there were known to be in Holland five other English espionage organisations; but neither in their extent nor in their achievements did they rival his. Reuter's news agency, too, had its own organisation, the methods of which, in Germany and Belgium, were grounded on the same principles as those of the military espionage system. As the whole English military espionage confined itself chiefly to the German navy and the German

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coast (which included Belgium), it is clear that the powerful machine set up for this object achieved wonderful results.

Holland also formed the base for the English trade and economic espionage against Germany. In charge of this branch was the English consul-general in Rotterdam, supported in particular by the commercial attaché, Sir Francis Oppenheimer.

As neutral travellers from Germany across Holland and from Holland to England came under English control, there was at the disposal of the English secret service an extraordinarily effective lever for extorting information. The influence of England's espionage in the Netherlands was substantially stronger than that of France. The agents of England were to be found in all ranks of society, among all nationalities, among all travellers going to and fro between Germany and Holland. Only at the start did the English secret service owe anything to the help of Dutch Jews. Very soon after the outbreak of war this limited territory was abandoned and everything subject to English influence was turned to account in the service. Among the travellers through Holland were many war correspondents from neutral countries, and the English espionage paid particular attention to these. Leonhard Kooyer, a war correspondent of the neutral daily, *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, made eight journeys to the theatres of war in Belgium and the north of France and four to Germany in English interests. He reported his observations not only to his employer, Tinsley, but also direct to the War Office in London.

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The German invasion drove the Belgian secret service almost entirely on to Dutch territory. Only isolated branches remained on Belgian soil. In 1915 there was discovered in Liège a Belgian secret service officer who had had the courage to stop at his post till then and keep in regular touch with an agency in Maestricht. This showed that he possessed a personal courage and a patriotism worthy of respect, and he bore himself so manfully and bravely before the German court that his judges, in comradely recognition of his bravery, did not pass the death sentence to which he was liable by law. In the main, the Belgian secret service before the War was too feebly developed and too little self-reliant to be capable of playing an individual part in the difficult work of espionage in Holland. It was almost completely merged into the French system.

The French I.S. did battle in Holland on two fronts. On one it worked in Belgium, and through Belgium in the rear of the German army towards France; on the other against Germany. But France preferred to work against Germany across Switzerland, her near neighbour—a path easier in every respect than the lengthier way across Holland, which was only to be reached by way of England. Espionage in the direction of the theatres of war was, therefore, predominant in the French secret-service work in Holland. It will be considered by itself later on, and then I shall show that the English and French espionage services on the fronts, besides turning Holland to account and working thence into Germany, each had their own auxiliary help in Holland at command.

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The proximity of the theatres of war made Holland a rendezvous for German deserters, and it was possible for the enemy espionage to get most valuable information by pumping these men. Interrogation bureaux under English control were to be found along the whole length of the Dutch and Dutch-Belgian frontiers. In the internment camps set up by the Dutch authorities were confidential agents who continued the cross-examination of the deserters and kept track of their whereabouts when they had left the camps, so that the suitable men among them could be won over and prepared either for return to the front or for spying in Germany. This source of news was, from the military point of view, certainly the most productive in Holland. That neutral country at her rear constituted a great danger to Germany's war efforts. No such danger existed for the Entente.

Although far from the home-base, the Russian organisation for secret-service work in Holland was far more systematic and more dangerous to Germany than the organisation in Switzerland. The credit for this belongs to the Russian military attaché at the Hague, Colonel de Maier, who himself took a conspicuous and personal part in the work. His example influenced the Russian representatives in Holland, who gave him successful support. To his share fell chiefly the military espionage in inner Germany. In the West front and the navy he showed less interest. It was also very greatly to the advantage of the Russian espionage that, before the War, he had formed numerous relationships with Germany from Holland.

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In Holland the division of labour between the espionage services of the different Great Powers of the Entente was most effectively arranged.

In the Scandinavian States the English I.S. was head and chief, and this not only because of the manner in which it gathered information about Germany, but also on account of the diligence with which it watched over Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in the interests of economic and trade espionage. The controllers of this economic espionage were the English consuls, the number of whom notably increased at the beginning of the War. Thus the staff of the consulate-general in Gothenburg was increased from one professional consul in peace to seven in war-time. In Norway, too, there was in peace-time only one regular English consul, but during the War thirty-three were appointed, and twenty-five vice-consuls besides. Their sole task was to collect evidence about Germany's economic condition and to block all commercial intercourse with her. Only Sweden took the trouble to oppose this invasion of spies. Yet there, too, espionage work was actively carried on, the military and naval branches under the English military attaché, the commercial and economic branches under the consul-general. On account of its land-frontier, Denmark was the seat of a purely military espionage. Here, as in Christiania, the work was in charge of the English military and naval attachés.

France developed her own system of espionage in the Scandinavian States, closely supporting the English service. It showed itself here more in the form of independent, if compulsory, activity of all

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the officers and officials in the foreign service and less as a methodical extension of the already existing system. For France did not need an organisation here; she had Switzerland at her disposal as an avenue into Germany, and Holland, as an inquiry station and as a base for the espionage in the rear of the German army.

The United States left military espionage in the northern countries to the English and French services. They themselves were concerned here almost exclusively with the state of the German mercantile marine, the economic condition of and the food situation in Germany, and the temper of the German people. On this account a systematic service was set up under the control of the naval and commercial attachés and the consulates-general in Copenhagen, Christiania, and Stockholm. All Americans coming out of Germany and other travellers were cross-examined by these bureaux. But no despatch of agents was observed.

The Russian secret service was favoured by the authorities in Denmark; by those in Sweden it was, in their own interests, combated. Copenhagen, therefore, was the centre for Russian espionage against Germany, though the control of it was temporarily in Stockholm. Faithful to its peace-time system, the Russian General Staff worked in war-time also with a vast, capacious organisation. For that reason only a few of the enterprises of this service were exposed, though these were very considerable ones. The biggest was that of Dr Katz of Warsaw, who was known as a secret-service agent in peace-time and who, on the outbreak of

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war, set up his headquarters in Copenhagen. His staff consisted almost entirely of Polish Jews, who were trained in Warsaw and sent in groups to Copenhagen. Thence, to some extent with English and French help, they went across Switzerland to Germany, where definite, systematic activities were assigned to them. Thus Schapiro, the chief agent, had to watch East Prussia ; Festenstadt was responsible for Posen, Willner for Berlin, Silberberg for Bromberg, and Blauzwirn for Breslau. Most of these chief agents were unable to get to work. Soon after entering German territory they were arrested. But this did not prevent their Russian employers from sending more and more, who mostly met the same fate. Another Russian enterprise was concealed in the Danish advertisement sheet, *Export Revue*. The manager of it was also a Russian Jew. Behind him stood the Russian military attaché in Copenhagen, his brother-in-law. As the latter was arrested by the Danish Government for swindling, this organisation collapsed at the centre. In 1915 there arose a group of Russian spies, among whom the Jews Blumenthal and Stückgold played a conspicuous part. Their speciality was the procuring of spies in music-hall circles. While these undertakings, relying on the Jewish element, failed on account of the untrustworthiness and cowardice of the agents, Colonel Rascha's organisation in Copenhagen, working through Swedes, Finns, and Germans, often scored successes. His agents were successful in gaining a foothold among military people and the higher ranks of German society.

In Roumania the joint espionage service of the

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Entente was run by the Russians. After the occupation of the country by the Germans we discovered, to a greater extent than we had been aware of in peace-time, how the Russian secret service had already been effectively at work there before the War against the Central Powers, especially against Austria. In this it had been helped by the Roumanian police. During the War, while Roumania was neutral, the Russian I.S., helped by the English and French consulates, was specially concerned with the lines of communication between Turkey and Germany, in order to ascertain what war material was going to Turkey and the movement to that country of German troops.

During the War the control of the I.S. of the Great Powers of the Entente remained in the hands of the various General Staffs, supported in the economic and political spheres by their governments. A general supreme control does not seem to have existed. Nevertheless, the collaboration was very much closer than in the last years of peace. Overlapping was avoided by a division of labour. As already mentioned, collection of military information fell to France and Russia, while England confined herself to the naval warfare and economic questions. America took part in all branches of the espionage, but only to a limited extent. But, with her entry into the War, political espionage and propaganda received a fresh impetus. The centre for political espionage was subsequently with the Americans, for the military with the French, after the establishment of the unity of command, for the economic with the English, who set up an intelligence centre at

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Folkestone. When Russia's military power collapsed in 1917, her I.S. abroad lost its directing force. In so far as it was not placed at the service of the Bolshevik propaganda against Germany, it was absorbed into the systems of the other Entente States. The collective organisation of the Entente secret services experienced a further concentration in the second part of the War. To it was transferred the control of the counter-measures against enterprises by the Central Powers which might damage the Entente's conduct of the War. As a result, the influence of the Deuxième Bureau of the French General Staff and of the English Intelligence Department in England increased considerably. All the Government offices at home and the embassies and consulates abroad were, so to speak, militarised and made branches of this system. But the more the International Intelligence Service increased among civil servants and served other ends than the collection of purely military information, the more this latter shrank. More and more it became concentrated in the theatres of war, evolving its own system, which must be specially considered later.

But the International secret service became more an instrument for serving the ends of the War as a whole, less one for strategical or military decisions. It embodied the saying of Clausewitz that warfare and politics are one. In consequence, intelligence departments and governments worked hand in hand. What the secret service found out in political matters was turned to account through propaganda, and the workings of this propaganda were watched by the secret service in their turn. What the secret

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service discovered regarding economic conditions influenced the measures taken to blockade Germany and to exercise economic pressure on the neutral countries.

It is clear that Germany, which before the War had neither economic nor political intelligence services, and the General Staff of which had only had in the last six months before the War the sum of M.450,000 to carry on its own secret service and to combat the enemy's—this Germany could not be in a position to work against Russia, France, England, and the smaller neighbouring states, as every single one of these was able to work against Germany. Her trifling forces had been massed against Russia and France, the most probable opponents in a land war. The carrying-out of this effort required all that we had at our command in peace-time, and the outbreak of war exhausted our resources. After the first encounters with the enemy, the German military authorities found they had nothing to rely on.

So, in the autumn of 1914, the reconstruction of the German intelligence service began under the most inauspicious circumstances. It had to accomplish its task without any help from, nay, almost in opposition to, the German representatives abroad. It was quite out of the question that, under these conditions, it could obtain, in the neighbouring countries already mentioned, a footing even approximately equal to that of the intelligence service of the Entente already in possession. Now, in war-time, unlimited funds were, to be sure, placed at its disposal. But a secret service is not to be built up on money alone, if it is not to do more harm than

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good. The essential part of a secret service is the personality of its servants. And, in consequence of pre-war neglect, Germany wholly lacked an educated personnel, while the enemy was served by a large number of trained officers and the whole system of his efficient representatives abroad.

In contrast to the enemy, who worked against Germany concentrically from all sides, Germany had to build up an espionage system working eccentrically towards all directions. Against Russia was left to her only the long and narrow path across Sweden and Finland. Considerations of time and space played here quite a special part, if the news which came out of Russia by this route were still to have any value at all on its arrival. England was protected by the Channel, and had the whole traffic from the Norwegian, Danish, and Dutch harbours under strict control. France, therefore, concentrated on the Swiss frontier all her forces, which were already trained before the War in checking espionage. Just beyond this frontier lay, like a glacis, that pro-French region of western Switzerland, over the police of which France had learnt how to exercise a far-reaching influence. And these French defences were pushed as far as the German-Swiss frontier. Every traveller coming out of Germany into Switzerland was immediately reported on the French-Swiss frontier.

The circumstances, as outlined here, constituted a further difficulty in the construction of the German war intelligence service. It had to be content to stay on German territory and thence to attempt very gradually to form connections in the enemy countries

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or to bring investigators through the barriers set up by the enemy. Nothing was more absurd than the Entente's fear of spies at the outbreak of war. With its own footrule the Entente measured Germany. At first glance the difficulties which heaped up before the German secret service were, from the standpoint of the German effort, regrettable. But they led to this : in contrast to the enemy I.S., the German was forced to avoid anything excessive and to work as rigidly as an intelligence service must if it is to achieve trustworthy results for the conduct of the War.

As already mentioned in the first chapter, the German I.S. was successful before the War in establishing very valuable relations in Russia as in France. These lasted up to the outbreak of war. But, as has already been said, to the honour of the French and Russian people, all relations were broken off the moment war began, and it took a considerable time before the service was successful in forming new ties. That was achieved in France in 1915. But up to that time thirty-five Germans had been condemned for services rendered to the enemy I.S. Shameful as this fact is for Germany, it must nevertheless be emphasised, because it throws a glaring light on the enormous work done by the Entente secret service in Germany and the start which it had.

The War showed its disintegrating effects most speedily in Russia, but in France, too, and even in England, so that the German I.S. found everywhere a few, but good, connections. In the neutral countries it could only move with extreme caution, and did not dream in the least of capturing the

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position occupied there by the enemy league. The Germans in neutral countries, on whom the General Staff had fixed certain pre-war hopes, showed goodwill, but it was clear that goodwill alone was not enough when control by the official representatives of the mother-country was lacking. Help from this source dwindled more and more, and it had finally to be quite abandoned. While Germany had to adopt this policy, the Entente was extending its service by employing its nationals in neutral countries under the control of its official representatives.

Espionage organisations in neutral countries, like the large number which, as I could instance, had been set up by the Entente, were utterly impossible for Germany. Her "military information posts" lay on German territory along the neutral frontier. At each of these posts only a few officers worked, most of them not regular officers, but such men on leave as were acquainted with foreign countries. Only the control of the military information post was in the hand of an I.S. officer on the active list and specially trained. At General Headquarters a staff officer of the General Staff, with two assistants, managed the "secret service," under the chief of Department III B. From this it is obvious what a limited part espionage proper played in the German military information service.

Germany was not prepared for the World War. And all the military studies relating to a coming war bore no relation to the ultimate reality. In peacetime the General Staff had a theoretical interest in the American army. Its development was watched, as far as this was possible through the Press and the

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correspondence of the military attaché in Washington. The conscientious work of the General Staff secured for us an excellent picture of the American army. For a regular secret service in this case not only money but also sufficient interest was lacking.

And in this direction the outbreak of the World War changed almost nothing. Only quite gradually was the possibility of America's intervention borne in upon the German political and military consciousness. When this question began to press for decision, the General Staff was still almost completely dependent on its pre-war information about the military possibilities of American intervention. Not on the strength of news, but on the strength of their own estimates was formed a picture which was completely borne out through the actual course of America's share in the War. It is not correct that the German General Staff was deceived about the forces which America could throw on to the continent of Europe or about the time this would take. This point will be dealt with in the consideration of the results of the secret-service work.

Nevertheless, the attempt to get a direct notion about the military matters in America had to be made. A distinction must here be drawn between the first part of the War, when America helped Germany's foes by supplying munitions and war-material, and the second part, when she participated in the struggle on the Entente's side. Even to gather information about the former presented extraordinary difficulties. The route to America was barred in the West by England, France, and Italy, in the East by Russia and Japan. The seas of the world were controlled by

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England, which exercised an almost inescapable surveillance over traffic. It was all but impossible to send Germans for espionage to America. There remained the attempt to get information from South America. But even to send trustworthy persons there was almost impossible, and was a success only in a few isolated cases. Communication from America presented the same difficulties. In these circumstances an independent service was created by pro-Germans living on the American continent ; but this was not to be compared with an organised information service ; it was, on the contrary, dangerous in itself, as the sources of information were unknown in Germany and their trustworthiness could scarcely be correctly estimated.

Then when America herself came into the War, in the spring of 1917, the obstacles to German espionage in America increased. On the other hand, so did the need for getting an insight into the military preparations of the United States. Traffic on the direct route between North America and the Continent became quite impossible for German agents. All news obtained over the route *via* South America was henceforth outstripped by events and therefore worthless. This circumstance led to an almost complete abandonment of the costly attempt to keep up a secret service in America itself. There remained nothing further than to watch the American military forces from the moment when they landed on European soil. Consequently, on America's entry into the War, the German secret service was extended to all the harbours on the French coast. Even though the difficulties there were the same as

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surrounded a secret service in France generally, yet the agents succeeded in getting satisfactory, up-to-date reports. Of all the belligerents America was the least threatened on her own territory by German espionage.

This evidence stands in seeming contradiction of the information about German attempts at sabotage and propaganda in America which was sent broadcast through the world. If the exaggerations which enemy propaganda spread for its own ends are brushed aside, perhaps there remain a few such enterprises of which the German General Staff had less knowledge than the United States itself. For they arose from the praiseworthy initiative of friends of the German cause, who were not, however, acting under control from Germany. As a result, their self-sacrificing attempts were of comparatively little use to Germany, and they contained in themselves from the very start all the dangers of aimlessness and lack of plan.

CHAPTER VII

IN THE THEATRES OF WAR : THE EASTERN FRONT

The difficulties of espionage in war-time—The German I.S. at the front—Russia's secret service well informed—A hundred and twenty secret documents and plans betrayed—Prisoners' statements—Spies at work on the Eastern front—Secret movements of troops—Anti-Czarist propaganda of the French I.S.—The March revolution—Germans send Lenin to Russia—Germans co-operate with Bolshevik propaganda—Bolshevist attack on Germany's "Home Front."

THE War created completely new conditions for the military I.S. Military secrets and, above all, the advance of the armies and those military preparations only meant for war, known to few in peace-time and kept safely under lock and key, became public. Under the eyes of millions, with the co-operation of thousands, the decisions slowly ripened into deeds. It was necessary to get information of these same proceedings among the enemy and to prevent him from having an insight into our own conditions. In war all considerations vanish save the one aim of victory in the struggle.

In this contest the World War created on both sides tasks such as had never formerly been accomplished by the I.S. True, in the Russo-Japanese War there were wide-spread battle-fronts and week-long battles. In that time an espionage could be developed which had been eliminated, as a direct aid to the command,

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from the war of movement. So far as has become known, the Chinese population, on whose territory the war was fought out, rendered their kindred race, the Japanese, substantial services and did serious damage to Russian plans. At that time the wings of the battle-front still remained free and allowed the cavalry to undertake big movements with the object of obtaining information.

But the World War created conditions which put all previous experiences quite in the shade. The cavalry, in war-games, at manœuvres, and in service-rules the arm for reconnoitring, was eliminated after the first battle of the advance. The fronts were fixed and were ever more firmly consolidated. They moved only forwards or back. However, reconnoitring by air was a new element in warfare. The air arm was energetically developed by all the belligerents. But it observed only the position of the enemy, saw marching columns, moving railway trains, towns, villages, and smoking chimneys, and these only in an area limited by the aeroplane's radius. Air reports provided ideas of the intentions of the enemy command, but at a time when these intentions were already translated into deeds and there was not sufficient time to take counter-measures. Airmen reported nothing about the feeling among the enemy troops, about the condition of the population in the towns and villages, about the preparations far behind the lines or beyond the sea. They told us nothing about the production of war-material in the factories. And these points were of ever greater consequence as the War ran its length and technical matters became more important.

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Then the length of the front was far beyond any pre-war notion. Of the 2400 kilometres of fighting front on which German troops stood, the English held altogether 135, the French 800, and the Russian 1400 kilometres. The Allies had at their disposal, in their own or allied countries, an extensive railway network, while the Germans had to use in enemy territory a railway system which was to a large extent destroyed and was difficult to handle. Germany fought on several fronts widely separated from each other. Her foes, on the contrary, fought in the main in comparatively narrow and definite areas. Every enterprise was certain to be serious for the German army, which was inferior in numbers. So the German I.S. in the theatres of war had its chief task in ascertaining purely military facts.

After the defeats of the Russian army and those of the Allied forces on French territory, our opponent recognised that Germany could not be beaten militarily. The longer the War lasted, the more was the Entente's military conduct of the struggle extended by political and economic warfare, and the more was the military effort intended to keep up the pressure on the German front so that the final victory of the economic and the political struggle might be garnered and secured. For that reason the I.S. of the Entente in the theatres of war was, from the first, imbued with political aims. It was an advantage to it that it could concentrate its efforts on the German army, for if that army gave way, Germany's allies would surrender of their own accord.

The interest of the High Command in the enemy

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troops on all the fronts was the same. Only if the information regarding the enemy in one particular spot was correct, could the whole impression be accurate and the division of strength on the various fronts be the right one. Germany had to help her allies by the despatch of troops and munitions. The despatch of these troops naturally depended, in a high degree, on an accurate knowledge of the enemy's position, so that important fronts should not be unnecessarily weakened or surprises be effected on less important sectors, for even these might react adversely on the general situation. In all army commands in which German troops were employed and on the Allied General Staffs there were I.S. officers of the High Command. In most cases they controlled the secret service within the area controlled by the command to which they were attached, and they were immediately provided with the information secured by the examination of prisoners, the discovery of enemy documents, the air operations, artillery observers, and reports from the troops. They transmitted the full results of their work to all the armies under the High Command. They were forbidden to make use of spies, for these were regarded as useless, except in certain circumscribed cases.

After having sketched this general background, which would do for the picture on either side of the lines, it is necessary to fill in the conditions in each separate theatre of war. Each was peculiar on account of the differences in the depth of the front, the nature of the ground, the character of the population, and the energy of the enemy's operations.

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It will be best to study the Eastern Front first of all and then to deal with conditions on the Western Front, where the final decision was arrived at and where, therefore, I.S. work in all its branches reached its highest development.

In peace-time the Russian I.S. was only intended to act on the offensive. The booty taken in the Battle of Tannenberg included proofs that the Russian High Command was provided with better material regarding Germany as a theatre of war than that in the possession of the German High Command. When the German armies captured Warsaw, among the documents found there were printed records of 120 secret documents and plans of the German and Austrian military authorities. They had been secured for the Russian General Staff by the Intelligence Bureau at Warsaw during the period of 1907-10. The documents we secured at Wilna, Kowno, Riga, Cholm, and at other headquarters of high Russian military and civil authorities provided us with further evidence of the successes of the pre-war Russian espionage. The "March through the Brandenburger Tor" was carefully prepared for by means of investigations in Germany and the connections set up there.

But the Russians were surprised by the supreme secret of the German army. This was the great devotion of the people in the defence of the Fatherland. That leadership of the General Staff which arose out of quiet, loyal work found its personification in those two commanders, Hindenburg and Ludendorff. By inferior forces, the Russian army was thrown back to Russia, and thereby the whole

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peace-time achievements of the powerful Russian I.S. became worthless. The preliminary conditions of the Russian secret service were not realised. A new task, which demanded definite and quickly effective work, was beyond the capacity of the unduly swollen Russian service.

The Russians, therefore, were left with no other source of information than the statements of German prisoners. These prisoners were first-class material, and for that reason they were well treated while within the jurisdiction of the commands at the front. This was, of course, to persuade them to talk. The martyrdom of the prisoners in Russian hands began when they were sent down from the front. It could, however, be established from Russian army orders which fell into our hands that the German prisoners did not give very much away. The crafty methods employed on the West front for the purposes of getting something out of prisoners—methods dealt with in a later chapter—were not resorted to by the Russians. Prisoners were only brought in irregularly and not in great numbers, so that this source was not really a very productive one.

Then the Russian I.S. resorted to the plan of unobtrusively sending spies into the evacuated territory in front of the Germans or, as deserters, into the German lines. In peace time the Russians did everything on a large scale, and success was prejudiced in this case, too, by the use *en masse* of such spies. They lacked, therefore, the necessary training for the work. They were clearly chosen without much care ; many were delighted to escape the War. They had no inclination to return to the

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Russian army, the energetically maintained confidence in victory of which they no longer shared, once they came under the influence prevailing behind the German lines. This use of spies in masses was so obvious, that it was possible, without great difficulties, to discover everything and cripple the whole organisation.

The front on the West had been for a long while wholly impenetrable; but on the Russian front there were gaps and wide stretches of forests and bogland which enabled persons acquainted with the lie of the land to get through. So, when the Eastern front came, practically speaking, to a standstill, Russia began to employ civilians who had been trained in the espionage. The business of getting them through was, however, so clumsily done that the plan was given away at the beginning. As these spies became sources of information for the German I.S., they did the Russians more harm than good.

The war on the Eastern front was scarcely waged on Russian, but on Polish or Russianised territory. There was at the disposal of the Russian commander, therefore, nothing akin to that enthusiastic help—referred to later—given to the Allies by the population in the Western theatre of war. But, in the main, no hatred was entertained by the population in the East against the Germans, except in Lettland. The local persons used as spies were mostly Poles, Jews, or other persons from the Baltic provinces who had as much sympathy for Germany as for Russia. That is not to say that, at the beginning, they showed any particular sympathy for us. They maintained a neutral attitude, were only concerned with what

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was to their own advantage, and attracted to places which offered the best prospects of livelihood. So the chance of earning money remained the only inducement to really enthusiastic spies. But this tempted them to offer their services to both sides so as to earn double wages.

Reports were spread on the German East front and elsewhere during the War that the Poles maintained an extensive espionage system on behalf of the Russians. That is not true. The Poles, with the exception of the intellectuals in the cities and the landowners, were neutral and made no efforts to injure the Germans. Only when Polish independence beckoned, did a Polish espionage and an individual Polish I.S. come into existence. It was not to render help to the Russians but to serve Polish aims and to establish communications with foreign countries, especially with the Poles in America and the governments of the Entente.

The Russian Jews looked upon espionage in war and in peace as a matter of business first and foremost. They lacked all spiritual participation in the War. Though, from the political and religious points of view, they fared better under the German occupation than under Russian rule, their sympathies lay more on the Russian than on the German side. A diverting mixture of business sense and national indifference, so characteristic of conditions on the Russian side, was shown by an incident at a German frontier post within the Austrian area. A Jew, who had been sent out on an espionage mission, returned with several deserters to whom he had acted as guide. He offered to do it again. For every deserter

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brought in with arms and equipment, the Jew was offered a comparatively high reward. A few days later he did appear with a rather large number of Russian soldiers. As the promised reward was about to be paid him, he declared that he did not want it. "The gentlemen," he added, "have already paid."

Convinced at last of the uselessness of their espionage through the front lines, the Russians discontinued it altogether. In the summer of 1915 an army order, signed by General Ewart, a commander on the West front, came into our hands. It stated definitely that the Russian I.S. in the war area had completely broken down.

The secret service working in neutral countries against Germany became, therefore, all the more important for Russia. It was thus of great assistance to her that France and England forwarded to her in the quickest possible way all that was learned about Germany's warlike measures against Russia. The more the Russian I.S. at the front failed to function, the more we had to reckon with the fact that the French and English I.S. would carry out investigations for Russia in Germany and engage in espionage on her behalf in the rear of the Eastern front. That that was so was proved by a *questionnaire* which fell into our hands.

Our chief work became, therefore, the task of protecting the German army, as it advanced into Russia, from the infiltration of espionage, especially on the lines of communication. It was an advantage that, behind the front, there were barriers in the form of the Vistula and other parallel rivers. Along their

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courses it was possible to set up, with small forces, a control over all descriptions of traffic. When big operations were being carried out, the territory behind the German and Austrian armies was closed by these controls. This was successfully done on the occasion of the invasion of Roumania. Transylvania was, by the posts on the River Theiss, completely closed to all but military traffic. The South-East front, moreover, was protected against penetration by espionage agents from Germany by a rigorous control on the Austro-German frontier. The long duration of the War, the resistance of the populations to the restrictions placed upon them, the failure of the authorities to enforce regulations relentlessly, and the demands of the political parties in the Reichstag for their relaxation, finally robbed all our precautionary measures of their effectiveness.

And in Germany lurked the Entente secret service. For that reason measures were taken to lead it astray. Considerable numbers of troops from the West front, destined for the strengthening of the Austrian lines, were, first of all, despatched to the north; on the other hand, those intended for northern fronts were sent to South Germany. These troops were moved along through the actual front areas to their proper destinations. This was done on the occasion when, in the spring of 1916, the break-through on the Russian front in Galicia at Gorlice-Tarnow was being prepared. The success was complete. In spite of the use of strong forces of troops and artillery by the Germans and the Austrians, the Russians were completely surprised.

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The break-through delivered Galicia into our hands and made the whole Russian system of fortresses insecure. This successful battle caused the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Berlin to confer the degree of doctor *honoris causa* on the Chief of the German General Staff, General von Falkenhayn. In the diploma the success of this secret plan was specially mentioned. If, as far as estimating the greatness of generalship is concerned, there is a certain exaggeration in this recognition, the German counter-espionage service can at least lay claim to the credit of having contributed to the success of the military operations in the East, in spite of the Russian I.S., which in peace was built up on such a prodigious scale and in war was backed up by the Entente.

The joint operations brought the German and Austrian intelligence services into closer co-operation. The more the highest strategical leadership fell to Germany, the more did her I.S. and counter-espionage system gain in influence. Attached to all Austrian commands, under which there were German troops, German I.S. officers of the High Command were at work. They were under a unified control, and their endeavour was to put into force in the East our I.S. experiences in the West.

But our own I.S. found practically unsurmountable difficulties in the East. As already mentioned, the population nowhere showed any particular friendliness. In addition, there were the great distances of the Russian theatre of war, the sparse population, and the scarcity of roads and railways. The Germans, too, were driven to paying attention to

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the statements of prisoners. We experienced great difficulties in finding interpreters and examining officers who knew Russian well and could be used for military cross-examination in sufficient numbers to cope with the flood of Russian prisoners and deserters. Such officers had partly to be brought from the West front. Only in the winter of 1915-16 were the army corps staffs on the Eastern front provided with a sufficient number of interpreters; in the case of the divisional staffs that was not the case till the summer of 1916.

The Russian prisoners provided no evidence that there was any war enthusiasm among the people. The soldiers said bluntly that they had been "driven" to the front. As good soldiers, however, they were obedient and patient; they had to suffer great privations. They only surrendered when the struggle was hopeless. Particularly loyal were the soldiers of German extraction and those out of the Baltic Provinces. They fought particularly hard and, as prisoners, were loath to say anything. The Jew fought very badly, surrendered readily or deserted "to escape death"; he gave information clearly, because he was intelligent, and readily, because he expected good treatment. The Poles did not fight well either. After the occupation of Poland they, too, readily gave themselves up, and, indifferent to the War, put their knowledge at our disposal. The Lithuanians were the same. Tenacious, capable of resistance, anti-German and silent, if not mendacious, were the soldiers of Lettland and Esthonia. From the purely military point of view these two races and the troops from Siberia were

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Russia's best soldiers. The Mohammedans fought loyally on the Russian side, but as prisoners of war they became friendly to the Germans.

The genuine Russian prisoner showed himself susceptible to good treatment and, as a general rule, willingly told what he knew. As he was, in most cases, uneducated, what he knew was not much and had only a local value. The Russian officers, including those from the Baltic Provinces, remained true to their military oath. They had an unpretentious, soldierly outlook and refused to give any information. Many of them, like the commanding general of the II Russian Army Corps at the Battle of Tannenberg, Ssamsonow, escaped imprisonment by committing suicide. All the more tragic is the fate which the Russian revolution prepared for loyal Russian officers.

For the purpose of extensive investigations in the rear of the Russian army, in the interior of Russia, that is, we had at our disposal only the narrow way over Sweden and Finland. To recognise the difficulties of such investigations it is only necessary to consider how long it took for an agent to reach Russia by that route and what value his news could have if he returned by the same long way. Such news had nearly always been long overtaken by events. The attempt to send news by telegraph became, therefore, a matter of greater importance. But in a country where the police were so thoroughly organised that effort failed too. The difficulties in the way of getting prompt information from the Russian front were not surmounted even when the military situation permitted of our information

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bureaux being sent forward to Finland or, in the south, to the Crimea and the Caucasus.

Therefore espionage in the Russian theatre of war became for the Germans, as well as the others, a subordinate matter. It could only provide material for very limited local tactical successes. Not even one of the big re-groupings of the Russian army was reported by it in time.

We had, however, a reliable source of information in the intercepted Russian wireless. All the orders were, of course, in code, but the system used was simple and was seldom changed. It was, therefore, easy to decode.

Our I.S. also obtained a good deal of information from the documents of various Russian authorities. These were seized as our army advanced, and though they had no great military value, dealing mostly with long-past events, they did provide a complete idea of the feeling in the Russian army and among the Russian people.

As I mentioned in the chapter regarding the outbreak of war, the news we received from Russia even then showed that it was impossible to speak of hostility towards Germany in the population and the army. I have also said that this impression was confirmed by the statements of prisoners at the beginning of the War, in spite of the heavy defeats which the German army, from the opening of the struggle onwards, inflicted on the Russian army, defeats which, in their turn, caused the Russian soldiers to undergo serious hardships and to make heavy sacrifices, to see the course of the War go otherwise than they had thought and had, by their

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superiors, been led to believe. The reserved attitude of the Poles, Lithuanians, and the Baltic troops may have been due to the fact that their homeland had become the theatre of war. The stoicism of the Russian soldier, however, had its reverse side. He lacked enthusiasm for the War; the prisoners were unaware of any reason for war against Russia. The "revanche" and the liberation of the country from the invading Germans, two things used so successfully by the French Government to keep up the spirit of the troops, or economic and political competition by Germany, of which every English soldier was convinced—these things had no effect in the case of the genuine Russian soldier. He did his duty without question. In the first year of the War, no trace of any Czarist propaganda among the Russian soldiers at the front or against the Germans was to be detected.

During and after the second year a change was evident. The Russian prisoners ceased to believe in a Russian victory. Many of them said that Russia was being bled for the sake of the Entente. The army and the people were discontented at the long duration of the War, the reason for which they did not understand. Talk with captured officers showed that the desire for peace had found fruitful ground in the highest social circles and even at the Russian Court.

Then, at that moment, it was plainly evident at the front how the French secret service, which had been remarkably passive till then, set to work with its propaganda among the Russian troops. The Czar and his advisers, who wished for peace, were

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made responsible for the long duration of the War, for the loss of battles, for all privations and sacrifices. The purpose of this was not, however, to promote peace, but to overthrow the Czarist régime because, wanting peace, it had become a danger to the Entente. The revolution was being prepared. That was the vengeance on Russia for having, since the beginning of the century, given hospitality to the French I.S. That service took advantage of the strong position it had gained and turned against the Government.

At the same time there was campaigning among the troops in favour of the Democrats and Social Revolutionaries. So, because the ground had been well prepared by propaganda, the March revolution did not seriously shake the Russian army. The soldier saw in the revolution freedom and the end of the War ; he had been taught by then that, under the Czar, he had fought and suffered long enough for distant goals. For that reason the war-weary army greeted the revolution with enthusiasm. The peace rejoicings did here and there, for a little while, produce disintegration and anarchy at the first, just as the whole of the great Russia was intoxicated at the thought of peace.

An offensive by the Central Powers in those days would have met with much less resistance than did the Allies in the West in the autumn of 1918 from the German army being weakened by approaching revolution.

But, as happened in the case of Germany, too, the situation developed differently from what was expected. The new Democratic Foreign Minister, Professor Miljukow, called for a decisive effort, and

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the Democratic War Minister, Gutschkow, ostentatiously begged to be released from his duties and to be given a command at the front, so that he might be nearer the hated foe. As the Russian soldiers did not, at the first, understand this meant the Germans, the French propaganda caused foreign Socialists, such as Vandervekde and Thomas, to be sent for. The intelligence service reported that they travelled from place to place and represented to the troops that the continuation of the War against Germany was a matter of honour for Russian Socialists. Kerenski himself delivered rousing speeches to his troops.

It was, therefore, under the Kerenski Government that an anti-German propaganda first began among the Russian troops. For this service such old and well-known revolutionaries as Plechanow, Amphitheatrow, and the notorious Breščko-Breschkowskaja offered themselves. In speech and in writings they worked among the troops in favour of the continuation of the War. Everyone who took the word "Peace" on his lips was at once stamped as a German agent. Nothing was said, of course, about the shedding of more Russian blood for foreign aims. For six weeks after the revolution the army was firmly in the hands of the new Government, and the prisoners we took showed a strong anti-German bias. Their belief in victory was roused afresh. While these developments were taking place we entered into negotiations with numerous Russian commanders, including the cavalry general, Drago-mirow, commander-in-chief on the North front. Our aim was to stop the progress of these develop-

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ments, but our efforts led to no result. French propaganda had triumphed.

The prospects of a military victory, however, had not improved. The Kerenski Government had reached power by means and with aims which, from the Russian national standpoint, could only be regarded as reprehensible, and its fall was to be foreseen. As successors, the Bolsheviks were lying in wait. Their leader, Lenin, was in Switzerland. After the fall of the Czar's Government, which had exiled him, he was free to return to Russia. He had the choice of two ways. One, through Entente countries, was, however, barred. He turned to the Germans. The German Foreign Office favoured his travelling through Germany and Russia because it hoped to create difficulties for the anti-German Kerenski Government. At first, however, the German High Command was against the idea, but later agreed, on the condition that Lenin and his companions should not be given an opportunity for propaganda on their way through Germany. Its co-operation in the matter was limited, therefore, to providing anti-espionage agents to see that Lenin was kept isolated while in Germany, and to accompany him on his journey through the country.

His arrival in Russia took place when the people were again beginning to be disillusioned and when, in the army, too, voices were raised to ask why the War was still going on in spite of the fall of the Czarist régime, why no steps had been taken to bring about peace, for the Germans were no longer attacking, and why the Russians should continue the War if the Entente was prepared to do this for itself.

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With the March revolution the Russian I.S. as such and as an anti-revolutionary organisation ceased to exist. In its place came a propaganda such as has been described. This brought our I.S. into touch with the Russian front in many ways. The daily negotiations between the two fronts there brought it about that no changes on the Russian side were hidden from the Germans. As a result, the Kerenski offensive did not find us unprepared.

Military action interrupted the propaganda. Not till the beginning of September 1917 was it possible again. The unfortunate offensive had robbed of its effectiveness the old call for the continuance of the War. It was now possible to detect on the Russian front how the Bolshevik propaganda, which was the propaganda of peace, gained ground. In this direction a German propaganda, directed by our I.S., was set in motion. As both sides were following the same lines, the propaganda of both sides could co-operate. At many points German and Russian troops fraternised. It was possible for German I.S. officers to go over to the Russian lines and to advocate peace between Russia and Germany. They were enthusiastically received by the troops and were carried shoulder-high through the trenches and the camps.

After the Bolshevik revolution of November a new position arose. The military struggle was really at an end. But the German front on the East had to be maintained in order to keep Bolshevism out of Germany. The French intelligence service on the Russian side continued to act on the social revolutionary side against the degrading Treaty of

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Brest-Litowsk and in favour of the resumption of the War against Germany. But this propaganda did not now succeed in its aims. While in the West the forces were gathering for the decisive effort, in the East the struggle became a purely political fight for power. The Bolshevist propaganda among the German troops was slight. The Russian authorities did not place the central organisation of their propaganda in the theatre of war but at the "home front." The idea of a revolution was not carried from the German East front into the homeland but from the homeland to the front.

The revolution attempted by the Social Revolutionaries, with Entente help, in July 1918 in Moscow, the murder of the German Minister to Russia, von Mirbach, and the assassination of the German commander-in-chief in the Ukraine, Field-Marshal von Eichhorn, were the last perceptible acts of the French intelligence service which had, before and during the War, worked to achieve the co-operation of Russia in the fight against Germany.

CHAPTER VIII

IN THE THEATRES OF WAR : THE BALKANS AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

Difficulties in Bulgaria—Strong anti-German feeling—A powerful news service—Collapse of Bulgaria foreseen—A triumph of political propaganda—No women spies in Turkey—I.S. and Armenian massacres—Sublime Porte's "back door"—The Austro-Hungarian army's weakness—Russia's I.S. attack on the Dual Monarchy—Irridentist propaganda—Its cordon round Austria-Hungary.

I

UP to the autumn of 1915 the German I.S. had had nothing whatever to do with the Balkans. When the Serbian army was broken and in retreat and a connection established with the Bulgarians, the first meeting took place, on Serbian soil, of the Chief of the German General Staff, General von Falkenhayn, and General Schekow, Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff. I joined the latter on his return journey to Sofia in order to bring the intelligence service in the Balkans into unison with the German.

As far as the highest military authorities were concerned, this was soon accomplished, but lower down the official scale our work came up against the Bulgarian, "Polecka! Polecka!"—"Slowly, now!" It was impossible to move at the usual German pace. A civil service in the German sense did not exist.

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The German officials and officers who had not been trained in intercourse with foreign peoples, found, therefore, great difficulties in their way at first; these, however, were eventually overcome with the aid of the higher authorities. The police was useful and feared, but it had party more than foreign political aims. An intelligence service, as we understood it, did not exist.

The entry of Bulgaria into the War on Germany's side marked the triumph of the policy of King Ferdinand and M. Radoslawow, the Prime Minister, but public opinion was not wholly pro-German. The great majority of the people, whose national ambitions were the possession of Macedonia and the Dobroudja, and the official and military classes, who were convinced that we should win, were certainly on the German side. But the moneyed classes, the banks, and the well-to-do families were bound by their interests to the Entente and especially to France. They did not support Radoslawow's policy, and they it was who provided the Entente with a service of news which left nothing to be desired and which was better than anything which could otherwise have been created. On account of this, scarcely any political or economic espionage by foreigners was to be noticed. But there developed a considerable amount of traffic between pro-Entente circles in Bulgaria and Switzerland, where the French headquarters for her Balkan secret service were to be found. Austria could have shut this route, but, out of political consideration for her ally, she did not do so completely. There were, too, suspicious signs that the Czechs helped to keep up the communication

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between France and Bulgaria ; indeed, there were in Bulgaria high Austrian officials of Czech nationality who were suspected of actively assisting in the work. Official Bulgarian circles showed goodwill in protecting military interests, but they were only partially successful owing to the power of the financial and political groups ranged against them.

Besides these definite and widespread relationships, the Entente ran a well-organised minor espionage throughout Bulgaria. This played, however, quite a subordinate rôle. What the Entente wanted to know regarding military matters, it learned through its local relationships via Switzerland. On the front a tactical espionage flourished, favoured by the nature of the country and the racial mixture on both sides. German I.S. officers, in co-operation with Bulgarian, however, successfully put the German principles and experiences from the main theatre of war into force in the espionage and counter-espionage services.

Beyond the front, in Greece, English and French intelligence services were set up at the beginning of the War. There France remained in the background and allowed England to lead. England set up her I.S. there on the usual grand scale, and gave it a high political note. Greece was, too, the base of the espionage and propaganda service against Turkey. That was carried on mainly by way of Smyrna. In the Levantines very suitable material was at hand for the running of the service in Asia Minor.

In alliance with the Russian I.S. and directed by the French, a very considerable Roumanian espionage came over the Danube in the rear of the Bulgarian

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army. The same route was used for Bolshevik propaganda, on a not inconsiderable scale, even before the Russian revolution. It had no chance of success in a peasant state like Bulgaria, but it helped, all the same, to bring about a weakening of public opinion.

The purely Turkish circles were loyal towards Bulgaria, but anti-Turkish groups, the Armenians and the Levantines, did what they could to injure Turkey in allied Bulgaria. Both these groups developed on Bulgarian soil a strong anti-war propaganda which was carried on with pro-Entente help.

The hostile I.S. in the Balkans was in the main political. It was so in order to husband military strength and, above all, to attack politically and to break the front of the Central Powers at its most sensitive point. This policy was completely successful. The attack of the Salonika army on 15th September 1918 was made on an abandoned front. It was no military triumph, but a definite political success; it was the result of treachery on the part of the Bulgarians. That it would come to that had been clearly seen since the beginning of April of that year. In the middle of July the German I.S., basing its opinion on its news from Bulgaria, could have foretold the exact date of what was to happen. The canker, resulting from the predominance of Entente finance in the Balkans and the pro-French attitude of influential circles, had done its work.

It should be mentioned that the representative of the United States, who was accredited to both Bukarest and Sofia, carried on independently, on

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behalf of American interests, a successful propaganda against the Central Powers. He was enabled to do so because the point of view was maintained and accepted by Bulgaria that America had not declared war on Bulgaria. Therefore, all efforts to remove the American agent failed.

Conditions in the Balkans presented an immediate danger for Germany. By means of a sharp control of the passenger traffic with Bulgaria we endeavoured to prevent pro-Entente agents from obtaining glimpses of Germany. Our measures, however, were rendered futile by the great, almost criminal, number of travellers from Germany who came under the pretext of escorting consignments of food parcels for the troops, etc. Most of this traffic was generally for the mere satisfaction of a desire for sensation and of curiosity. The annoyance caused by these people and their officiousness did not influence opinion in Bulgaria in Germany's favour. A further immediate danger was that German troops were exposed to the influence of the Entente intelligence service. The German commander-in-chief, General von Scholtz, paid particular attention to the patriotic instruction of his troops, and to the end they remained proof against evil influences. But as far as the political success of the Entente and the political collapse of Bulgaria were concerned, our troops were, of course, powerless.

H

As has been mentioned, the enemy's secret service found at Smyrna an entrance into Asia Minor. It had another base in the English Fleet at Mitylene,

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and English intelligence bureaux on a big scale were established in Galatz and Syria. General Townsend, who was taken prisoner at Kut, and who, during the rest of the War, lived on Prinkipo Island, was another source of information, for the Sublime Porte allowed him complete liberty of movement, and he associated with all the neutral representatives. The I.S. also had a fixed centre in an interned American guard-ship. Over against Russia, the Black Sea and the Caucasus Mountains formed complete barriers. On the other hand, the Russian I.S. in Holland, the activity of which I have already mentioned, was at work along the Mediterranean to Constantinople. In the Caucasus there was lively intercourse by means of deserters. It often happened that these deserters changed sides four or five times, according as the general treatment improved in one camp or the other, but, as far as the I.S. was concerned, their usefulness was strictly local.

In all the active I.S. work in Turkey scarcely a single Turk was employed, and Turkey was the only war-region in which women played no rôle. There were scarcely any "neutral" spies, because conditions in Turkey were so peculiar that the enemy I.S. apparently only concerned itself with inhabitants who knew local conditions. The spies whom we caught were mostly Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. The Greeks or Levantines were, as a rule, cowardly; the Jews showed themselves to be very anti-Turkish and, of all the Entente States, worked most readily for England. As spies, Armenians were very determined and dreaded. They placed great difficulties in the way of the Turks and

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that led to more severe measures against them. The enemy intelligence service cannot, therefore, escape blame for the fate of the Armenians during the War. In the fight against espionage a cause of trouble was the fact that the "Sûreté Générale" and the Police Prefect of Constantinople were not one and the same authority, that office hours were scrupulously adhered to, and that no overtime was worked. In itself the Turkish police was smart and energetic, well-trained by political intrigue and, for that reason, feared.

It was not easy for the German I.S. to adapt itself to Turkish conditions, because it was not familiar with them. But as leading Turkish I.S. officers became acquainted with German officers and German officers were sent to Turkey, it was, nevertheless, possible to bring about a tolerable working arrangement.

We succeeded in putting a stop to the activity of a large number of enemy agents. This was, indeed, done to such an extent that the courts were congested. The punishments were severe, and were laid down in a measure which the German Reichstag refused to pass into law but which was put into force in Turkey. The conditions in the Turkish prisons, filled to overflowing with spies, were pathetic, and a great deal of typhus prevailed. This espionage *en masse* and the consequent delays in the course of justice were certainly fatal to many innocent persons.

Much valuable news doubtless reached the Entente because high Turkish dignitaries were really on its side and kept up relations with it. The Commander

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in Smyrna, Rachmi Bey, for example, favoured foreign influences to an extent that was not good for the interests of the Central Powers. The friendship of these circles with the Entente was older than relationships with Germany. Even the Sublime Porte did not energetically assist the fight against foreign influence. A back door was obviously being left open for eventualities. The loyalty of the army to its allies was, however, all the more pronounced. Its chief leader was Enver Pasha, who agreed to every request of the I.S. The Turkish people, too, were against every kind of propaganda, including the Bolshevist, and were, by reason of their faith, proof against it. The Turkish military leaders, therefore, appreciated all the more the danger threatening Germany through the propaganda which aimed at splitting the Central Powers and their allies. Indeed, they often drew the attention of the German High Command to the visible detrimental results. It was certainly remarkable how well the authorities in Constantinople were informed regarding conditions in Germany. Politicians were constantly going to see for themselves how things were in the Fatherland. With Austria-Hungary relations were good, though there was some suspicion regarding her intelligence service, because it had been active in Turkey before the War with a view, above all, to winning commercial influence. Austria-Hungary did not abstain from this during the War, and, as a result, the reliance placed in the representatives of that country was less than that reposed in the Germans. Constantinople was also well-informed regarding conditions in Bulgaria, and the Turkish

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authorities warned those concerned of the obvious success of the hostile propaganda among the people and in the army of that country.

The Turks' own I.S. had no central point. The theatres of war lay far from each other, and each independent army had its own intelligence service.

A very extensive and cleverly conducted political service spread, under military control, far into Central Asia. This was, however, regarded as a purely Turkish concern, and its aims and achievements were kept secret from us.

IH

Many unjust charges have been brought against the Austro-Hungarian army with regard to its behaviour in the War. They are unjust in that the troops which were true to the Monarchy did not fail in courage in doing their duty. But, as a whole, the army was unequal to the demands which a World War made upon it. Every army is but a part of a people. No army can exist when the people are split up into parties and races. The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian union was the aim of powerful forces before the War, and in order rightly to estimate the effect of that on the army it is necessary to know how matters developed over a considerable period of time. After 1908 this destructive propaganda set in with renewed force. The civil authorities had to pay attention to the work of counteracting it; the chief military authorities were confined to holding the influence of this disintegrating activity as far as possible away from the troops. Though they did all that was possible

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in this way, it was still not possible for them to destroy the year-long labour of this particular propaganda.

It was held back by military training and public eruption was prevented, but it could not be wholly uprooted. Of course, this hostile propaganda did not operate only among the civil population; it found its way into the barracks, and it has been proved that it worked in close, co-operation with the general staffs of countries hostile to the Dual Monarchy. It was a part of the foreign I.S. before the War, and when the struggle came it went over wholly to this service.

When military authorities concerned themselves with the matter in peace-time, they were accused of pessimism and were opposed by those circles in the Dual Monarchy who were in touch with its enemies.

Russia had, since the 'eighties, since war with Austria-Hungary appeared to be inevitable, been carrying on espionage. After the Russo-Japanese War this increased against Germany and against Austria-Hungary as well. There was this difference : in the case of Germany, France was the driving power, while Russia had, as far as Austria was concerned, her own political motives. The Russian espionage in the Dual Monarchy was even more active than in Germany. In 1910, 19 Russian spies were brought to trial; in 1913, 34; and in 1914, up to the War, 36. Russia could always find willing helpers among the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary, so she carried on her espionage by means of large groups of spies—often as many as twenty

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agents forming a group. The espionage net was cast over the whole country, from the Carpathians to the mountains of the Tirol and the plateau of Bosnia. In all large towns its agents sat, and during a whole generation nearly every Russian military attaché in Vienna had to leave his post because he had been caught spying. Colonel Martschenko, a military attaché who had to go in 1910, had in his service an Austrian *militaire* who had been working for Russia for twenty years. In 1913 Colonel Sankiewicz had to leave because he was compromised by his relationships with a lieutenant at the Military Academy, with another officer, and with several other persons connected with the army in one way or another. In addition to the Russian military attachés, the Russian consuls were active in espionage, and so were Russian priests and members of the Embassy staff. In Eastern Galicia, the Ruthenians, racially related to the Russians, rendered enthusiastic service to the Russian I.S. Priests, deputies, advocates, and judges helped as well, and the Ruthenian schools and associations were centres for the Pan-Slav and Great-Serbian propaganda and sheltered its agents.

Russian agitators did not only travel all over Galicia but also through the other Slav parts of the Monarchy, and prominent personages from these regions, and living in Moscow and St Petersburg, offered their services. It was the same people who, during the War, supported the activities of the revolutionary committees, who sabotaged the war loans and represented military service for Austria as degrading. No fewer than one hundred and forty death sentences on Russian spies caught in the

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interior of the country were passed during the first two years of the War. Political leaders, like Kramarsch and Raschin, were condemned to death but received pardon through an amnesty.

In spite of its membership of the Triple Alliance, Italy carried on a widespread espionage service against Austria-Hungary. Up to 1902 she had almost exclusively concerned herself with France, but after that year her main I.S. work was done in Austria-Hungary. The number of Italians who were arrested and condemned was, comparatively speaking, small, but that is accounted for by the fact that they were protected by the population of the Irredenta on the south-west frontier region. It was especially the Dante Alighieri Association which bestowed great care on the propagation of irredentism. Publicly, its *raison d'être* was the protection and the spread of the Italian language. It was, of course, proscribed in Austria, but still countless Austrians belonged to the central organisation in Rome and to the local branches in northern Italy. It was in close touch with the I.S. of the Italian General Staff. Its agents were at Trieste, Rovereto, Trent, Pola, Goritza, and many other towns. As it delivered secret documents regarding the Austrian army to the Italians, it is clear that among its members were Austrian military with pro-Italian feelings. These were termed "amici," that is, friends, because they did not work for money but out of a belief in the objects of the association.

A peculiar minor espionage in Austria-Hungary was very successful. It was carried on by spies who came to the country every year with the

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thousands of Italian workers who found temporary work in the Dual Monarchy. Numerous officials, too, were of Italian origin. A series of high-treason cases which took place during the War showed the real character of many members of the Lega Nazionale, the Giovanni Fiume, and other associations, the ostensible purposes of which were only cultural. The documents of one of the Italian army commands captured in the War gave a whole list of persons, mostly belonging to the southern Tirol, who had delivered to the I.S. bureau in Verona all that was worth knowing regarding the military position in the Tirol.

As Russia penetrated the Dual Monarchy up to the Italian frontier, so Italy worked inwards as far as Budapest and Bosnia.

Out of regard for the Triple Alliance relationships, the Italian consulates were treated with indulgence, though they were also engaged in secret service work. The Italian military attachés did the same up to 1906, in which year Major Delmastro compromised himself and had to leave Vienna. After that year they were instructed to refrain from I.S. work. This prohibition did not, however, extend to the Italian naval attaché.

Then the Italian Irredenta was linked up with the Serbian Irredenta, which was thoroughly saturated with Great-Serbian propaganda. Again, these maintained close relationships with the Roumanian Irredenta and that of Czecho-Slovakia. Thus round the Monarchy was a cordon which was only open on the Bavarian part of the German frontier. The Great-Serbian propaganda, which spread itself over

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Croatia, Slavonia, the southern part of Hungary, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia, opened up, after the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an extensive espionage as a preparation for immediate war. It was a part of the national programme, to realise which was the duty of every good Serbian, whether he lived in Serbia or Austria-Hungary. This propaganda was embodied in the Narodna Otbrana, at the head of which was General Bozo Jankovic, and the ultimate aim was an insurrection, and, in the event of war, the rendering of assistance to the Serbian army. The comitaji schools in Cuprija and Prokuplie trained the leaders of the bands, which consisted of ex-service men, teachers, and priests of the Greek Orthodox Church. The Serbian I.S. officers were members of the Narodna Otbrana, which, just like the Dante Alighieri Association, was outwardly a harmless society, the *raison d'être* of which was to provide a higher culture for the Serbians of the Dual Monarchy. In close touch with the Narodna Otbrana there were, in Austria-Hungary, other cultural societies, anti-alcohol associations, sport clubs, and student corps. The fight against the Great-Serbian propaganda was even more difficult than that against the Italian or the Russian, because the struggle was hampered by the lack of education of the loyal population and the indifference of the Mohammedans in Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the documents of the Serbian I.S. were captured in the War, it was possible to hand over to the courts a large number of spies and traitors, many of whom were found guilty and punished.

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After the outbreak of the War the headquarters of the Great-Serbian propaganda were transferred to a foreign country. Leaders like Dr Trumbic, the Mayor of Spalato, were able to get away in time. Then there was formed a Southern Slav Committee which consisted almost entirely of subjects of the Dual Monarchy. It had its headquarters first in Rome, then in Paris, and subsequently in London. It regarded itself as the united popular representation of all the southern Slavs. In 1917 it laid down its political programme in the Treaty of Corfu, according to which the future State of the Southern Slavs was to be formed under the sceptre of the Serbian Royal House. The propaganda to back this up was mainly carried on in America, among prisoners of war, and in Switzerland. Three great societies were formed in America—the Central Associations of the Croats, the Serbs, and the Slovenes. At the head of them was the Southern Slav National Council in Washington. It worked in close relationship with the Southern Slav Club in the Austrian Reichsrat, which had accepted the Corfu programme. This propaganda caused numerous desertions. Out of deserters the Montenegrins formed three battalions and the Serbs an Adriatic Legion. In Odessa, too, two whole divisions were brought together, and in America units were composed of Southern Slavs from Austria-Hungary. It was obvious that a definite propaganda was carried on among the prisoners who, after the Serbian retreat, were transported to France.

Espionage and propaganda were so closely intertwined in Austria-Hungary that it is impossible to think of the one without the other. It is easily

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understood that the front of the army of the Central Powers which had, under such circumstances, to fight against Russians, Serbs, and Italians, was bound to have many fragile sections. As the State, so was the army corroded by the work of the hostile intelligence service. The seed, planted by years of work before the War, sprang up during the struggle. Austria-Hungary, just like Bulgaria, is a warning example of the effect of a systematic preparation for war by means of splitting the unity of the people. The collapse of both countries was hastened, too, by the signs of decomposition in Germany as well.

CHAPTER IX

IN THE THEATRES OF WAR : THE WEST FRONT

Secrets which were kept—French precautions—Use of carrier-pigeons—A spy at the German G.H.Q.—How a French force held out behind the German lines—The Kaiser in danger—Spies in sporting attire!—Entente “colonises” German war area with secret agents—Spies landed from aeroplanes and balloons—Training a population in espionage—“News Balloons”—How secret wireless stations were set up—Widespread Entente propaganda—German help—Effect of propaganda in Germany and on German troops—A French Socialist’s trick.

IN spite of all espionage and the endeavours to entice Germans to commit treason before the War, important military secrets, such as the provision of the German artillery with “Big Bertas” and the details of the German advance, were kept secret from the French. This enabled the right wing of the German army to make its surprisingly rapid advance, and thus the whole espionage system which the French had prepared for the eventuality of war in Germany was rendered useless.

Only on the southern wing, where the Germans stood on their own territory and the French had pushed forward on to German soil, was it possible for the French to put into effect some of their I.S. preparations. The pro-German inhabitants, whose names were listed, were arrested and carried off to

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France. Quite a number of Alsatians and Lorrainers went to France and strengthened the I.S. there. After the march up to the Donon, a military motor-lorry driver, the son of a manufacturer in Broischtal, went over the river and joined the French. He took with him, of course, a great deal of valuable information. Later he appeared as a French I.S. officer in Switzerland. Such a surprisingly large number of Alsatians and Lorrainers acted as spies from the beginning of the War onwards that the High Command had to forbid the employment of them in any positions where they would get an insight into important matters. Our southern wing was threatened not only by the attitude of the population but also by espionage from Switzerland. In spite of the fact that the authorities in Alsace-Lorraine had, to a certain extent, been trained to fight against espionage, it was, nevertheless, difficult for them at the outbreak of the War, as it was later, to stop it altogether. Though the area of operations was cut off from Switzerland by a guarded barbed-wire fence, though the German-Swiss land-frontier was relatively short, and though the water-frontier of Lake Constance provided a certain protection, yet, during the whole of the War, a very considerable espionage was carried on between the Alsatian theatre of war and Switzerland. This was made easy by the fact that, in barring the frontier, four German States, the Reichsland (Alsace and Lorraine), Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, were concerned. A considerable time passed before the police of these States, accustomed to independent action in peacetime, could be made to co-operate with each other.

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But as soon as this was accomplished and the shutting of the frontier made effective, new difficulties arose, because the German frontier population objected to the prohibition of travel-communication with Switzerland. The injurious results were mitigated, however, in that the southern wing of the army was not the most important.

The advance of the right wing of the army led it into the jurisdiction of the "service de renseignement territorial," which had been set up in France at the same time as the "service de renseignement étranger." In May 1899 the Prime Minister sent a secret instruction to all the prefects, informing them that field-watchmen, custom-house officers, country postmen, river-guards, and road inspectors, all the officials working in the open air, that is, were for I.S. purposes placed at the disposal of the Special Commissioner. The whole country was divided in one hundred and twenty-two sections which, on the frontier and in the neighbourhood of important military depots, were smaller and more liberally provided with officials than were those sections farther inland. Since 1900 a local intelligence service had, therefore, been in existence in case France should be the theatre of war.

As the advance brought the headquarters of the Special Commissioners into the hands of the Germans, searches in their offices brought specially valuable material to light. Among other things were the lists of all the agents, who were arrested and taken off to Germany before they could begin their activity. The picture was everywhere the same. After the first victorious German battles

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in the advance, carrier-pigeons and instructions were brought to the agents by military motor vehicles. They had become accustomed in peace-time to the handling of these pigeons, and the pigeons were trained to fly to newsgathering stations. In the lists we found numerous agents in Luxemburg and Belgium with whom carrier-pigeon communication had been practised before the War at fixed intervals. French I.S. officers brought them baskets with pigeons. All the pigeons of the fortress of Sedan had been trained to fly to Luxemburg and Belgium. Years before the War a high railway official in Luxemburg, Fournelle, the head of an intelligence bureau in Brussels, had been in personal touch with the chief of the French I.S., Colonel Dupont. Two things were taken into consideration : Belgium as a theatre of war and Belgium as an ally. A number of spies who had been left behind were only arrested after a considerable time. For example, an Alsatian spy, named Henri, was discovered in 1916 at G.H.Q. He was called up at the beginning of the War and left behind in Charleville. He lived secretly with a family who gave him his food in return for various services. But when German supervision became sharper and he had become dangerous to his hosts, they decided to dispose of him. Badly wounded by his friends, he had to run for safety to the German military police.

Numerous French soldiers were separated from their units during the retreat. As far as they escaped capture, they were, like countless young men who reached military age in the course of the War, helped by the inhabitants to get to Belgium or

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Holland. These young men, sent to the front, were valuable informants for the French I.S. When G.H.Q. were, on 28th September 1914, transferred to Charleville, we received a report that an entire regiment of Zouaves was to be found in the Rocroi woods, and that it was foraging and requisitioning in and around the surrounding villages. Not till the end of November was it possible to surround these isolated troops. It was certainly not a regiment which eventually capitulated at Signy le Petit, but still there was a French company at war strength, consisting of 2 officers and 223 men, together with 4 Englishmen, all in uniform and with complete equipment. During the two months before this force was hemmed in, the Kaiser was in the habit of motoring through the Rocroi woods.

For the purposes of counter-espionage, we chiefly employed officers of the Alsace-Lorraine police who had been in the positions of commissioners attached to the army commands there. As they knew French and had acquaintance with the working of the French I.S. in peace-time, they rendered good service. But even in their ranks the French secret service had a hold. Police-Commissar Waegle of G.H.Q., unsuspected by reason of his position, was in communication throughout the War with that service. As a reward, he is now in the French civil service. The additional police force which could be placed at our disposal in the theatre of war was certainly reliable, but it had neither linguistic ability nor experience in counter-espionage. It was in no way prepared to tackle the work which fell to it. There were actually police commissioners who came along

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in knee-breeches and long stockings and felt hats with a sprig of chamois hair and believed that in such an equipment they would achieve success in the "secret" army police in France! These externals were, of course, quickly got rid of. The work of training the men was, however, wearisome and the enemy was far and away ahead of us. The French had in their special police, which was spread all over the country, a force thoroughly acquainted with espionage in peace. The first success of the German counter-measures was achieved in the spring of 1915, when the whole French intelligence system, even that working on French soil, was put out of action by the German army police.

It can be asserted that at that time the theatre of war in France was almost devoid of spies. On account of the very considerable coming and going between home and the front, it was doubtless possible to send fresh spies to our front, even across Germany. That it was possible in spite of all regulations and precautions for foreigners to reach G.H.Q. even was demonstrated by an American journalist who, without any of the prescribed passes and without being held up, paid me a visit in my bureau at headquarters. Other cases proved the gullibility of surveillance officials and troops. In the autumn of 1914 a woman was discovered who had been unhesitatingly passed everywhere because she was wearing an 1870 Iron Cross. Some months later a "woman army doctor" was arrested; she was wearing a service cap, a uniform-like blouse and a short side-arm with an officer's sword-knot, and had in her possession all sorts of papers from various

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hospitals. She deceived quite a number of army medical men, but she was, in reality, a criminal with a considerable prison record. Neither of the women intended to spy ; it was the desire for adventure that made them do what they did. The stories told of the fantastic disguises of spies belong to the realm of fiction. The first rule for a spy is that he should avoid any conspicuous clothing. Fables, too, are the many tales of suspicious light signals at the front. Such reports caused us a lot of trouble, but there was always some quite simple explanation. Many people, too, believed that secret telephone connections with the enemy played a great rôle in espionage. Even in the year 1916 at one of the army fronts a company of pioneers was, against the advice of the military police, employed for months in digging up roads and interrupting traffic towards the front in order to find an alleged telephone cable which was said to be buried at a depth of six yards. Clearly, of course, the first work of the counter-espionage service was to find out the wires which ran to the front and to put them out of action.

As the French intelligence service prepared for the theatre of war had collapsed, it was necessary to find ways and means to spread spies again in the French areas occupied by the Germans. It was natural that the enemy should try to get into touch by air with its own population. In May 1915 it was discovered that spies, provided with carrier-pigeons, were being set down behind the German lines by French airmen. These spies were persons whose home was in the occupied area, and they were landed in their native districts where they knew every high-

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way and byway. Germans, too, were employed in this way. They were mostly Alsatians and Lorrainers, who had lived in France since before the War and had avoided military service in Germany, soldiers who had deserted, or prisoners of war. "Air-spies" of German nationality were more useful, because they were better acquainted with army conditions and could move with self-reliance among the German troops. Frenchmen, on the other hand, knew the population and could reckon on help from the people. All the "air-spies" were oldish men. Under their civilian clothes the French spies wore French uniforms and the Germans, German uniforms. The latter were instructed to take off their civilian clothes on landing and hide them, so as to appear in uniform among the German troops. The French spies kept their civilian clothes on in order to go about among the people; only when they were in serious danger were they to take off their civilian clothes so that, if arrested, they could be treated as prisoners of war and not as spies. The "air-spies" had very complete instructions and were well provided with French and German money. They were skilled in the handling of carrier-pigeons and generally brought six over with them for the purpose of sending back the information they gathered. The "air-spies" were landed at night, mostly near the lines of communication in quiet regions where there were few troops, and therefore, not a great deal of surveillance. From there they had to slip up to the fighting area. They were promised that, after a certain period, they would be picked up at the same spot by an aeroplane.

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Enterprises of this kind, it was noticed, greatly increased when big operations were about to take place, and so we could deduce where the enemy was going to undertake such moves or where they were expected from the German side. The statements of "air-spies" and the instructions found on them gave us information regarding the intentions and surmises of the enemy. In 1915 nine "air-spies," four of them in uniform, and five aeroplanes fell into our hands. Attempts to pick up the spies again were watched. The French aeroplanes would fly at the arranged time over the landing-place, kept under observation by German counter-espionage agents. But the airmen in such cases flew at a considerable height, because the sign agreed upon that the coast was clear was not given. It was often established, however, that the promised attempt to pick up the spy was not undertaken. In no case was it definitely ascertained that an "air-spy" was really taken off again. They were left to their fate, and either fell into the hands of the German authorities or reached Holland by a long and weary route. Numbers of them were caught far behind the front in eastern Belgium. They were instructed that if they reached Holland they were to report to the French consul, who would see to their return to France. Some of them had instructions to destroy railway-lines and bridges in the rear of the German army, especially on those parts of the front in which a German attack was expected or an allied offensive was to take place. Regarding successful enterprises of this nature nothing can be ascertained. The usefulness of "air-spies" lay mainly in the informa-

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tion they sent by their carrier-pigeons. On one occasion a captured French airman said frankly that to bring back a spy was only seldom attempted, as it was too dangerous an undertaking.

This method of obtaining information could not be resorted to by the German military authorities. No enemy prisoners of war were found who would undertake work of this nature against their own country. To set down Germans behind the French front in the middle of a hostile population was quite out of the question. Even in Alsace-Lorraine the French did not engage in this kind of espionage; it was restricted to the Franco-Belgian theatre of war. There it must have yielded results, because "landings" continued right into 1917, a year in which seven "air-spies" were caught and an aeroplane captured.

The number of aeroplanes lost in this work in the year 1917 resulted in a new system being adopted. The spy landed by means of a balloon. The advantage about this method was that the landing took place unnoticed, because the betraying noise of the French aeroplane was absent. The balloons had a diameter of $8\frac{1}{2}$ metres and held 310 cubic metres of gas. They could only carry one person, and had a range of travel between 40 and 60 kilometres. The "balloon-spies" were trained in England. The period of training was twenty-six days, during which six trial flights took place, two being by night. Carrier-pigeons were taken on these enterprises. The task of the "balloon-spies" was not so much that of obtaining information as that of arranging a news service in the rear of the German army, the

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way out being via Holland. In the meantime a Front Intelligence Service had been organised in Holland. Four "balloon-spies" were caught in 1917.

In 1917 a third system, with the same objects, was devised. In this case the spies landed by means of parachutes from specially constructed aeroplanes. Between the wheels the aeroplanes had a compartment made of aluminium to hold the spy and his parachute. The airman could open the floor of the compartment and the spy, who did not know the moment at which this would be done, fell out with his parachute attached to him. In 1917 we counted three spies who had been landed behind the German lines in this way. One of them was found shattered to pieces; his parachute had failed to act. Spies landed by balloons or parachutes were a greater danger than men conveyed by aeroplanes to their destination, because the former landed unnoticed and their espionage system was on a broader foundation. Theirs was not the temporary activity of a single spy, but their aim was the organisation of a lasting intelligence service carried on by instructed agents via Holland.

In the same year came a fourth system. From aeroplanes large numbers of carrier-pigeons and little "news balloons" were thrown in order to prepare the population, over the largest possible area, for the work of the transmission of information. The pigeons were put in couples into small baskets; little silken parachutes were attached to these and so they floated gently down to earth. In the baskets there were food for the pigeons, instructions how to handle

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them, documents to be filled in, examples of reports, French money, and an appeal in this form :

“ The resistance of the Boche is being exhausted by the Allied attacks, which have already freed a part of French soil. In order to maintain the advance, it is necessary that the Allies should be well informed regarding the position of the enemy and his intentions. It is your duty, as good patriots who are in the midst of the enemy troops, to render this service to the Allies. The means of doing so are here at hand.

“ You may risk your life, but think of the Allied soldiers who give theirs so gallantly to set you free. By sending information you will be doing your country an incalculable service and you will hasten the end of the War.

“ We shall know how to reward you when peace comes, and you will always have the satisfaction of knowing that you acted as a good patriot.”

Baskets with dead pigeons were found in large numbers in lonely districts behind the German lines. In December 1917, 63 were discovered, in January 1918, 41, and at the end of May, 45, behind one army alone. These figures represent but a small fraction of the number of pigeons scattered behind our lines. A large proportion was doubtless made use of by the population. Carrier-pigeons in flight were constantly being observed. It is difficult to shoot them down, but this was done in eleven cases. They all carried important military information. This useful system was extended by the enemy in 1918. Pigeons were dropped not only from aeroplanes—that was often very conspicuous—but also by means of small balloons, of five metres in diameter, to which very ingenious devices were attached for letting the pigeon-cages free. The balloons carried a wooden

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cross, to each of the four ends of which a pigeon-basket was attached. In the middle of the cross was an alarm clock which, after the flight had lasted for a certain time, automatically released the baskets and eventually allowed the gas to escape from the balloon. So that the remains of the balloon should not arouse suspicions, it carried the words : " This is a German balloon ; it may be destroyed." Later, a slow-burning fuse was employed instead of the clock. It set the balloon on fire after the pigeon-baskets had been released.

Every occasion when pigeons were dropped served as an opportunity to incite the population. An appeal, delivered in this way in June 1918, read :

" The Germans will not succeed in breaking the power of the Allies. They cannot prevent us from achieving victory and from annihilating for ever that vile people which is the enemy of the human race."

In this way the German military authorities learned of many eruptions of hate in enemy countries and of their determination to fight till Germany was overthrown. When the military authorities had such proofs as these of the real attitude of the enemy, it was clear why they thought differently from the politicians who, living in the safely protected homeland, believed in peace by understanding, and who were convinced that the military authorities indulged in exaggeration.

The carrier-pigeons were, of course, very sensitive. They were exposed to death if not found at once. As a result the enemy hit upon the idea of distributing " news balloons." These had a diameter of 60

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centimetres and were made of tissue-paper of light bluish colour difficult to see in the air. They could be filled at any ordinary gas-jet. The packets which were thrown down contained one, two, or three of these balloons, folded and with complete instructions how to make use of them. Often chemicals were included in the packets, so that the finder could make gas on the spot to fill the balloon. They had a disadvantage as compared with pigeons ; they could only be used when the wind was favourable.

It must be mentioned that in the same way the enemy fitted out the population behind our lines with wireless telegraphic apparatuses. These were senders of the newest construction from the Marconi Works, with four accumulators, 400-volt dry batteries, and 30-metre antennæ ; by means of them messages could be sent about fifty kilometres. The packet with these apparatuses contained, in addition to the usual material, instructions in ciphering. The German military wireless stations often reported that small stations must be at work somewhere, but, though a number of wireless sets was found, we never discovered one at work.

The Entente military authorities incited the peaceful population of occupied France to espionage activity, in spite of the great dangers attendant on such work. This incitement was contained in appeals which were dropped all over the country behind our lines. Such appeals read :

“ Attention !

“ Are you a good patriot ? Will you help the Allies to beat back the enemy ?

“ Yes.

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"Then take this packet; take it, unobserved, to your home; open it in the evening when you are alone and act according to the instructions which you will find in it.

"If you are observed, let the packet lie. Note the spot and come back by night and get the packet. See that you destroy the parachute immediately; it can be of no use to you.

"If you carry out these instructions carefully, you will have acted as a good patriot, done a great service to the Allies, and helped to hasten the hour of final victory.

"Patience and courage!

"Long live France! Long live Belgium! Long live the Allies!

"For our native land!

"In order to hasten the hour of your delivery, which is certain, take special care in filling in, on the form, the desired information. Ask reliable friends, should there be anything you do not know. To establish your identity give the names and addresses of two persons in unoccupied territory. This will serve to identify you after the Delivery, so that you may be rewarded.

"Every soldier of France and Belgium is at one with you. Support them in their duty and show them once more that the courage of the oppressed is no less than theirs.

"Long live the Allies!"

After the end of December 1917 the enemy dared to drop pigeons and "news balloons" in Alsace and German Lorraine. They carried the following appeal:

"To every patriot of Lorraine!

"By providing the news we ask for, you will perform an invaluable service and hasten the end of the War.

"When peace comes, France will know how to reward you and you will be proud that you have acted as a good patriot."

But the enemy did not merely use the air service

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for espionage but also for propaganda. Up to 1916 airmen carried out almost exclusively the distribution of newspapers and pamphlets, which were in French and German ; they were intended to rouse and incite French and depress German opinion. The Supreme Command regarded this action as being outside military activity, and treated accordingly those airmen who were taken prisoner and who were guilty of distributing propaganda material. The enemy had, therefore, recourse to balloons again. They were constructed like the "news balloons," but could travel farther—towards the end of the War about 600 kilometres. These balloons, therefore, reached right into the heart of the homeland, especially into the north-western industrial region. Each one carried four hundred pamphlets, which it dropped automatically in small bundles as the slow-fuse burned away the retaining cord. For the people in France and Belgium it was mostly new French journals which were dropped—falsified issues of the *Gazette des Ardennes* and such "newspapers" as *La Voix du Pays*, *Courier de l'Air*, and *Lettres à Tous les Français*. The journals for the German troops contained appeals to desertion, strike, and revolution. Falsified issues of German newspapers represented conditions at home in inflammatory fashion. Forged letters from German war prisoners in France and England, and illustrations of the alleged enviable treatment of German prisoners in both countries, were designed to persuade the German soldiers to desert or to depress their spirits.

When, in 1917, the Supreme Command was quartered at Kreuznach, there was already a vast

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amount of material regarding this side of the activity of the enemy I.S. A collection of it, consisting of extraordinarily clever brochures, pamphlets in prose and verse, and of single leaflets and pictures, covered, several layers thick, a table in my bureau large enough for twelve people to sit at, although there was only one specimen of each document. General Ludendorff once ordered these documents to be shown to a group of Parliamentarians who had arrived at G.H.Q. As far as these people harboured the belief that the War could be settled otherwise than by arms, the material aroused among them almost unbelievable doubt. It was impossible to convince them of the hatred and the will to destruction of the enemy. At the front the I.S. officers had to see to it that the enemy's propaganda material was handed over by our troops. We were authorised to pay rewards for this, but such an inducement was not necessary. The troops themselves rejected this propaganda, and it was only when it began to penetrate into the homes, when the opinions thus created reached the soldiers in their letters and when the troops encountered it on leave, that the hostile intelligence work began to have an effect in the theatre of war.

The longer German divisions had to be kept in the fighting area, the longer they were exposed to the pamphlets dropped from the enemy aeroplanes, and the severe hardships they experienced helped this propaganda to achieve results. If the divisions were recuperating behind the lines, they were not protected, but had more leisure to study the pamphlets thrown down. In July 1918, in the area of one army alone, no fewer than 300,000 enemy

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pamphlets were handed over to the authorities. The number of those not delivered up could not have been small.

At first it was mostly pamphlets, caricatures, and hand-bills which were thrown down; these called upon the soldiers to desert, and were designed to decrease their readiness to fight and their belief in victory. In 1917 this action was extended, and political books and brochures were distributed in which Germany's war-guilt was demonstrated and a revolution called for. Among this literature were the writings of Prince Lichnowski, Muhlon, Grelling, Balder, and others. It is one of the most melancholy sides of the enemy propaganda that Germans worked for it or at least provided material for it. It increased the effectiveness of the propaganda when it could quote German sources and point to the support of representatives of Germany.

The effect of the propaganda from the air was, among the French and Belgian population, very considerable from the beginning. With passionate devotion, the documents were hidden and guarded like a treasure. It also happened that prudent persons among the French authorities made arrangements for the return of the provocative papers, in order to prevent indiscretions which might cause serious misfortunes to the population. At any rate, the air-propaganda aroused among the people an admirable confidence in victory. This had an overawing effect on many a German soldier, especially when he compared it with the people's state of mind at home, shattered by hostile propaganda and other influences.

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The fundamental attitude of the French population who were influenced by this propaganda was brought clearly to my notice by the following experience: On the journey from one army command to another, I passed through an extensive wooded region. There was scarcely a road which ran at right angles to the front. The district had been completely undisturbed by the happenings of the War. Beside the road, in complete isolation, stood a Château at which my chauffeur wished to ask for water for the radiator. In front of the château was a great court of honour, the entrance to which was flanked by two lodges. At a window I saw a white-haired matron sitting. I entered to ask if I might be permitted to see the interior of the château while the chauffeur put things in order. In the quiet, comfortable room, in addition to the old lady, was a young Frenchwoman of unusual physique and beauty. While she was looking for the keys, I asked her if the old lady was her mother. She replied that she was her grandmother and, answering another question, that she remembered the war of 1870-71. When I inquired what the grandmother thought about the War, I received the answer that the Germans were now much more cruel than they were then. I was surprised at this opinion, because it was quite impossible that these two women, in their solitude, far from the scene of the struggle, could have obtained any first-hand impressions of the War; they received no news from the front, and travel and the postal service were prohibited. I tried to make it clear to the young Frenchwoman that not the

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Germans but war itself had become more gruesome, and that plundering was, in spite of the severity of the authorities, an inevitable accompaniment of war. I related to her that, at the beginning of the War, I reached the French town of Vouzières with the first German troops and that we found that the town had been completely plundered by the French soldiers. The young Frenchwoman, who listened in silence to my defence of the German conduct of the War, pulled herself up passionately and flung this at me: *Non, monsieur! Ce n'est pas vrai! Si vous voulez ma vie, ce n'est pas vrai! Jamais!* I could not but secretly admire such a deep-rooted loyalty to her own people.

The enemy was prepared for war even as far as propaganda was concerned. Much misery was caused to the French population when, on the advance of the Germans whom they had been taught to regard as barbarians, they fled in panic from their homes. When they were overtaken by the Germans, they regretted having turned a willing ear to the provocative propaganda, and they cursed the authorities of their own country for having caused them to flee instead of advising them to remain quietly at home. The secret military police had, in the interests of the counter-espionage service, to concern itself with this state of affairs. Everywhere it was discovered that the local authorities, and especially the mayors, had, even before the War, stirred up popular feeling against the Germans. At the outbreak of the War they were the first to leave their posts, and they carried the population with them in headlong flight. The majority of French judges

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joined in the general exodus. The local police in some cases remained behind, retained their rights, and carried out their duties. The prisons, which in many instances we found to be deserted, were gradually filled again with criminals, but there remained but few courts to deal with their cases. The result was that many persons arrested by the French authorities for misdemeanours and crimes had to remain untried in prison during the whole course of the War. Conditions in these prisons, in war times and on account of the remarkable apathy of the French authorities, were very often miserable in the extreme. We tried to the best of our ability to ameliorate these conditions, and a royal emergency measure, providing that, in cases where no French courts remained, German judges should try the prisoners according to French law, could not be carried out.

The pre-war propagandists, who represented the Germans as barbarians, carry a heavy responsibility towards their own people for the bringing about of such a state of affairs. Right into the neighbourhood of Rheims and Châlons whole villages were to be found which had been deserted by their original inhabitants and were over-populated with families from regions on the frontier. As the Rheims and Châlons regions became war areas later, one can imagine the fate of these people, all the more easily to be understood when it is compared with what would have been their lot had they remained in their homes far behind the fighting lines.

The pre-war propaganda caused the same misfortune to the Belgians. It had generated hate

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and created a system of using the population for the prosecution of the War.

This disregard for the interests of their own people was shown in another way by the enemy propagandists. All means were resorted to in order to stir up the masses. This was not done only by scattering pamphlets, etc., from aeroplanes, but by messengers and propaganda material from Holland, and by the printing and distribution of faked newspapers in the occupied area itself. The public opinion created thereby was the most fertile soil for espionage. Countless secret printing-plants, concealed in the cleverest ways, were discovered. These establishments concerned themselves, too, with the production of false passes and leave papers for the German soldiers. With the help of these, efforts were made to persuade them to desert and to make desertion easy.

The faked newspapers did honour to their name. When the Germans had won great victories, these journals reported serious defeats. The Russians were always reported to be marching on Berlin, though they had long been thrown back across the frontier. This sort of propaganda passed from the population to the prisoners of war, who spread it in the prisoners' camps throughout Germany. The impression produced by it was extraordinarily tenacious. For example, there were Russian prisoners who worked in the neighbourhood of Metz and could hear the sound of the guns on the French front. But nothing would convince them that they were almost on French soil; they held to the belief that they were in the neighbourhood of

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Berlin, and that the sound of the guns came from French armies marching on the German capital. Many a German was at pains to explain the real war situation to the people. Outwardly, they were astonished, and appeared to believe what they were told. But in reality it was proved that many Germans who took part in this educative work unconsciously favoured espionage.

To counteract the propaganda among the people of the occupied areas the *Gazette des Ardennes* was established. With it a number of reasonable Frenchmen were associated, and it had a wide circle of readers in the occupied regions. These Frenchmen were severely punished after the War—in some cases sentence of death was passed—because they had rendered service to the enemy.

If a German propaganda similar to that of the enemy had been set up, it would have had to renounce all assistance from enemy subjects. The enemy peoples, including the International Socialists, presented a solid national front. Among the enemy's intelligence service agents in Belgium who were caught were quite a number of leading personalities in the Socialist movement. The Belgian Socialist deputy for the great industrial centre of Charleroi, who was employed at Flushing during the War, wrote to the head of the I.S. in Belgium: "I think it is important to express the approval of the General Staff regarding all my colleagues. I am greatly pleased with their work, and I thank you for the valuable co-operation by which you help to accomplish the liberation of the homeland."

It was reported in 1915 that a leader of the Socialist

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movement in France, who was in the army as a corporal, had been taken prisoner. He was, it was said, ready to go to France and work for peace. In order to verify the statements we asked in Berlin for the services of a person who was thoroughly acquainted with conditions among the French Socialists. The deputy Sudekum appeared, and after a searching examination of the prisoner came to the conclusion that his statements regarding his political position were true and that he should be allowed to carry through his plan. He was, therefore, put *au courant* of events, given civilian clothes, instructed by means of a journey through Germany regarding conditions in the country, escorted to Basel and there set at liberty. As soon as he arrived in France, the Press there began to resound again with the news of this effort of the Germans to break the unity and the determination of the French people. The French Socialist himself took a part in this and sneeringly condemned the stupid Germans. The deputy Sudekum was reviled as *le Sozialist du Kaiser* ; but in Germany he was forced to put on a field-grey uniform as a result of his patriotic action.

CHAPTER X

IN OCCUPIED FRANCE AND BELGIUM

Espionage in Belgium—A tremendous organisation in Holland—Thousands of arrests—A frontier which could not be closed—The electric barrier—A curious postal service—Distinguished “spies”—The clergy and espionage—Belgian and French women—Use of deserters—The bombardment of Paris.

WHILE the theatre of war was colonised with spies by air from France and propaganda was carried on among the local population and the German troops, the same was being done in Belgium by land from Holland.

Each of the Allies took part in this enterprise, and their offices were at Paris, Le Havre, and London. A joint bureau in Folkestone, under English direction, assured the centralisation of this very large and exceedingly complicated effort. In Holland, too, there was an English service, apart from the Franco-Belgian. It busied itself almost exclusively with investigations in the Belgian coastal region, while the Franco-Belgian service turned its attention to Belgium itself and the fighting front in France. Each service consisted of several independent groups. The chief English groups were those of Tinsley, the Comte de Lesdain, and the Reuter service in Rotterdam, of the van Tichelen brothers and the

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Curboin group in Flushing, the Bazaine group in Maastricht, and that of Major Oppenheim in The Hague. The groups of the French service were directed by Colonel Lelen in Rotterdam, by General Bucaille in The Hague, and by Emil Fouquenot in Maastricht. In close co-operation with them were several purely Belgian subdivisions: Major Haumann's group in Breda, Victor Ernest's in Flushing, and that of Alfred Lamaing and Lieutenant Mitchell in Maastricht. Working with them were the groups of Consul Wismael, of Consul Roover, and of M. Moreau, an engineer, in Rosendaal, and of Jacques Scheffer in Rotterdam. These chief groups had under them a whole series of minor groups working on Dutch territory along the Belgian frontier.

In the same way a counter-espionage service was set up to "queer" the work of German agents. The railway stations, the hotels, German businesses, and, of course, every German, together with the consulates and legations of all countries were closely watched. The English service had its headquarters at The Hague and Amsterdam, the French in Rotterdam, and the Belgian at Maastricht. Joint consultations took place in the Hotel Bellevue at The Hague. The central authority was exercised by England through a bureau at Southend.

Into the service of these two great organisations came Belgian refugees of all sorts and conditions. They represented the whole people and the whole country, and they placed their local knowledge and connections at the disposal of the service. Even at the beginning of 1917 the German I.S. knew of

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five hundred persons in Holland who were engaged in connection with espionage in Belgium. From them the thread of espionage ran to relatives and friends in Belgium, then to a central point and thence into the hands of agents, who were part of a system or "service," as it was called. Because of the tremendous extent of this espionage, it was not difficult to get on its track. If we did so, then, first of all, we broke the communication with the frontier by arresting the couriers. These were generally tradesmen, who, in order to conceal their activity, did carry on some sort of business. But often they were smugglers and bad characters, who were, however, specially fitted for the dangerous frontier and courier service. After the arrest of the courier, we allowed the service to go on as though it were not being interfered with. Without being aware that the communication with the Dutch frontier was really interrupted, the agents worked on and their reports came straight into the hands of the German counter-espionage service. Thus we found out where all the sub-bureaux were in Belgium and the north of France. When that had been discovered, we took action. At the beginning of 1917 no fewer than seventy-nine of these "services" were "bagged" and, in addition, four big enterprises were nipped in the bud. The number of persons arrested ran into thousands. There were single groups of as many as thirty persons of all ranks of society. Up to the time mentioned, more than five hundred persons were sentenced. Death sentences were passed in one hundred and seventy-nine cases, but the majority of these sentences were commuted.

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But in spite of this success of the German counter-espionage system, and notwithstanding these severe punishments, the enemy service continued its work with increased energy. The long frontier made it impossible for us to hinder the constant establishment of new connections between Holland and the Belgian people. The longer the War lasted and the more energetic the enemy's efforts were, the weaker became the resources in men at our disposal. Eventually, for this reason, the frontier control posts between France and Belgium had to be reduced, as had the number and the quality of the troops on the frontier between Holland and Belgium. We were compelled, therefore, to resort more and more to technical methods of shutting that frontier. A high, triple, barbed-wire fence was erected, and, at particularly threatened parts, a strong electric current was run through the middle one. Notices warned the population not to touch the fence, which was guarded at considerable intervals by old Land-sturm soldiers. Yet, in spite of the supervision, the warnings, and the danger, this was no real barrier. The agents of the enemy I.S. found ways and means of breaking through. They climbed over by means of ladders, getting safely through the electrified wires by wearing rubber shoes, coats, and gloves. They carried rubber staves to hold the wires apart, or they were equipped within insulated ladders to surmount the perilous fence. It was easy, too, to dig a trench under the wire and creep through. But almost daily we found dead spies on the wire. They had not been expert enough in the use of their appliances and they had been electro-

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cuted. The old Landsturm soldiers on guard, too, were not always proof against the pleas of apparently harmless frontier people, and, as a result, they became unreliable. Sometimes it was their kindness ; often they were heavily bribed ; again, they were persuaded by ever more and more tempting gifts of food. After a short period these guards had to be relieved or moved to another part of the frontier. Then every such change reduced the knowledge of places and persons of the frontier guard as a whole. Everything, therefore, went to show that there are no means of effectively sealing a land frontier in enemy country.

Still, the barrier did hold up the stream of enemy subjects who had reached military age, war prisoners, airmen who had been brought down, and spies—all going through Belgium to escape across the frontier. Numerous German deserters were also stopped, and thus the enemy did not get the benefit of their information.

In the north of France and Belgium these persons followed quite definite routes, according as their own secret agents or particular districts made things favourable. The German counter-espionage service had no particular interest in shutting up these routes, nor was it an advantage that the Dutch authorities should disturb the organisations known to be working in Holland. The more the enemy I.S. worked along known ways, the easier it was to counteract.

The members of every service had *noms de guerre*, mottoes or distinctive signs by which they could prove their identity to each other. Their news was written on small slips of paper which could be hidden in foodstuffs or elsewhere. They did not

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hesitate to resort to force to achieve their aims and often used weapons in resisting arrest. Several military police lost their lives in this way. In occupied France there were no railways or postal services at the disposal of the inhabitants, and permission from the local commander was necessary before any person could leave the place in which he was domiciled. But in Belgium a certain degree of freedom prevailed. In order to keep the economic life of the country going it was necessary not to stop the use by the inhabitants of railways, bicycles, and post.

Every sentence passed on a spy was made public by poster. But this did not scare the people. It caused them to employ children—who could not be proceeded against—as newscarriers and couriers.

A particular way over the Dutch frontier was made accessible to the German I.S., though not originally intended for our use. In Liège and Lille there were letter-collecting centres to enable people to correspond with their relatives in France. The letters were forwarded by messengers via Belgium, Holland, and England.

On the Belgian-Dutch frontier we arrested a number of people who earned a great deal of money by running this secret postal service. Among them were women who, hiding under their clothes whole bundles of these letters, assisted in the work of forwarding them by the roundabout way of Holland and England. They were agreeably surprised when they found that they were not sentenced to the severe punishment prescribed by the law, and that their postal service was, so to speak, legalised.

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They fulfilled, faithfully and thankfully, the obligations placed upon them. When they came across the Dutch-Belgian frontier with their post from France and England, they handed it over to us, and received it back again after we had gone through it. Thus, with more convenience and less danger, they could deliver the letters to the addresses in occupied Belgium and northern France. The same was done when they took letters in the reverse direction—those which had been collected in the occupied areas to be forwarded to relatives at the allied front. The messengers received the letters after we had examined them, with the exception of those which contained inadmissible news. Thus a good deal of information went to France and England in the form the German I.S. desired. All sides were satisfied. The system originally planned to do harm to German interests, was advantageous to us. The letters from France, many of which escaped the censor, contained a good deal of useful and accurate news, while the outgoing post did not do us any harm and, indeed, gave us an insight into the attitude of the people towards the German troops, led to the arrest of treacherous individuals, and, finally, gave us the opportunity of letting news through which might influence the enemy, for before it reached its destination this post was examined by the enemy I.S.

Out of necessity the German military authorities were often forced to agree to things which were advantageous to hostile espionage.

Distinguished persons had repeatedly to be sent to France in the matter of the care of the population in the occupied area. That such persons were

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questioned regarding conditions on the German front, and that they told what they knew, is understandable. Our military authorities had to decide to send into unoccupied France women and children for whom there was not sufficient nourishment, and who were merely so many mouths to be fed. Thousands of these people were carriers of information, even though their miserable belongings were scrupulously inspected. Only in the last year of the War were they submitted to six weeks' quarantine. At the end of such a period even the information they carried in their heads was not dangerous to us.

The provisioning of the local population rendered the help of a Spanish-American committee necessary. A certain degree of freedom of movement had to be given to the delegates so that they could convince themselves that the foodstuffs reached their proper destination. They had many conversations with mayors and other official persons. Though their whole activity took place under the eyes of the controlling German officers, it was clear that these foreigners saw and heard much, and that, once back in Holland, they were not under any obligation to remain silent about it all.

The church and other cultural institutions, as well as the priests, were, on account of a certain sensitiveness on the part of the German authorities, protected to a greater extent than was advisable in the interests of the German counter-espionage. This was soon recognised by the people and taken advantage of. The churches were often meeting-places for anti-German conspiracies. That priests actually took part in spying was proved in several cases when

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espionage organisations were discovered. In northern France, too, religious edifices were also used for espionage purposes. The spiritual office was misused. Particularly was the palace of the Archbishop of Cambrai suspected of being used as a centre for spies. In France a number of cases of this nature came to light. At the headquarters of a German army, secret maps, on which the disposition of the German troops was marked, were stolen. The thief managed to hand them over to a priest with whom they were safe, and the priest gave them to the enemy intelligence service. The only secret wireless station discovered in the western war area was found at the house of a priest in Flanders—though it could not be definitely established that the apparatus had been used for espionage purposes.

As "the cloth" afforded effective protection, it was naturally used as a disguise by secret agents. The counter-espionage service reported, during the first advance, that a French priest in the act of spying had been seized by German troops. On the following day, however, the news was corrected. The spy was an infantry captain who had been left behind by the French. This was ascertained by his having under his soutane and hanging round his neck a medallion with a photograph of his wife and his little daughter. This made us understand, right at the beginning of the War, the sense of sacrifice there was on the French side, even in the matter of espionage.

It can be understood that the lengthy period of military occupation persuaded some inhabitants, in Belgium but not in France, to offer themselves as spies.

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The Walloons, with their astute character, represented themselves as very suitable for employment as spies, even on the German side. They had moderate military knowledge, were superficial in observation and in making their reports, had bad memories and were vain. Above everything they were concerned to make themselves attractive, to experience something interesting, and to feel important. Flemings, in spite of their pro-German sentiments, did not offer themselves as spies in so many instances as did Walloons. If they undertook a task they carried it out in reliable fashion. Belgians who worked for the German I.S. were required to offer their services to the enemy service and appear to work for it, because every Belgian who managed to go abroad and who could and would return to Belgium without being in the enemy service was suspected at once and thereby lost.

The Belgian woman, who worked with great self-denial for her country, absolutely refused to have anything to do with the German I.S. In this respect she was superior to the Frenchwoman. As the Frenchwoman did not suffer as much in occupied France as the Belgian woman did in occupied Belgium, the temptation to act for the German I.S. was greater in the case of the Belgian woman. Among the Frenchwomen the German intelligence service had quite a number of helpers who acted out of hate for their foreign oppressors, the English and the Americans. It was also an advantage to our service that Englishmen in the French war area and Frenchmen in the English theatre of war were ready to be of service to the German I.S.; their conscience

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seemed to slumber when they were not doing anything against their own countrymen. On the other hand no citizen of the United States was in the service of the German General Staff. Thus it was possible for our I.S., in spite of all difficulties, to use the narrow available outlet through neutral territory to send observers even into the ranks of the enemy armies and to receive their reports back over the same route. If circumstances forced restrictions upon us, especially in regard to the number of such observers as compared with the tally of "air-spies" and persons from the local population who were at the disposal of the enemy, that did not do us a great deal of harm. This circumstance compelled the German I.S. to be more particular in the choice, training, and control of its agents, so that their reliability, safety, power of judgment, and skill were increased. In this way it avoided the confusion caused by the use of spies *en masse* which always produced great quantities of news, the worth of which was difficult to estimate, and in the volume of which the little that was important and accurate was lost.

We imitated with success the action of the French I.S. in inducing deserters to return to and act as spies at the front. It was also possible in France for deserters to go more than once between the front and Germany and to bring news of the greatest importance. It was not difficult to persuade them to induce comrades to desert and place themselves at the disposal of our I.S. Such signs of disintegration showed themselves only during the second half of the War and where they had already

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been evident in peace-time. The same conditions were met with among the French population beyond the war area—not among the ordinary masses of the people, but in the higher, international strata. As an example of the accuracy with which the German I.S. could work, even in difficult circumstances, I shall only state that the spot where each shot fired by the giant gun into Paris was precisely known to us twenty-four hours later, so that the I.S., in a way, directed artillery fire in this case.

worse than that to which the prisoners were accustomed. It frequently occurred that when an unusually large number of prisoners was unexpectedly taken, sufficient attention could not be paid to them on the spot. There was a lack of clothes, underclothes, and footwear. The chance of winning over the prisoners by good treatment was, to some extent, therefore, lost. The same possibility was present on the enemy's side, but, as has been definitely ascertained, he did not take advantage of it. The opposite method was adopted: prisoners who would not say anything were made tractable by bad treatment.

The enemy, who knew from the use he himself made of prisoners' statements what an important source of information this was, took the greatest possible pains to instruct his troops regarding their behaviour in the case of being captured. Orders regarding this fell into our hands, and so it was made possible for us to treat the prisoners in such a way that these instructions lost their effect.

The method of the enemy, right up to the end of the War, of inspiring in the troops fear of the barbarians and of captivity, had very often the opposite effect. Prisoners who, still feeling the effects of the violent emotions of battle, found themselves humanely treated, whose hunger and thirst were stilled—these prisoners spoke more willingly even than deserters. Deserters had, for obvious reasons, to be treated with great foresight, for the suspicions that they had come to spy, that they would curry favour by false statements, and that they would seize the next opportunity to disappear, were not to be rejected.

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The airmen of both sides were bound together by technical interests and a certain sporting spirit. In addition, many were quite young and the English and French airmen were often recruited from inferior material. Enemy airmen kept their respect for the German fliers up to the end of the War. In friendly conversation they gave information in quite a frank manner, and their news was all the more valuable because airmen often had exact information regarding strategic conditions, and, consequently, about the most important problems.

Intentionally false and misleading statements were made only by officers and non-coms. because they had some military judgment. The English officer, however, did not even do that. He was a model of silence, though sometimes English non-coms. and men of long service excelled him.

The effect of wounds and shattered nerves varied much. After having withstood heavy artillery fire, it was to be expected that the better-trained English prisoners should show greater powers of resistance than the French and Belgian. While, after such experiences, the latter displayed a nervous loquacity and an excited imagination, the above-mentioned influences caused the Englishman to be silent and often completely obdurate.

Lightly wounded men who noticed at the first-aid station that the barbarism of the Germans was not so terrible, would mostly speak under the influence of this thankfulness. It was the same in the case of the severely wounded in so far as they had not to remain in the most advanced positions, owing to the impossibility of moving them; or because the

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fire of their own artillery prevented their being transported to the rear. Their remarks only referred to the troops and not to their leaders' plans.

Gassed men were often very talkative and so were men in a high fever; the latter appeared to use the last ounces of their strength in order to give minute descriptions of their final impressions.

Some prisoners made statements which were models of their kind. Shortly before the beginning of the Battle of the Somme a Frenchman was brought in. He gave particulars of the whole plan of attack in every detail and with such definiteness that he was not believed. In the spring of 1918 an English sergeant made statements which were so comprehensive and, having regard to his position, so improbable, that they were received by us with scepticism. Later they were proved to be accurate. This was also the case with regard to one of the first tank crew prisoners. He had escaped unhurt from a tank which had exploded; for days he trembled and shook as a result of his nightmare-journey in the tank, and in this frame of mind he gave, going into the minutest details, information about his work in a tank factory, about the construction of the tanks, and the extent to which this new engine of war was being manufactured. The I.S. doubted the whole story until facts were ascertained which broke down our unbelief. The sergeant's details were so complete that a model of a tank could have been constructed from them.

Apart from purely military matters, the prisoners also gave us a good and reliable description of the feeling among our enemies. As far as their political

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views were concerned, they generally declared that they shared the views of the national parties in their own countries ; it was seldom that one professed to be or looked like a Socialist.

The first French prisoners were under the influence of the anti-German propaganda carried on in the French army. They shook with fear lest we should mishandle or kill them, and, therefore, they presented an abject appearance. When their minds had been set at rest, most of them expressed their satisfaction at being out of the fight. They were quite confident of the outcome of the struggle. They made it obvious that no other view would be tolerated in the French army. If one of them, when alone, showed that he weakened in this belief, he took care not to make this evident before his comrades. Their discipline was not nearly as good as that of the English. Respect for their officers and non-coms. was lacking, and their officers had not the manners of their English comrades. At the time of the mutiny in the French army, the prisoners were sullen. The French colonial troops, whites mixed with blacks, were excellent, and so were the negroes and the Malagasy who had been officially declared to be French citizens. They held life cheap and were cruel ; as prisoners they were refractory and difficult for the interpreters to handle. Among the Malagasy highly intelligent men were to be found, who, when carefully handled, were good-tempered and communicative. It was significant that they often complained of the lack of cleanliness which prevailed among the French. Apamites and other coloured troops were generally used solely as labour gangs

on the lines of communication. Only on the occasion of big offensives, when we broke through to the lines of communication, did we take a few of them; occasionally one or two would desert. The Mohammedans showed themselves to be quite friendly towards us, and declared that they only fought against us because they were forced to do so. The Portuguese made a bad impression; they were generally depressed. The notion of Germany was strange to them, and why they should fight against her was incomprehensible. They unconcernedly told what they knew. The Belgians were filled with hate—at least the Walloons were. The Flemings, on the other hand, made no secret of their sympathy for Germany.

Even after they had been captured, the English retained their strict discipline. Up to the end of 1916 they were accustomed to be without shelter even at night. An iron discipline, maintained by a severe code of punishments, was in their very blood. We discovered in a captured army order that in one army alone, within a period of eleven months in 1917-18, several officers and sixty-five men had been shot, mostly for cowardice in face of the enemy, but also for lesser misdemeanours. All the English prisoners were convinced that their country would win the War as it had done all others. It was seldom that any of them showed any leaning towards the belief that England could come to an understanding with Germany. The idea of an arrangement between France and Germany found only odd supporters here and there among the French prisoners, and those few were chiefly from southern France. It was

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remarkable that the Irish also sided with Great Britain in the War against Germany. The English battalions from South Africa were élite troops, and many pro-Germans were to be found among them. The English colonial prisoners were annoyed that their valuable divisions should almost always be put into action where the fighting was hottest and used to the last man. The Australians wrathfully emphasised that they were¹ dispatched presumably to Egypt, but were sent to the front in France. All the Colonial troops were like the Irish, united in their feelings for Great Britain and in the view that England had never entered a war which she had not won.

Before America's entry into the War, deputations from the officers' corps of the U.S. army were, for political reasons, received in Germany and in the theatre of war, though it was difficult to make staffs and troops understand why American officers should be at the German front while, at the same time, shells made in America were killing German soldiers. The active officers showed themselves at that time to be friendly—or, at least, not hostile to Germany. This attitude was also evident in American prisoners, even if their high sense of duty prevented all expressions of this belief. Officers who had been drawn during the War from other professions were, however, anti-German. The opinions among the lower grades were not unanimous. They regarded the War as a sort of crusade, and used the catch-words of the English propaganda at work in their country; the continuance of the War till infamous Germany was completely overthrown appeared to

them to be an understood thing. But there were those who regarded the War against the Germans as a struggle against a kindred race, especially those who had seen France's coloured troops or had had to fight shoulder to shoulder with them against the Germans. For the coloured troops they had a contempt bordering on loathing. Their views regarding the War itself varied. The regular soldiers had a simple military faith which a prisoner of the 1st American Division put into these words : " Our job is to kill or to be killed." Among the men called up during the War there were many who regarded the War in itself as an injustice, and who did not conceal their joy at being out of it. The American prisoners were perhaps robuster than the English, but they had not such great powers of resistance. As their divisions came to Europe one after the other and fresh material was always being brought up, the general attitude of the troops was not uniform. The first of the newly formed divisions to be sent to France appeared to be recruited from the inhabitants of those States which were emphatically anti-German—States where English propaganda had taken firm root and which put their faith in President Wilson's Government. Prisoners from divisions which arrived later and which were composed of men from Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and other States in the West, were inclined to be friendly towards us. Men from one of these States said unanimously that they were forced against their wills to fight against Germany.

The statements of prisoners gave us an impression of the relations between the different allied troops.

They were not friendly. It was the worst penalty—and it led to mutinies—when they were transported in company and kept in the same prison camp. Resentment was not restrained when coloured troops were brought into close contact with European prisoners. The French refused to have much intercourse with their Russian allies. No attention was paid to French wishes, but, on the other hand, English and American prisoners were protected, as far as possible, from contact with coloured troops. Judging from the attitude of the prisoners, it was impossible to speak of a real brotherhood in arms among the enemy nations. It appeared, indeed, that they were only held together by anti-German policy. If the German Government had been interested in these things, and if there had been a political propaganda on our side, we could have made much out of this which would have proved invaluable for the purposes of propaganda at the front.

The English looked with contempt on the French ; they complained of the lack of cleanliness among French soldiers and made merry over their slack discipline. They told us that the French population on the English lines of communication were handled with draconian severity. As a result much better order prevailed behind the English lines than behind the French. Strong forces of English police saw to it that all war requirements were promptly executed. The only point in which the English took the population into consideration was that they avoided quartering the staffs in châteaux, generally preferring asbestos barracks or other buildings which it was difficult for German airmen

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and artillery to discover. It was, therefore, very difficult definitely to fix an English staff headquarters on the map when we had only prisoners' statements to rely on. The English prisoners spoke of occupied France as of enemy country, and referred to the stern measures taken against the population as something natural. English officers told our I.S. officers that it was incomprehensible to them that the Germans should behave so humanely towards the French population. Their astonishment was all the greater because they, too, had been saturated with propaganda regarding the frightfulness of our conduct of the War. If one thinks how many different races went through the region of the lines of communication in France during the four years of the War, one can understand the view of many a prisoner of war that the inhabitants of the corresponding German region had a much better time of it.

The same refers to the region in the rear of the Belgian front. The Flemish prisoners especially expressed themselves bitterly about the lordly attitude of the English and their relentless methods of destruction on Belgian territory. The French prisoners appeared to be outwardly pleased that the English despised them, and French officers who were not saluted by the English displayed a certain nervousness in the presence of their Allies. At first the French regarded themselves as superior to the English as soldiers and gave vent to contemptuous criticism regarding the inferior value of the new English divisions. It was, however, obvious that French national pride was humbled by the thought that they must recognise the English

as the saviours of France. The superior English commissariat aroused their envy. They grumbled about the arrogant and lordly attitude of their allies in France and of the molestation of their women folk by the English soldiers. The callous destruction of their towns and villages on and behind the German front by English artillery and airmen filled them with hate. They often gave expression to their angry feelings against their allies, and declared that they would prefer the Germans to side with them and turn the English out of France, for the opinion was general in the French army that the Channel ports would never be evacuated.

When America declared war against Germany, the prisoners' confidence in victory rose considerably. The arrival of the American troops was looked forward to with enthusiasm. But a change soon took place among the English and French prisoners. It offended their pride that they should have to admit that the Americans were their saviours in the hour of need. The understandably small achievements of the newly formed American divisions and their initial helplessness in nearly all military matters led to the American troops being despised to some extent by the war-hardened English and French. But when the Americans quickly and successfully got through their apprenticeship they won recognition from the Allies by their gallant conduct; but the circumstance that they were there as rescuers, and the conceit which the Americans showed, preserved that estrangement which had always existed between the Americans and the other prisoners. As for the attitude of the Americans

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towards the French population, it transpired that they aimed at a correct and forbearing attitude and showed a natural and spontaneous discipline. As their pay was high and as they spent money very freely, they appeared to the suffering population as profitable guests and more welcome ones than the English and even the native troops.

It seldom happened that war prisoners deserted. It did happen that they disappeared among the population and remained hidden, but only a few escaped prisoners were caught on their way to Holland and, therefore, back to the front. If they did reach Holland, they were dangerous "reporters," for they could give information regarding everything they had seen among the Germans and learned from the population during their flight.

For German prisoners in enemy countries it was almost impossible to escape, because they would not be assisted by the population. However, it did happen that escaped men did appear on the scene. They had to be treated with great care because of the suspicion that they were sent back with the help of the enemy to make investigations and to desert again at the next opportunity. We established the correctness of this suspicion on several occasions through the voluntary statements of the returned soldiers, so we made it a principle to send these men to the German east front. This means of espionage, however, did the enemy a good deal of harm, because these men could give us very valuable information regarding conditions far behind the enemy front, and, especially, tell us what the hostile I.S. was doing with the German prisoners.

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This information was useful for the purpose of warning our own troops about the methods of the enemy. Shortly after their capture, prisoners underwent an examination on points of immediate interest to our troops. Then at the places where the prisoners were assembled they were closely questioned. This examination was continued in the camps, when experts and informers, mostly Alsatians and Lorrainers in German uniform, were employed. These informers were not conspicuous in big camps, because many different kinds of prisoners were gathered together there. Prisoners who were believed to be in possession of special information were kept apart, and we tried by gentle handling to induce them to speak or by severe treatment to force them to do so. When prisoners were speaking among themselves, their conversation was listened to by informers; this was done especially in the case of officers. In addition, microphones were placed at inconspicuous places, behind coat-stands and cupboards, in the barracks, and these instruments were connected with the office of an interpreter or an I.S. officer. In this way the conversations of the prisoners, who believed they were not overheard, could be listened to. They often spoke among themselves about the questions they had been asked and those they had refused to answer. Gradually the prisoners learned of this, however, and they adopted the habit of closely examining the walls of their rooms and of making sure of the trustworthiness of all those who lived with them before they talked about military matters.

In the inland camps the prisoners were not free

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from this espionage. The same methods were applied in order to learn what the prisoners' attitude was and to investigate certain questions.

In such circumstances it is not strange that maps which fell into our hands gave the position on the German front with fair accuracy. That was also the case with regard to the German maps containing the details of the enemy's front. Apart from the questioning of prisoners, there was a number of other means of obtaining information for the I.S.—enemy maps and documents, the badges of the fallen, and other things. A favourite plan was to bluff prisoners by giving them exact information about their own front, so as to make them believe that we knew everything and that, therefore, it was no use their being silent.

It was, therefore, not difficult to get exact information regarding the composition of the enemy front ; but that cannot be termed a great success. The difficulties of the intelligence service really lay in ascertaining the strength and disposition of the reserves and the intentions of the enemy leaders. In this respect the I.S. of the Entente generally and at the front, too, failed in spite of its vast extent.

CHAPTER XII

ESPIONAGE IN THE HOMELAND

Germany the only country open to spies—Elusive neutrals—Schools for spies—I.S. agents in prison camps in Germany—Getting the news out—Instructions to prisoner-spies—Science to the rescue—Letters, telegrams, and passes—Night battles with spies on Lake Constance—Four hundred war spies captured in Germany—Widespread misuse of the German uniform in Germany—Espionage among the nobility—Danger centres—Espionage through the Press—Political murders.

PROPERLY speaking, there can be no talk of a special enemy-espionage at home except in the case of Germany. The secret service of the German General Staff in France and Russia spent itself in the theatres of war which parts of those countries had become. As far as it could take an active part farther in the rear, it did its work under those "front conditions" already described. England and America were all but completely protected by the sea against the penetration of our espionage. For the same reason both countries could reduce the leakage of news to a minimum. So much the greater sensation did the few spies make who succeeded in getting in; the majority of these cases has been verified. But the number of them does not nearly mount up to the number of spies caught in Germany, as will be mentioned later.

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In Germany the conditions for the development of an extensive espionage and all the other work of a secret service were peculiar. Hemmed in on all sides by the enemy, she had also far-stretching land frontiers in common with her neutral neighbours. Still less than the frontier in the rear of the battling army of the West could these frontiers be barred. Besides, in her own interest, Germany had to keep up traffic with abroad. The enemy put no difficulties in the way of this, in order not to block the path of his agents. The separation of Germany from the outside world began first on the Dutch, Danish, and Norwegian coasts and on the Franco-Swiss frontier. It is noteworthy that hardly a subject of one of the neutral States, lying outside the ring of the belligerents, was arrested as a spy in Germany. Everyone who travelled from the west through England or France was intensely suspect. Enemy agents were recruited not only in Brazil, the Argentine and Spain, but also all over the globe and among all races. It must be supposed that they did their share of spying in Germany, and yet scarcely one of them was caught.

The populations of Switzerland, the Scandinavian kingdoms, Holland, and Luxemburg were, therefore, all the more fully utilised. There was a big choice for the posts of the lowest type of agent in the furtive vagabonds who made the neutral border-states their rendezvous during the War. Relations, too, were established with the porters of big hotels and the waiters in Germany who were taking the place of the Germans called up for military service. The same thing happened with performers at the

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smaller theatres, companies for which were supplied from abroad during the War. In this way dancers and others found their way into Germany as women spies.

But the enemy had his delegates in higher circles too. He got recruits among the neutral students in Germany and, with economic espionage in view, through the numerous business associations existing between Germany and the neighbouring neutral countries. It became known in quite a number of cases that neutral business men, dependent on the Entente for their livelihood, were forced, especially by England, to undertake I.S. duties. It was, of course, more difficult to get capable spies for economic matters. The general economic situation, indeed, could be understood without much trouble, but the position in particular branches of war-industry and agriculture called for expert judgment if the information were to be of any real value. Roumanian Jews often appeared as Russian spies, because they could move freely in Germany as neutrals during the first half of the War. They had pretexts for their journeys, particularly in the first part of 1916, when the Roumanian corn, already paid for by Germany, was released, and the export of medicine and machinery from Germany to Roumania had been arranged. And wholly with the idea of being able to send travellers into Germany on espionage missions, firms were set up by the enemy I.S. in the name of neutral foreigners, especially Swedes and Danes.

But military investigations needed an expert organisation. In Germany the transport of troops

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from one front to another was continually taking place. The enemy had to supplement his information about this—information picked up in neutral countries, for the most part casually, and that from the theatres of war, which invariably dealt with matters in the final stages of preparation. That intelligence, therefore, was added to by spies who were continually dispatched into the interior of Germany with definitely framed military questions. Agents for these tasks were found in great number among the German deserters in neutral countries. During the War desertion to Holland was easier than to Switzerland, because the frontier towards Germany was longer, and therefore more difficult to guard. It was also more frequent because Holland lay in the rear of the German army in the field. Because the English espionage, working in towards Germany, was predominant in Holland, German deserters there furnished most of the agents for it. In Switzerland, on the other hand, they fell to the share of the French I.S. A case has become known in which, in 1917, one Alsatian decoy alone brought more than fifty German deserters to the French I.S. authorities working against Germany. Destitute, separated mentally from their fighting countrymen, the deserters quickly yielded to temptation. As German soldiers they were capable of judgment and had acquaintances among the German troops. The necessary papers—perfectly forged—were provided for them by the enemy I.S. Comparatively speaking, only a few deserters went to Denmark. There the anti-German South Jutland Union decoyed them into the French I.S.

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The numerous Russian fugitives and exiles living in Switzerland did little to help the I.S., apparently out of enmity towards the Czarist régime ; but they took a lively part in it when, after Russia's collapse, it was turned into a socialistic propaganda service against Germany.

A fruitful source of espionage was also offered by the German labour exchanges in Switzerland, particularly for information about Germany's economic condition during the War.

Without doubt the trustworthiness of the agents employed by the French was not sufficiently tested. The reason for this must be sought in the fact that a high premium was paid to the decoys for each agent brought along. This easy selection caused carelessness in giving instructions. The Dijon espionage school for secret-service agents, who were to be sent through Switzerland to Germany, could only train comparatively few out of the great number chosen.

The training given in the Anglo-French espionage school in London was much better, for the English I.S. laid the greatest stress on the thorough education of the spies sent out, especially those engaged in naval investigations. This school was run on a German I.S. plan, by which the "scholars," divided into five classes, were familiarised with all the details of espionage.

It might be thought that the demand for spies to go to Germany was met by the sources referred to. But even among the war-prisoners in Germany recruits were enlisted. For this purpose there was a quite systematic plan. Messengers, fully instructed, were sent into the prison-camps ;

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or prisoners, who let themselves be taken willingly, carried instructions to the prisoners ; or a confidential agent in the prison-camps was sought by means of letters such as the following :

“DEAR COMRADE,—Here I have had the opportunity of talking to a Frenchman, who commissioned me to get as much news as possible (you understand me). He asked me to find a correspondent for the camp. I thought of you. I know you have some cautious and intelligent friends who will regard it as a pleasure and a duty to work with you, if you will undertake the control for your camp.

“Report on conditions among the troops and among the population, and, in general, on matters even of secondary importance, as these may yield interesting facts.

“I shall never write to you under my name. (In case of necessity perhaps you can get the right to send an extra letter, if I ask questions in my letters about the missing.) In general, you will write in invisible ink. For my communications this is unnecessary, because they will be concealed in jam-tins. But it may happen that I shall be obliged to send, by letter, a secret message which I cannot send you in a packet because of unforeseen circumstances. In such a case the corners of the notepaper or the card will be slightly clipped. Communicate these precautions to no one except to those people whom you must use as substitutes in a case of emergency.

“Every parcel will contain a tin. But the correspondence will only be found in soldered tins. With every tin you will receive a packet for making invisible ink. As for the developer, we shall send you a small quantity of that in case you want it ; but this will seldom happen, for the trick with the parcels is considerably safer and almost as quick.

“Burn every letter after you have gathered the necessary instructions from us.

“At the last moment I am told to tell you that, if you will concern yourself seriously and energetically about this, you will be remembered later on.”

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It can be understood that in every prison-camp there were several confidential agents of the enemy I.S. They questioned fresh prisoners about all they had seen among the German troops and in Germany from the moment of their capture. Sick prisoners who were being exchanged carried abroad the news thus collected. As this method, however, delayed the information, the agents generally preferred to dispatch it through the post in cipher and invisible ink. The whole of the mail for prisoners of war had, therefore, to be very closely watched and treated with chemicals. The officers were dangerous individuals in this connection.

For the French I.S., the prison-camps formed the starting-point for sabotage. The instructions sent to the camps regarding aims and methods of work provide the best information about this. First of all there was a general rule to be observed :

“ Look out for some safe, discreet, prudent friends, send us their names and tell them to mark their letters with a, b, d, so that these can be recognised in future and identified.

“ You will receive all the packets and letters. Act secretly ; direct and divide the task among these friends. The work consists of collecting and forwarding information, of contriving escapes, of instructing saboteurs and of sabotage. Use alternately the addresses I give you, find out a friend in the postal censorship. If you wish to have your camp censor's stamp, I will send it to you.

“ You must have your camp well under control. Perhaps you will all be needed for the German collapse. The whole organisation must be looked upon as a service which is assigned to you personally and to the Frenchmen who are proved trustworthy. You must always be able to deny any relations with us.

“ Arrange for the destruction of railway stations, military

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camps, public buildings, stables, munition factories ! Choose only determined and very cautious people for this work. Inform me in cipher of the particular directions in which you can work—airship hangars, munition factories, etc. ! I shall send you what is necessary. Do not move any object which is contained in a food-parcel without having read the instructions enclosed. There is danger in careless handling.

“Ask for what you need for escape—maps, compasses. The escaping prisoner must inform me of his route and of the place at which he will cross the frontier. Never say anything about this, even in neutral countries. After a successful escape the men concerned will be employed in the interior of France, but in no case on the North-East front.

“Name to me those who are disloyal ; they must be punished, even as the brave will be rewarded.

“Instructions are to be treated as military orders.”

When the formation of a group of saboteurs had been brought about in this way, more particular instructions, such as the following, were sent :

“Every man who goes out on field-work must urgently pass on the following instructions from mouth to mouth and carry out the orders with the thought that he is a Frenchman and is contributing towards the coming victory.

“Allot people their tasks ; show them how they can reduce the number of cattle, put sand in the machinery, effect short-circuits, etc., and how they can derail troop-trains.

“Where possible, procure sulphuric acid ; the spraying of potatoes with this makes them useless as seed. A bad harvest is worth as much as a lost battle. You are working for your country.

“Spread propaganda among the labourers on the farms and teach them to cut out the eyes and sprouts of the seed potatoes with chips of wood and knives ; you will receive, in rolls of chocolate, cakes or biscuits, small apparatuses for this purpose.

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" Answer immediately in case you want material for arson and pastilles for infecting cattle. If you say ' Yes,' the next parcels will contain pastilles or other things in a virus-tube. Read the directions on the box containing the pastilles.

" You can also have small apparatuses for arson, which will start a fire from three to five hours after they have been placed. Set these in big farms, railway trucks and trains ready to start. On farms, first give the pastilles to the cattle, then start fires. Then the cattle will be taken elsewhere and so infect another stall.

" Take your chance and choose well. Your deeds will be rewarded if successful. After every act of destruction inform me by letter or card, so that I may put it down in the reward-list.

" Write for what you want. I shall then send you great quantities of material. In conclusion, you must make such progress that in all districts the farms may go up in flames and the cattle die by fire. That must and will lash the foe like a whip which swishes down on the German people. In addition, obtain faithful friends, if possible. You are working nobly for victory and your country."

So the French prisoners of war in Germany were not, even during their imprisonment, released from war-duty. The danger to the individual, like the reaction on the position of the prisoners in general, was considered as little in this case as in that of the claims of the espionage service on the inhabitants of the war areas. But in a number of cases of sabotage it could be established that they must have been carried out by agents sent from the neutral countries, Switzerland, Sweden, and Denmark. We frustrated attempts, engineered in Copenhagen, on the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, bridges, railways, and factories.

How many explosions, fires, accidents, acts of

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destruction in factories, and damage to German food-supplies are really traceable to sabotage is hard to establish. For in cases where the plots succeeded, the traces of guilt were almost without exception effaced by the successful act of destruction.

The work of inquiring into and of bringing about opportunities for sabotage and reporting on successes were permanent parts of the French intelligence service. For the rest, its aims are best set forth in a sheet of questions-dated 1916 :

“ To be valuable, information must consist particularly in accurate statements and the sources from which they come. It is necessary to emphasise this point. Information applies to politics, economics, finance, and military matters.

“ Under political intelligence is to be understood : differences of opinion in the parties, the socialist movement, the views of the Reichstag and the Chancellor, the Chancellor's policy, his schemes and the plans he could carry out. The general moral, strikes, riots. The relations between the allies—Germans, Austrians, Turks, Bulgarians. Propaganda in enemy and neutral countries ; the efforts of the German Government respecting the latter. Experience has shown that much gossip goes on in Berlin in circles worth considering, and that news which ought to be kept secret is often the subject of indiscretions. It is possible, therefore, to learn something there.

“ By economic news is to be understood all general statements included under this head. Communications about foundries and the State-owned and private concerns are always of interest ; lack of raw material, wages, the provisioning of Germany by contraband through the neutral countries, Sweden, Holland, and Switzerland.

“ Financial news includes information about loans and balances at the big banks, the exchequer, etc.

“ Under military information is to be understood : wastage and condition of the troops, feeling in the army, the

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question whether political or strategical considerations have played the bigger part in the change in the High Command. The relations in the political world—the civilians on the one side, the High Command on the other. Casualties, material efforts by land and sea, the big movements of troops from one front to the other.

“Information must contain details which distinguish it from the ordinary reports which can always be easily got from travellers coming out of Germany. A single one of the above-named points, dealt with carefully, is worth more than a long report which only contains the usual estimates.”

It is clear from this inquiry-sheet that military intelligence takes the last place; the more the enemy set his hopes on the internal collapse of Germany, the more it faded into the background. This is clearly seen from an inquiry-sheet that reached the French agents in September 1917 :

“ 1. Feeling in western industrial districts and in the towns of Cologne, Berlin, Leipzig, and Munich. State particularly whether anything is heard of secret revolutionary propaganda, and whether people have already been arrested or sentenced.

“ 2. Is it true that a great Polish conspiracy has been discovered in Posen and that many eminent Poles, among them two deputies, have been arrested?

“ 3. What sort of troops are now stationed in Tondern, Husum, Hadersleben, Sonderburg, Schleswig, Kiel, Rendsburg, and Neumunster? What is the name of the present Deputy Commanding General of the IX Army Corps? Is it true that there is also a new commander in Flensburg? The attempt must be made to become acquainted with sailors.”

From this inquiry-sheet it is obvious that the revolutionary tendencies in Germany were not hidden from the enemy, and that even then he was

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paying particular attention to the centres of the movement.

American questionnaires were almost entirely political in their contents ; they contained questions like the following :

“ Do the Germans believe that they are going to win the War ?

“ Do you believe in the outbreak of a revolution in Germany ?

“ Are the Germans fond of their Kaiser ? ”

The English inquiry-sheets were mainly concerned with the German navy and with economics. In addition, by questions like the following, they showed England as the driving force behind the air-raids on German towns :

“ Accurate details about the air-defences along the Rhine ; result of the damage done in the Entente air-raids on the different towns ; number of people killed in them.”

The inquiry-lists of the English and also of the French commercial and economic espionage are impossible to reproduce ; they are too extensive. They contained the most detailed instructions and questions on every branch of war-industry.

The struggle between espionage and counter-espionage led, in the long years of the War, to phenomena which could not be foreseen in times of peace. Germany, being the country most threatened by espionage, was, therefore, obliged to carry on the keenest defensive activity, at least as far as the powers of the General Staff permitted. The supervision of the post and telegraph services, as well as

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the granting and examination of passes in the passport offices, was also within the jurisdiction of the General Staff.

When we discovered, as we did very soon, what the enemy was doing to overcome the obstacles we put in his way, the forces which the police had at their disposal were clearly no longer sufficient for the work which the General Staff required. In Department III B a scientific section became necessary, and, in addition, a department was formed for the safeguarding and continual testing of the cipher systems used. Chemists, physicists, and mathematicians, too, lent their help.

The methods we had hitherto applied in our postal censorship for the purpose of discovering cipher messages were soon out-of-date. Ordinary invisible inks, which everybody knew in peacetime, were easily dealt with by the application of iodine. A disadvantage of these fluids is that they destroy the surface of the paper. During the treatment, these damaged places were easily discovered, as the particles of iodine adhered to them and the writing appeared in a brownish colour. But these simple methods of secret writing were, during the War, used only by private people. They were employed especially in the letters exchanged between prisoners of war and their relatives so that information might be given which the writers thought would not be passed by the censors of their own country. The whole incoming and outgoing mail had, therefore, to be chemically treated at the postal examination stations. But very soon after the outbreak of war the whole organised intelligence services

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took up the use of chemical inks which defied the usual means of development. The least progress in their use was made by the Russian I.S. But most obstinately and right up to the end of the War the French I.S. kept inventing new kinds. The simplest plan—stopping postal traffic altogether—could only be resorted to in times of the gravest military crises, for there were reasons why Germany was obliged to keep communication open with foreign countries. The enemy was more favourably situated. He only needed to watch the postal traffic to and from Germany ; that throughout the rest of the world could do him no damage. In the scientific struggle between chemical inks and developers, the latter were victorious. No ink could be discovered which could not be rendered visible by treatment.

But the whole of the post had also to be read. Portions of letters, which had to be concealed from enemy-knowledge, were rendered unreadable by the censor's applying a substance which, it was assumed, could not be removed—at least, without destroying the writing beneath. But the I.S. of the country to which the letters went had an interest in finding out what the censor wanted to hide from its knowledge. Science, therefore, sought methods of dissolving the covering substance without injuring the writing beneath. Conversely, it kept seeking new media which could not be done away with. In this competition the interests of the I.S. triumphed. No substance gave absolute security.

The I.S., too, was continually inventing other methods of communicating news : under postage-

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stamps, between postcards gummed together, in the wrapping of parcels, etc. The collection of the counter-espionage service contained examples of astounding inventive genius and of laborious efforts.

The use of codes in telegraphing was universally forbidden, and yet apparently quite ordinary telegrams could convey important news in phrases previously agreed on. For that reason these, too, had all to be watched and specially examined in relation to their senders.

Wireless telegraphy was quite a new thing in the World War. It enabled each belligerent to tap the messages of the enemy. In wireless work, therefore, telegrams were given out, almost without exception, in code. While the chemist was playing a big part in dealing with the post, the mathematician came into the circle of I.S. workers for the purpose of deciphering codes. The Russians were the most harmless and clumsy in their code-system. The harm thus done to their conduct of the War was often shattering. On the other hand, the formation and the careful use of codes by the rest of the enemy powers was remarkable. In the shortest space of time systems and keys were changed. It was evident that the enemy I.S. was always closely studying the German ciphers and was led to its own caution by the results thus obtained. And yet, according to what German scientists found out in war-time, it must be taken as certain that no system of ciphers is insoluble in the long run. Frequent juggling with the letters of the alphabet increases the difficulties of decoding, but does not make it impossible. All that is needed is a certain

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number of telegrams, all in the one code. In consequence, the I.S. searched everywhere, not only in the enemy-country and in the atmosphere, but also in neutral countries, for telegrams in cipher. They were bought at high prices. In 1918 the Swedish courts sentenced two English agents to long terms of imprisonment because they had taken away from a telegraph-messenger a number of telegrams addressed to the German Minister and delivered them to the representatives of the English I.S. Similar sentences were passed in Holland, and especially in Switzerland, on account of thefts of political telegrams on behalf of the Entente espionage. The limitation of secret service in Germany to the General Staff had the unfortunate result that its experiences during the War were only of benefit to its own cipher system. Unhappily it was not successful in inducing the Foreign Office to let the ciphers it was using be examined and adapted to scientific progress. Hence it was explicable that secret political telegrams often came to the enemy's knowledge. The only militarily tested experiences as regards cipher systems were lost to Germany on the disbanding of the General Staff. The victorious countries, therefore, are now at a tremendous advantage.

The more limited communication by post and telegram became, the greater stress had to be laid by the I.S. on the necessity for keeping the frontiers open to travellers. A strict control of persons and passes was set up at the frontiers, and so the I.S. found itself faced with fresh difficulties. Its agents, above all, had to be supplied with adequate papers.

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In the matter of passes, therefore, a bitter strife was waged between espionage and counter-espionage. Forgeries, in peace-times punishable by law, were now brought to the highest perfection with State help and with the co-operation of our best scientific brains. Passes were manufactured which were not to be distinguished from genuine passes in make of paper, signatures, and stamps, and yet they were false in every particular.* The German passports were the easiest to imitate.* They consisted of comparatively plain paper. They were bound in book-form, so that it was possible without much difficulty to take out leaves and put in others, and the rubber stamps most in use were easy to copy. The passports of other countries were better protected against misuse and forgery. They mostly either consisted of a single sheet or else were folded according to the Leporello system, so that no one part of them could simply be taken out and another substituted for it. As far as the kind of paper used and their outer covers were concerned, they were works of art and mostly had embossed stampings. But all this did not prevent the appearance of false neutral passports which, beginning with the paper, were manufactured by the I.S. itself. The imitation of the signatures was astounding. It would be going beyond the limits of my expert knowledge if I gave a complete description of these very interesting activities. I can only state this much as a certainty: nowadays an ordinary control of passports no longer offers any safety, and agents sent out under State auspices are the most certain to be provided with the prescribed passports, to all outward appearances genuine.

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But spies were also in possession of genuine passports which had originally been issued to another person. Since 1905 orders had been in operation in France that personal identity papers should be taken from German deserters for use by I.S. agents. During the War a system of German passport thefts was set up for this purpose. The photograph and the signature of the passport-holder had to be made to agree with the agent's. Science discovered, for counter-espionage purposes, a kind of glue which prevented the photograph from being detached. The I.S. retorted by discovering a method of blotting out the photograph, of re-sensitising the photographic paper already used without destroying it, and of printing a new photograph where the old one had been.

For the prevention of passport forgeries science turned also to the manufacture of paper, and, as a result, papers were made which did not allow of any erasure or alteration. Finally, the use of photographic reduction in the service of espionage deserves mention. It accomplished the reduction of documents as large as a sheet of typing paper to the size of a leaflet a millimetre square. In this way agents could receive almost indiscernible instructions which they could read with the help of a magnifying-glass. The extent of the espionage against Germany led, towards the end of the War, to the establishment, at every deputy general command, of a chemical centre which had under its expert control all the posts superintending the postal, telegraphic, and frontier traffic.

But all these measures could only be effectively

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taken at the chief points for crossing the frontiers and at the landing-places on the North Sea and the Baltic. Long stretches of the frontier had to remain uncontrolled, as the number of officials grew less and less, so that anything which could happen did happen. The more that was achieved, the more skilful became the spies' method of crossing the frontier and their ways of hiding news. In this direction, too, incredible things were done.

We could not limit watchfulness to the frontier. The Rhine shipping, for instance, offered to spies routes by which they could come in. During the War it was still free to neutral captains. The regular river-police contented itself with carrying out river-police regulations. As a result, there had to be set up a system of river superintendence by means of motor-boats manned by experts under military control. This river-guard proved to be particularly necessary when G.H.Q. was situated at Kreuznach and thereby exposed to the whole enemy I.S. working inside Germany.

It was equally imperative to organise on military lines the defence of the German-Swiss frontier running across Lake Constance. Equipped with search-lights, motor-boats carried out this work. They had to fight many a battle with determined agents of the enemy I.S. who were trying to reach Germany by crossing the lake on skiffs. In great measure the import of material for propaganda into South Germany was prevented—propaganda which was intended to stir up South Germany against the North. In these circumstances the grievances of the Dutch and Swiss Governments regarding the

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restrictions on neutral shipping could not be taken into consideration.

It made for very great difficulties that the industrial district in north-west Germany lay close to the Dutch frontier. Protection against the pressure of the revolutionary propaganda of the enemy I.S. from Holland could only be difficult and incomplete.

All these circumstances presented extraordinary dangers for Germany's conduct of the War. That of the enemy was protected both by the geographical positions and by the fact that no German propaganda existed in enemy lands. True, at the beginning of the War, in default of an official propaganda in Germany, a large number of private persons, together with societies formed with this object, had undertaken propaganda. But, lacking official support and control and not being in a position alone to produce the necessary funds, one undertaking after another was given up. For some time a shy, silent, official propaganda did exist under the control of Herr Erzberger, Member of the Reichstag. But its productions showed their German origin by mistakes on title-pages and elsewhere, so that from the first they were recognised abroad as German productions, and were, therefore, turned down. Whole bundles of them must be lying to this day in the cellars of German representatives abroad !

The number of spies captured represented but a small fraction of those actually at work, and the spies captured and sentenced included only the smaller, less dangerous elements. The big spies and traitors knew how to avoid the counter-espionage police. The number of spies captured is no proof

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of the efficiency of the defence-service ; that is only proved if State interests are successfully kept secret. I shall give the number of persons sentenced in Germany during the War for offences against the treason-laws, because the nationalities are interesting.

There were :

235 Germans,	among	them	67	Alsace-Lorrainers,
46 Frenchmen,			5	Danes,
31 Dutchmen,			14	Austrians,
25 Swiss,			3	Englishmen,
22 Russians,			3	Italians,
20 Belgians,			3	Swedes,
13 Luxemburgers,			1	Peruvian.

The espionage was carried out in 175 cases for France, in 59 for England, in 55 for Russia, in 21 for Belgium, in 2 for Italy and in 14 cases for several of them jointly.

Sentences were passed in 33 cases of sabotage which, with one exception, were instigated by France.

The Germans sentenced had chiefly helped England, the Alsace-Lorrainers, without exception, France. The Dutchmen fell victims almost exclusively to the English I.S., the Swiss and Luxemburgers to the French, the Swedes to the French and Russian.

In how great a number of cases the aims of the I.S. were pursued under the cover of the German uniform is shown by the fact that, during the first three years of the War, 1785 wearers of a false uniform, including 384 false officers, were prosecuted in Berlin alone.

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According to an official statement published in 1919, 6000 persons were employed in the English counter-espionage service, working only against Germany. The German counter-espionage service, which had to struggle with the espionage of all the enemy powers, numbered, at the end of the War, 1139 persons in official posts. If the service had been in the hand of the Government and had been conducted by it with energy, the traces of the hostile economic and political espionage could have been discovered, and would, at least to a great extent, have been rendered harmless. This statement apparently contradicts the fact that in France the collective counter-espionage service was linked up in 1917 with the military I.S. But the reason for this action was based on the recognition that France had only a military and not an active political espionage—that is, neither propaganda nor sabotage—to fear from Germany.

It was a great advantage to the enemy that some of his allies only became the open foes of Germany in the course of the War. Up to their entry into the War they could move freely in Germany as neutrals. In particular, the Americans, living in Germany until America's entry into the struggle, furnished the enemy with abundant information regarding the development of the political situation up to that time.

International relationships of all kinds, too, formed a constant danger during the War. They existed in all circles of society, and they were the more dangerous the higher and more influential these circles were.

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The postal censorship gave us occasion to superintend particularly and continually even certain members of the higher nobility. There were many cases of internationally mixed marriages and relationships. The persons concerned had hereditary possessions abroad and were mostly accustomed to spend part of the year in delightful spots in foreign countries. The conversations and letters exchanged between such relatives and friends mostly ran on the lines of high politics. Then came the War, cutting threads and erecting barriers of which individuals were not sufficiently conscious. What could be said in peace-time might easily be harmful to the Fatherland's interests in war-time. Many of these people seemed to be quite unaware that conversations in neutral countries and the exchange of letters as in peace bordered on treason in war-time. It was particularly serious that indiscretions from this source were frequently committed in the company of personages intimately connected with the enemy Governments.

Precisely the same state of affairs existed in the international relationships of the big commercial houses. The enemy could, therefore, obtain news which kept him informed on great decisive questions and saved him the trouble of getting this information through small, isolated enterprises. In this way, too, influence in political and economic questions could be gained, that is to say, propaganda and politics could be carried out on a big scale.

The stock exchanges, too, constituted dangerous news-centres and were arenas for numerous enemy

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agents who could get news there and push propaganda as well.

In view of the domestic political situation in Germany, the completely uncontrolled relationships between the international political parties was a very serious matter. At conferences in neutral countries discussion was bound to turn to subjects of interest to the enemy's intelligence service and his propaganda as well. This was particularly dangerous for Germany, because her international parties took internationalism seriously, while those of the enemy countries supported the national war aims of their country. The parties of the neutral countries, too, represented something more than national, but in no case German, interests. The German High Command, therefore, as far as possible, fought against the participation of representatives of international parties in conferences abroad.

In this connection the neutral representatives in belligerent countries must also be referred to. The military attachés of the neutral States accredited to Germany received and deserved the full trust of the High Command. Nevertheless, the danger existed that, through them, expert opinions might reach neutral countries where they would not always be treated with the necessary reticence. It was not difficult for the I.S. in the neutral countries to avail itself of this source of valuable information. The same holds good of the reports to their Governments of neutral legations and consulates regarding economic and political matters. Active intercourse between leading political and economic circles, as well as eminent representatives of the German

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Press, and the neutral legations was, therefore, undesirable. It was another matter when, as with the enemy, these persons made use of such intercourse for furthering the war aims of their own Governments. It was, too, very harmful to us that the news-services of the neutral legations were only fed from Berlin, while the rest of Germany and its attitude remained a closed book to the neutral representatives. During rather a long pause in the military operations an opportunity was given to the neutral military attachés to tour Germany in order that they might become acquainted with our war-measures in the homeland. They also visited the abodes of German culture, science, and social welfare-work, and were shown, among other things, how high was the standard of Germany's national economic efforts in peace-time. They were greatly pleased with this experience, and their admiration for and sympathy with Germany were deepened. A similar enterprise on behalf of neutral political representatives had to be initiated by the General Staff.

Political events in Germany, particularly in the Reichstag, were of perpetual interest to the enemy I.S. They could not remain hidden from it. When events took place which were certain to put fresh life into the enemy's confidence in victory, I was urged to have the frontiers barred to post and newspapers. But such a regulation would only have been a purposeless annoyance to everybody. What took place in the Reichstag happened under the eyes and in the hearing of the neutral representatives sitting in the Diplomats' Gallery. Their telegraphic

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despatches in code were spread next day throughout the whole world and thence found their way to the enemy.

Among all the belligerents the Press was subject to censorship. Nevertheless, the most important German newspapers were systematically watched for news, in London and Paris, and the German provincial and trade papers by the I.S. in Holland and Switzerland as well as by agents in Germany itself. The chief papers were studied on account of their political and economic contents; the small ones, less carefully watched by the censor, because a careful perusal of them often yielded a great deal of useful military information. The big newspapers going into the neutral countries carried much information abroad by means of pre-arranged announcements in their advertisement columns.

Much serious mischief was done by the distribution of food-parcels. This served many Germans and neutral foreigners with a pretext for gratifying their curiosity in the theatres of war and for having a "joy-ride" to Belgium. On their return home they were able to tell a great deal, for that, indeed, had been the purpose of their journey to the front.

In the bitterness of modern war, as can be seen from what I have said, the "battle front" is not restricted to the theatre of operations. Not only the soldier at the front, but also the leader far behind, the statesman at home and even people in neutral countries are threatened by death, if the interests of one of the belligerent powers demand it, and if that power is animated by boundless energy in his struggle for victory. It is significant that the World

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War had its origin in the political murder of the archducal heir to the Austrian throne. Here also is a side of modern warfare which has become one of the tasks of the I.S. It finds out ways and means of removing politically embarrassing persons, seeks the instruments for carrying out such schemes, and brings about the deeds at the appropriate moment. The connection between such deeds and official sources is, of course, kept specially secret. The German I.S. has no positive information at its disposal, and it can only make its statement on the ground of messages and warnings received. But the German Emperor was constantly threatened. He was guarded by a special police force at G.H.Q. Measures for his safety had to be very cautiously taken, because he forbade them when they came to his notice. The same thing happened with Field-Marshal von Hindenburg, who regarded this supervision humorously. General Ludendorff was the best guarded of all, because he scarcely ever found time for walks or furlough, and, therefore, was continually under military protection. In a position difficult to guard, Field-Marshal von Eichhorn fell a victim to assassination in Kieff. In the Balkans, the classic land of political murder, Czar Ferdinand of Bulgaria was continually in danger. The German I.S. also received warnings about him. Agents came to the German I.S. offering to remove leading personages on the enemy side. The energy of these persons was undoubted, and they tried to persuade us to a belief that they could achieve their ends. The offers came mostly from Russian or Turkish circles, and related to the Grand Duke Nicholas and

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Venizelos. I remember one case particularly in which a Russian officer, a prisoner of war, urged on by the conviction that the War between Germany and Russia meant disaster to his country, for which he held the Grand Duke Nicholas responsible, offered to approach him, dressed as a monk, and to assassinate him. These and similar proposals were not accepted by us, although the principle, often discussed, does not lack a certain justice—that not only the soldier in the trenches but also the leader must risk his life, and that his removal may perhaps be of much more use than sacrificing thousands of soldiers.

It is necessary to touch briefly on these proposals if the description of the range of the modern intelligence service in the homeland during war is to be complete.

CHAPTER XIII

RESULTS

The German military I.S. superior to that of the Entente—German Command never taken by surprise—Entente reserves accurately estimated—The American forces—The art of deceiving the enemy—England's economic I.S. supreme—Revolutionary propaganda in Germany—The tale of a Bolshevik trunk.

THE value of an intelligence service cannot be measured by its extent but only by its successes. In this respect the German I.S. can only be compared with that of the enemy in its success in the work of collecting military information of value. But here it can claim for itself that, in spite of all difficulties, it proved itself superior to the Entente I.S., which was much more extensive and was favoured by circumstances. From the Battle of the Marne onwards, at the decisive break-through at Gorlice-Tarnow, in the advance against Serbia and Roumania, on the Isonzo, in all the great German offensives on the West front, the enemy command was surprised by the German moves. The withdrawal of the German front to the "Siegfried Line," too, remained a secret, in spite of the extensive preparations for it, and only came to the enemy's knowledge after it had been carried out. In the middle of July 1918, a German attack met, for the first time, a completely

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informed enemy. The fatal consequences proved the importance of preserving secrecy regarding the intentions of the army command and also the utility of a successful I.S. It has not been possible for us to find out how the enemy was informed, but it seems in this case, too, he owed his knowledge not to his espionage but to the statements of German prisoners. On the other hand, it is a fact that the German Supreme Command was not surprised by events in any case of importance.

In spite of the limitations of our espionage system, we received countless messages through it. If they related to military matters they were not immediately conveyed to the operations section, which only received them after they had been tested and passed by the "Foreign Armies" section. For the messages were often contradictory, and constant comparison was needed to distinguish the true from the false.

For the navy, any useful messages were handed to the intelligence service of the Admiralty. Messages regarding technical matters were directed to the German authorities concerned, and such as dealt with politics to the political department of the Supreme Command to pass on to the Foreign Office as it thought fit. Messages on economics went to an official centre at the deputy General Staff in Berlin, which was in touch with authorities concerned with economics.

At the General Headquarters, therefore, only the military messages were worked upon and were fitted together into a unified picture, because in this matter the military were the only experts and the responsible authority.

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When the collapse of Germany took place, the statement that the German I.S. had failed was used as an argument for the revolution. The leader of a bourgeois party, too, made the statement his own and thereby strengthened the impression that the collapse of Germany was a military one, brought about by false estimates and by underrating the enemy's man-power. This erroneous statement was particularly widely spread in regard to the reserves with which Marshal Foch had made the last decisive attack and concerning the American forces, the overwhelming numbers of which had broken the resistance of the German army. Both statements are false. On both questions the Supreme Command was accurately informed by the German I.S.

On 21st March 1918, when the German offensive began, 16 English and 35 French divisions stood behind the front. They were distributed along the whole line. The enemy expected the attack, but did not know where it would take place. These were the reserves, but not a secret reserve-army, on the enemy side. The I.S. established that up to the beginning of April the English reserves had been put in at the front, with the exception of one division, and that up to the middle of May the French reserves had been so used, with the exception of two divisions. At the same time, it stated that the enemy had brought up divisions from the inactive fronts, and up to the middle of May had 40 new French divisions in reserve, while the English remained almost entirely without reserves. This second reserve force of the French was gradually put into the fighting line during the second German

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offensive in May and June 1918. In the middle of June there were at most 10 French divisions at war-strength still in reserve. Through reinforcement by American and Italian divisions and the filling up of thinned French divisions the number rose to about 30 at the beginning of July. By this time the English, too, had formed a reserve once more of about 18 divisions. These reserves were now more concentrated than in the March of that year. Their disposition was known. So neither the French attack at Villers-Cotterets on 18th July nor the English on 8th August was a surprise to us. The only unexpected thing was the failure to act of many German troops. In the succeeding battles the enemy reserves were again heavily reduced, so that when the German Supreme Command asked for an armistice at the end of September there were no reserves worth mentioning behind the enemy front, and certainly there was no great reserve army with which Marshal Foch dealt the last decisive blow. He advanced rather on a collapsing front, or, still more exactly, he pressed against a front the homeland support of which had collapsed.

As far as American man-power was concerned, all assumptions regarding the strength which could be provided, in the event of America's entering the War, and the time in which it could be brought across to Europe, were matters for calculation before America's declaration of war, and were, therefore, no business of the intelligence service's. This calculation by the German General Staff led to the conclusion that up to the spring of 1918, 15 American divisions and numerous commissariat and labour

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battalions could be brought to France. The I.S. established, however, that up to that time only 6 divisions were actually in France. This was an acute disappointment to the French and the English. Their pressure caused a speeding-up of the American transport. The German I.S. had evidence in the middle of May of 10, in the middle of June of 16, in the middle of July of 22, at the beginning of August of 28, in the middle of August of 31, and towards the end of the War of 36 American divisions in France. It is, therefore, a fact that the American man-power up to the spring of 1918 was not underestimated but rather over-rated on the German side. The arrival of the Americans, too, was known a long time before their appearance at the front. And we were also acquainted with their methods of training in France. While the American divisions which had come first to France were in training in France for several months and then were stationed on a calm section of the front before they came into big operations, from July onwards divisions were used at the important points of the fighting line after two months' training, and later after only one month. They distinguished themselves here by dashing onslaughts, but had to pay with much blood for their inexperience, in spite of which they had been of necessity thrown into the fight.

The statement, therefore, that the German Supreme Command was surprised by the strength of the enemy was invented to justify the revolution and is untrue, but, on the other hand, it is correct that single sectors of the German front were surprised by enemy operations. In spite of this,

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too, the I.S. gave information correctly and in good time. That does not mean, of course, that its messages were believed by leaders or troops in every case. It is not a matter of messages alone. The commander has the last word. Of course, only the most important messages come directly before him himself. As a rule he has to depend on the collective opinion of his colleagues. I can imagine that this opinion was not always unanimous among the Allies. The German I.S. had, therefore, no interest in reducing the vast extent of the enemy I.S. On the contrary, it was concerned rather with increasing the tremendous size of it and so, by many known routes, letting news flow to it which was certainly not correct. Yet it was accurate sometimes—when we had reason to believe that the enemy would mistrust the informer.

Among the great number of enemy spies who had fallen into German hands it was not difficult to find suitable instruments to work this deception. Carelessly chosen by the enemy, they were not in earnest about their job. They readily became agents for both sides, for they received, without danger, what they wanted, and earned double money if they were rewarded by both parties. But so that the numerous unknown agents of the enemy should collect false information automatically and that the German prisoners, too, should make false declarations, we circulated among the troops in the occupied territory, at home and in neutral countries, such false information as we wished to pass to the enemy. This deception of the enemy was a difficult and important branch of work. It

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was laid down in the I.S. and in the Supreme Command that the independent spreading of false information by subordinate authorities was forbidden, for, without a definite plan, this method of deception might have calamitous results. While the German I.S. conducted this campaign of misleading our enemies, it was itself protected in every possible way against attempts to mislead it in return.

The German military I.S. owed its successes in great part to the fact that it had not to provide proofs with its information, but had merely to furnish the facts established by it. With regard to the ensuing results it was quite unconcerned. It did not need to report what people wanted to know and it could be indifferent regarding the nature of its announcements. If it had an inherent tendency, this was distinctly not that of underrating the enemy, for it was on a clear recognition of the superiority of the enemy, in men and material, that the Supreme Command relied in its work of expanding the strength of the people to the uttermost for the purposes of the War.

The result of the economic and political I.S. is to be appraised quite differently. Here the enemy showed himself superior. In the economic intelligence work England took the lead. We must agree with the statements made by the head of the English I.S. on taking farewell of his staff after the War :

“ We owe it to your efforts that no case of destruction and incendiarism by enemy agents succeeded. This is all the more remarkable on account of the great number of enemy agents. You have gathered information of immeasurable value for the naval,

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military, and trade I.S. departments. The Blockade Minister believes that their work has contributed in a great measure to the effective maintenance of the blockade. In respect of the pressure on enemy trade, their information was of the highest value in the search for enemy goods on neutral ships. It will interest you to learn that in practically every case of contraband which came before the Prize Court the material evidence was furnished by you. The importance of this statement will be still more apparent when I add that the value of the cargoes without the ships is £30,000,000. You have also prevented the delivery of goods worth more than £70,000,000, and have completely destroyed the enemy's overseas relations as far as they could be destroyed at all."

In the political I.S. success lies wholly on the side of the Entente. There certainly was a German political espionage, assigned by the Foreign Office to Erzberger, the member of the Reichstag. But he was less concerned with finding out what was the political situation abroad or with influencing it than with proving the correctness of his own political course. As this aimed at promoting in Germany the belief in and the wish for peace by understanding, it coincided with the aims of the enemy I.S. Much information regarding the readiness of the enemy for an understanding and about peace possibilities during the War owes its origin to this tendency. The Supreme Command gained a different impression from its I.S. It was that of the enemy's will to destroy, which could only be broken if Germany triumphed militarily.

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Herr Erzberger, who, in spite of his semi-official activity, never came officially into touch with the Supreme Command, had nothing whatever to do with the I.S.

Until the autumn of 1917 the positive work of the hostile political I.S. was not opposed at all. Attention was first paid to it when, at that particular period, there were signs that the spirit of the broad masses of the people was being undermined by revolutionary agitation. In default of any other organisation, the military I.S. was bound to concern itself with this matter. Already in 1918 we had considerable information regarding this movement. Ambitious attempts to send revolutionary pamphlets from Holland into Germany were repeatedly discovered and thwarted. Then the French I.S., working from Switzerland, tried to rouse feeling in South Germany against the North. Inflammatory pamphlets in great number were seized on the South German frontier. In the course of 1918 signs multiplied that the efforts of the Entente I.S. to bring about a revolution in Germany were even excelled by the work of the Russian Embassy in Germany itself. More and more evidence accumulated that in Russia, Vienna, Budapest and Sofia, the Entente was promoting revolution. It was not difficult to find out that the couriers of the Bolshevik Government, who travelled between Berlin and Moscow, were the bearers of the many revolutionary pamphlets which appeared in faultless German in all the industrial districts of Germany. These pamphlets were only to be distinguished from those of the Entente propaganda by their being more

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radical in the ideas they put forward. But it was difficult to convince those circles which had attained to political influence in Germany that this propaganda was dangerous. The I.S. was obliged to resort to the trick of arranging that one of the twelve trunks, a cubic metre in size, which a Russian courier brought back from Moscow, should fall down the steps of Friedrichstrasse station in Berlin, so that the trunk burst open and its contents, hundreds of thousands of the aforesaid pamphlets, came to light. Only then did Joffe, the Russian Ambassador, receive his passports. That was on 5th November 1918, four days before the outbreak of the revolution. I received the message about the matter on my journey to the I.S. headquarters in the eastern theatre of war on the Russian frontier. The frontier official who informed me told me at the same time that orders had been issued to prevent the Russian ambassador from indulging in Bolshevik propaganda on his journey across the eastern theatre of war, as he might do while travelling from Berlin to the frontier. I could not help putting the question to myself: How would the enemy Governments deal with an ambassador from Soviet Russia, if he had permitted himself so to act on their territory at that stage of the War?

From these brief descriptions of the state of affairs in Germany it will be seen that the hostile political I.S. could easily achieve its ends. All the successes of our military I.S. were, therefore, unavailing.

CHAPTER XIV

AFTER THE WAR

Closing down the I.S. in Germany.—The enemy's secret service invades the country—The Allies' espionage after the War—Separate aims and separate ways—England and France increase their secret-service funds—Economic espionage resumes its sway—The French I.S. re-organised—The efforts of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia—Russia begins again—German assistance for the enemy—Miss Cavell and Schlageter—Recruiting for the Foreign Legion—Spy cases in Germany since the War.

WITH the political collapse of Germany an intelligence service under the military authorities became impossible. Its connection with the Press service and the patriotic propaganda drew upon it the hostility of those who had achieved power and who were believers in a peace by understanding. During the Chancellorship of Prince Max of Baden the Supreme Command was deprived of the two above-mentioned offices. This was what the Supreme Command, at frequent intervals for a long time, had demanded of previous Chancellors. But the purpose for doing it at last differed from the reason the High Command had for making the request. The Press Service and the patriotic propaganda were imbued with the spirit of resistance. The intelligence service in itself, too, did not fit into the new system. Its non-political habit of

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reporting matters in a way which was free from all bias did not fit into the picture which one wished to see: Understanding, universal disarmament and no more war.

During the War I often applied for duty at the front. But owing to the peculiar nature of my position, this request was never granted. I repeated it when, with the resignation of General Ludendorff, the state of affairs depicted above began to develop. But his successor as First General Quartermaster, General Groener, refused to consider my request in view of the importance an intelligence service would have during the armistice and the peace negotiations.

When the revolution delivered Germany over wholly to the enemy, I insisted on retaining my position, for I believed that this was my duty in face of the great danger of an unrestricted invasion of Germany by the enemy I.S. But the Supreme Command believed that I could not remain on account of the fact that the military intelligence service was seriously compromised politically. The War Ministry refused to employ me in the Frontier Defence Corps. I was sent on leave. The Supreme Command, then in Kolberg, endeavoured to retain my services to the extent that I should set my experiences down in a report. But political influences also prevented this.

With the disappearance of the German intelligence service all barriers were broken down which had been set up to prevent the secret service of the enemy from penetrating into the country. As there had only been a military counter-espionage service and

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as the army was to be disbanded, it was believed that there was no more to conceal from the foreigner. Beyond that, Germany, in the Treaty of Versailles, undertook to provide any essential information regarding military and economic matters and to suffer control by supervising missions.

Thus the hostile I.S. entered Germany officially.

The co-operation in international intelligence of the victorious countries dissolved with the end of the War. Only in Germany did they continue unitedly to follow their aims. There was, however, no longer any exchange or joint appraising of news as before and during the War. Differences of interests soon led to different paths. The United States withdrew altogether from the joint I.S.

Belgium lost the support of France. Her I.S. worked no longer with the French and the English services as in the War. She took part, naturally, in investigations in Germany as far as she was concerned with political and military events. Her sphere of interest appeared to be restricted to the Rhineland, Westphalia, Hanover and Hesse. The Belgian I.S. was particularly active against any German nationalist movement in the occupied regions, and kept a strict watch over former officers and prominent personages.

In 1920 both France and England increased the funds officially applied to secret-service purposes. The French Chamber voted the increase on the ground that the idea of revenge was becoming more widespread in Germany and that it was necessary to be continually informed regarding the activity of the chemical, aeroplane and airship industries in

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Germany. A reduction of French armaments, it was said, could only take place without danger to the safety of the country if France were fully aware of all that was happening in Germany. The English Government demanded that the vote for secret service should be doubled, although England was reducing her intelligence service as far as Germany was concerned. It may be taken for granted that these credits have been increased since 1920.

From the organisation point of view the English I.S. changed but little. In Switzerland it appeared to suspend its activities as far as these were directed against Germany. But in Holland, Tinsley's espionage bureau was kept going at Rotterdam. It shows a great interest in armament inventions. In addition, the English I.S. pays particular attention to the efforts of Germany to regain foreign markets. The service, indeed, has gone back to its original field of activity, the economic. It has, however, retained its trustworthy agents who were trained for war work; they appear to be intended for other duties. For the time being the French do not regard a complete secret service as necessary, because the military situation in allied countries is still sufficiently well known and it is desired to avoid everything which might disturb friendly relations. The service in the Scandinavian countries is retained, and the bureau in Copenhagen is under the direction of the energetic Captain Sommerfeld, who is assisted in political matters by Captain Hudson. The bureaux set up during the War at the English general consulates in Stockholm and Helsingfors still function. A military mission in Kowno has

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extended the system of investigations in the east.

The command of the Inter-allied Military Commission of Control was given to General Dupont. Thus the chief of the French I.S. before and during the War became the organiser of the officially recognised French intelligence service which was spread over the whole of the Reich.

The French I.S. underwent a change in that its headquarters became the Foreign Office; during the War it was responsible to the General Staff. It will be seen, therefore, that military intelligence was no longer given first place, that the diplomatic, political, and economic branch of the service became predominant, and that the military I.S. was made subordinate and subject to it.

The intelligence service in the French Foreign Office is divided into six departments: the diplomatic, the home political, the military, the technical and industrial, economic investigation and propaganda, and the safeguarding of France from foreign intelligence services in these spheres. The diplomatic and the home political branches were placed above the others. That means propaganda in favour of French policy throughout the world, and, too, a propaganda in those States which are to be made accommodating to French political aims.

In addition to the technical structure of the service, a geographical organisation was carried through. The I.S. against Germany was conducted by the "Section Europe Centrale"—"Sec." for short. Its head office for all branches is in Aix-la-Chapelle. With that office is connected an espionage

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school and a factory for forging documents. It is directed by an engineer officer who became notorious during the War, and it can forge any pass that happens to be wanted. It has its own paper factory and has in its possession the official stamps of every allied and neutral country.

The military espionage is under the control of the commander of the occupying troops at Mayence. Subordinate to it are all the bureaux in the occupied area—information, traffic, liquidation, reparations, coal, etc. Purely military information bureaux were set up at Cologne, Düsseldorf, Wiesbaden, and Strassburg. These maintain sub-agencies in Germany, the Düsseldorf bureau alone having fifteen in the Ruhr region.

In addition to these permanent organisations, temporary commissions are constantly appearing. From Cassel, for instance, a commission, travelling by motor-car, was sent through Germany with official instructions to look after the French war graves in Germany. With this commission travelled several known spies, dressed as officers, for the purpose of making investigations. Attempts have been made to obtain agents in the police and the army.

The political secret service has to study and influence the intentions of the German Government, events behind the parliamentary scenes, public opinion, labour troubles and disturbances.

After this system had, by means of the Commission of Control, been fixed on Germany, General Dupont went to Warsaw. His task there was, in the first place, to rebuild the intelligence service which the

falling away of Russia had demolished; in the second, to link up France's vassal States to the chain of the French I.S.; and in the third, to obtain a basis in Poland for the purpose of watching that former ally, Russia. Thus France can discontinue all her old I.S. relationships in Soviet Russia.

Up to 1920, Poland was busy building up her service with the active help of the French. It consists of inquiry, intelligence, diplomatic and counter-espionage departments. It is under military control and its headquarters are in Warsaw. In Wilna is a sub-department for Lithuania, in Brest-Litowsk one for Russia, in Cracow one for Czechoslovakia, and in Posen one for Germany.

Dantzic is looked after by a sub-department of the Polish General Commission there. The same bureau concerns itself with East Prussia. Under French leadership, the Polish I.S. has adopted the brutal French methods of work. Spies are trained in special schools, while in Warsaw the skill achieved during the War in the falsification of documents is being further developed. The diplomatic representatives and consulates abroad render help in political matters and in propaganda and furnish support for secret agents sent out from Poland. Already a Polish consul in Berlin has had to be recalled because he went too far in espionage.

The Polish I.S. is obviously greatly afraid lest Germany should become militarily or nationally strong again, and it works in closest relationships with well-staffed French bureaux in Warsaw, Posen, Upper Silesia, along the western frontier of Poland and in Bavaria.

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The secret service agents employed against Germany come from "Congress Poland" in but few cases; most of them are from regions which till recently belonged to Germany. They are, therefore, educated, good linguists, know the country in every way, and, in addition, are liberally provided with funds. They are, therefore, very dangerous. But French money is already having a disintegrating effect. Confusion (*polnische Wirtschaft*!) is beginning to make itself felt in the intelligence service. Scandals, caused by the misappropriation of funds by officers and officials of the I.S., are not rare.

Under these conditions the espionage on the Polish frontier is now in its prime. It surpasses that of Russia before the War, is especially dangerous because even German ex-officers are in its employ, and is able to make use of the acquaintanceships and relationships existing between the people of all classes in Germany and Poland.

The same perfection has been achieved by the Czecho-Slovak I.S. The co-operation between the diplomatic, military, economic and political espionage is very skilfully carried on. The Cabinet Chancellery in Prague controls the whole system. Then at the Foreign Office there is a propaganda bureau which works in the guise of Trade Missions, and an Investigation Department attached to the General Staff. The agents employed are distinguished for their especially high intelligence. They are mostly officers of the Czech legion and High School students who, pretending to do trade, make their investigations in neighbouring countries.

The espionage school in Hollaschowitz is, like

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the entire service, under French direction. There are indications that this tutelage is becoming unpleasant to the Czechs, especially in view of the large amounts of money which must be sacrificed to French interests in the intelligence service.

Only a restricted service is carried on by Lithuania. In the main it is not concerned with Germany. Lettland, too, has set up an I.S., the centre of which is at Riga.

The organisation in Germany and in the eastern border States called, at first, for all the I.S. resources at the disposal of France. The work done in and from neutral countries could be restricted, and, in consequence, took a subordinate place. Later, however, it was revived. Strassburg was the headquarters of a very widespread and actively conducted bureau which has been transferred to Switzerland, where it is successfully directed by a French General Staff Officer in the consulate at Basel. It is generously provided with funds and has become more and more the sally-port for the secret service for Southern Germany, especially after Munich had become less effective as a centre in consequence of the indiscretions of the French minister, M. Dard. Lately, too, activity in Holland and Copenhagen has appeared to increase.

True to its aims in the last years of the War, the Russian I.S. is chiefly concerned with political propaganda. It finds agents and propagandists easily at all places where it can count on the help of the Communist Party and other organisations connected with the Third International.

After 1919 the Soviet Government again set up a

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military and economic intelligence service directed against Germany. For that service an excellent supply of agents is at hand in the members of the *intelligentsia*, who, as a result of the revolution, have been left without means and are, therefore, compelled to enter that service as a method of obtaining a livelihood.

Germany is, therefore, besieged on all sides by a newly organised intelligence service. She has to endure an espionage and a pressure on public opinion with which nothing before or during the War can be compared. After having put herself in the wrong by the Treaty of Versailles and by her subsequent policy in Germany, France cannot give up the race.

Conditions in Germany help France in her efforts. Persons of French nationality live in our *pensions* and hotels and are not prevented from coming into touch with all classes of the population. Foreigners of all nations can, without attracting notice, travel all over Germany and do I.S. work. Economic espionage, carried on by England, America and Japan, can develop without restrictions. This can be all the more successfully done because no German laws exist to prevent it. We do not even have a central department to warn and instruct the threatened firms and economic interests.

But out of the German people there grow forces which help the enemy in the matter of secret service. The increasing unemployment and want, caused by the terms of the Peace Treaty and the political results of the revolution, created willing helpers, who place themselves at the service of our opponents

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because of the lack of preventive measures and because of their own greed of money. The State itself, for domestic political reasons, curbs the development of national feeling. How apathetic the people of Germany has become is shown by the fact that it is not filled with a fear of espionage—though that fear would now be justifiable—as was the case at the beginning of the War. When Schlageter was shot for his patriotic action in the Ruhr region, the remonstrance of German public opinion was limited to certain circles. While the carrying out of the death sentence on Miss Cavell during the War roused the whole world—propaganda was, of course, effective in this case—it was silent regarding the execution of Schlageter in peacetime. This shows that the conscience of the world is slumbering. Hostile secret service agents constitute, of course, a great danger to every kind of national movement. No humbug is too clumsy to be believed in Germany. As a result it is easy for I.S. agents to provoke and evoke such beliefs as will further the desired political aims. There is, too, no doubt that the attitude of the masses in Germany is being influenced by countless envoys from interested powers—France and Russia.

In these circumstances another tragedy was augmented, to the benefit of France. More and more people, who have lost their means of existence in Germany, are entering the Foreign Legion. Among them are well-educated people and persons belonging to the better social classes. France has set up her recruiting depots along the frontier in the occupied territory. The former military drill-

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ground at Griesheim is used as the central depot. If anyone is found to be more suitable for espionage work, the examining doctor reports him as unfit for the Foreign Legion. As it is generally a matter of dealing with despairing persons, it is mainly from among them that the French obtain agents to carry out acts of violence in Germany.

In the French secret service many of the agents, including persons in leading positions, come from Alsace-Lorraine.

Against this army of informers and agents which France, with her superior currency, is able to maintain cheaply in Germany, the German counter-espionage service stands practically stripped of all its weapons. It has received less official support since the revolution than it did before. Even a system of observing what espionage is going on in neutral countries is quite out of the question on account of the currency conditions in Germany.

France immediately instals agents in her service without examination. The quality of the personnel has not increased with the growth of the organisation. The value of the service, therefore, declines. But these street-corner vagabonds do render France the service she wishes them to render. They provide false news, and for that reason they cannot be punished if they are arrested. The case of the forger Anspach¹ is a case in point.

France does not overestimate the active value of this espionage *en masse* in Germany. She encourages it for political purposes, but takes care that, at the same time, it does not injure her serious intelligence

¹ See Note at end of chapter.—TRANS.

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service. The real I.S. is still carried on according to the old and tried principles. The control of it is being gradually transferred to neutral countries and to the eastern frontier States.

An example of how the latter system works is the action of the French major, Richert, in Munich. This case also shows how little we are in a position to stand up against the big enterprises of the enemy's I.S. Only in East Prussia, and Upper Silesia have we succeeded in smashing two considerable organisations. In Upper Silesia the discovery was made as the result of a burglary, arranged by the French I.S., being carried out at the wrong place. On this occasion it was proved that the murder of the head of the local counter-espionage system was planned.

As a rule the verdicts of courts of justice have, since the War, only concerned persons of quite minor importance. Their number, however, does show the great extent of the French I.S. in Germany. These numbers were :—

Year.	Number of Cases Tried in Court.	Number of Persons Sentenced.
1919	34	88
1920	103	171
1921	225	419
1922	175	241
1923	211	293

These figures speak eloquently in view of our wholly incomplete counter-measures. Nearly all

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the persons sentenced were Germans. As far as foreigners were concerned, they were mostly French, Swiss and Czech. There is no doubt that since 1920 the French I.S. has had agents in the German army. In that year there were five cases in which six persons in the army were sentenced ; in 1923 the figure was nineteen persons sentenced in connection with thirteen cases. In 1923 the number of cases was again six, and in these cases the police (*Schutzpolizei*) were concerned.

In the legal punishments inflicted, the damage done to Germany is not taken into account. The large number of espionage cases and the familiarity of the judges with them tend, indeed, to cause such affairs to be judged with increasing mildness. Only the People's Court (*Volksgericht*) at Munich applies the law sternly.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

The Anspach case, mentioned in this chapter, caused a few days' sensation in Germany in May 1922. In Erich Anspach the Berlin police thought, as was announced in the newspapers, that they had caught "the champion forger and spy of the century." He was, in particular, represented as the person who had supplied the Entente with all the information necessary for its post-war campaign against Germany.

Anspach was wounded during the War, and when the revolution broke out in Germany he was active in Communist circles. He drew upon himself the suspicion of the authorities, was arrested and charged with high treason. At his trial it was obvious that he was a young man of weak intellect, and he was sent to a lunatic asylum at Hildesheim. Eventually released, he was found by several employers to be unemployable on account of his laziness and the poor

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education he had received. Early in 1920 he began his career of fraud by forging pawn-tickets and, later, school and college certificates, without which it is difficult to obtain a first situation in Germany. Forging the diploma of a Bolshevik university for himself, he became "Dr Erich Anspach," and set up quite a factory for the production of University diplomas and export and import licences, by the sale of which he made a modest fortune.

He became more ambitious and blossomed out as "Dr Anspach of the Foreign Office." Then one night, in a café in the west end of Berlin, he boasted to his companions about being the "head of the Foreign Office." Several officials heard his talk, communicated with the police, and kept him under observation. His rooms were raided and a large number of documents seized. These were given out to the Press, and worked up into a series of stories, with all the excitement of a detective romance, in instalments.

It was stated that "secret" and "very confidential" documents regarding meetings of the Cabinet, conferences at the Foreign Office, army organisation, mobilisation plans, secret treaties, etc. etc., had been handed to foreign Powers by Anspach, because copies of the documents were found in his rooms. It was announced, on official authority, that several Notes received from the Entente had obviously been inspired by the information furnished to it by Anspach. Even the Minister of Defence allowed himself to be interviewed, and declared that the Entente's policy towards Germany was undoubtedly influenced by Anspach's information.

The sensation reached its height when serious Berlin newspapers solemnly announced that Anspach had supplied the Entente with all the information necessary for the conduct of the Genoa Conference!

Then came the reaction. Anspach's forgeries were examined and were found to be so crude that they would not have deceived a moderately intelligent office-boy. For instance, his document regarding the strength of the military police simply consisted of names taken wholesale from the

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Berlin Directory. His reports of "secret meetings" of the Cabinet—all the meetings of the Cabinet are secret—were made up of reports from the newspapers and parts of Reichstag speeches. And so on. Another document purported to give the details of a secret commercial treaty between Finland and Czecho-Slovakia!

Not a jot of evidence was forthcoming that any of these documents was ever handed or sold to an Entente Power; it is certain that Anspach never tried to dispose of them in that fashion. He appears to have amused himself by producing them, and there is not a single real "secret" in all the documents, because Anspach did not have any secrets to give away.

In the end it was admitted by the police that all his documents were mere efforts of the imagination. No proof was forthcoming that any Note from the Entente had been influenced by any of Anspach's "secret information." Then a semi-official cold douche was administered to the Cabinet Minister who had been interviewed and to the Press. "Investigations," it was declared, "are not helped by the gross exaggerations appearing in the Press, as, for example, that 'Anspach gave the Entente everything it required for the Notes to Germany drawn up by General Nollet, the Conference of Ambassadors and the Supreme Council.'"

The Anspach case can hardly, therefore, be regarded "as a case in point." He is simply a half-witted young man whose admitted frauds were possible in a time of national confusion.

Not till May 1924 was this "champion forger and spy of the century" brought before a court. His counsel asked the court to have Anspach's state of mind inquired into, and requested an adjournment as several witnesses were not present. The court refused both requests, whereupon the two counsel for the defence walked out of the court-room and the case had to be adjourned.

CHAPTER XV

SPIES AND TRAITORS

The only reliable people—The successful master of spies—"A service for gentlemen"—Disappointments—Unfair judgment on spies—Cases of heroism—Tribute to enemy spies—The wrong sort of I.S. agent—"International spies"—Traitors.

IN secret service there are only two sets of people who can be relied on : the persons in control of the system, and those spies who act out of purely patriotic motives and whom I would term "national spies."

The German military I.S. owed its successes, in the first place, to the trustworthiness and the energy of the officers detailed for service in it. They had a more difficult task than the officers of the enemy service. While the Entente I.S. officers had only to find out about German conditions, it was necessary for the German I.S. officers to become familiar with the military, political and economic conditions of several great powers and adjacent neutral states, the possibilities of entry into and travel in those countries, and their counter-measures. The services of our enemies had, even before the War, a much larger number of trained officers, and it was possible to unite these organisations in the War. The enemy, too, was supported by all its representatives and nationals abroad. But the German I.S. had no

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such help, and had to seek and train its personnel while the War was in progress.

Secret agents, all sorts and conditions of men, need, first of all, a commanding personality in every sense of the term to command them. He must have a knowledge of humanity, a dispassionate judgment and a skill in handling men. It is remarkable that in the German I.S. it was a cavalry officer of an old family and an unusually well-educated woman who knew best how to deal with the agents, even the most difficult and crafty of them. The Intelligence Service is a service for gentlemen. It breaks down wherever it is placed in the hands of other persons. The head of the service must, in every respect, stand head and shoulders above his agents; otherwise it is not he who commands but the agents with all their inferior characteristics. For in the secret service there are serious dangers for anyone who comes into touch with it. They lie in the uncontrollable nature of the work and of the information received, and also in the temptation which money offers. Stern discipline is necessary in the I.S.; it is also essential to look upon political opponents as the enemy and to believe in war. For these reasons the organisation of the I.S. is, in all countries, generally placed in the hands of military men, even when its purely military objects stand behind the political and the economic.

I.S. work provides, when it is honourably done, many a disappointment. It is one of its peculiarities that bad agents send in a great deal of news and good ones very little. The good agents wear themselves out quicker because they do really face the great

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perils of their profession. On the other hand, bad agents live long because they avoid danger. The number of agents employed, therefore, is not a gauge of the quality of the service. The heads of a service require strength of character so that they can continually be weeding-out and destroying with their own hand things which might give them prestige but which, in reality, are merely useless ornaments. The German I.S. was run on these principles. The English likewise acted on them before the War and apparently continued to do so afterwards. But the Russian and French services followed them neither before nor during the War. After the War the French continued to reject them, because the French I.S. is not so much concerned with ascertaining facts as with obtaining reports which assist in the realisation of French political aims.

The judgment passed on spies as being despicable persons is, in general, not just. Most certainly it is unfair as regards national spies who, from pure patriotism, render indispensable services to the political and military leaders of their own country, and, therefore, risk their lives for their native land. There were such on both sides in the War. At the beginning of the struggle the German General Staff was bombarded with applications from men who were unfit for military service, and from women too, both sexes hoping in this way to do their duty in the fight. Among them were people of the educated and well-to-do classes. Their notions of what they could do were, in most cases, exceedingly naïve, of course. Only a few cases could be seriously

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examined and proceeded with. After these persons had been employed two or three times, almost invariably came their end, and that end was, without exception, punishment by death, even in the case of women. There is the instance of a nurse who, having grown up in an enemy country, seemed to have all the qualifications for a successful career in the Intelligence Service. After a brief activity in France she was discovered and shot. In her will she stated that the money she had earned should be applied to the care of the wounded. Then there was the case of the mother of two officers at the front. It was with the greatest difficulty that she was dissuaded from the idea of returning as a spy to the enemy land in which she was reared. German merchants, too, sacrificed their property and their lives in order to serve the Fatherland. It will certainly occur to no one to despise such action.

So it is that the people in Belgium and France deserve the highest respect for the help they gave in this direction to their brothers-in-arms. They were imbued with burning patriotism, never during the long war-years lost their hope in the victory of their country, and in spite of the serious privations they had to suffer during the War—or, perhaps, just because of them—never let the will to the accomplishment of that end fail them. Many French and Belgians of both sexes were convicted of harbouring deserters or of espionage, and were, according to military law, severely punished. Without exception, they were heroes. Even in face of death there were few weaklings. They died without a tremor, often with a cheer for

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their Fatherland. Death sentences passed on women were scarcely ever carried out, although women were most passionately devoted to their work. For instance, a young French dressmaker took charge of the farthest advanced I.S. collection bureau in the theatre of war for the purpose of carrying out an enterprise which extended through Belgium and Holland. She did so though she knew that the scheme had twice failed and that both her predecessors at that advanced post of danger had been condemned to death. Though personally respecting such deeds born of patriotic feelings, the Supreme Command, having regard for its responsibility towards its own troops, could not always agree with the mild judgments of the German military courts or with the pardons which, for political reasons, were frequently given by the Governor of Belgium, General von Bissing.

Grateful recognition can, however, only be given to those spies whose sole motive was to help their country to victory. There were others. Large numbers of people came to the I.S. who endeavoured to use it for their own purposes. The idea harboured by most of them was that they could assure business advantages to themselves; that, for instance, they would, as secret service men, benefit by facilities for frontier travel, etc. The I.S. had to bear its share of the business profiteering of war-time.

To this group another is similar: that of the international spies. Their action, too, is devoid of all moral justification. They abuse the hospitality of neutral lands and are only inspired by a mania for money. As that was their attitude of mind, they

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were untrustworthy and cowardly. Such a view of them was confirmed in every case in which they came before a court. We did, however, come across a few instances in which neutrals, honestly convinced of the wrong being done to Germany, performed selfless service for that country.

The saddest chapter in the development of the intelligence service is that which deals with treason. It does great harm to the interests of a state that only military treason is punishable. A struggle between nations is no longer merely a military matter, so that the betrayal of political and economic interests is at least as serious as, and, in times of so-called peace, more serious than military treason. It goes against all notions of justice that a spy, who sacrifices himself for his country, should be despised and severely punished, while the traitor who, knowingly or unknowingly, damages the interests of his fellow-countrymen, should go scot-free and, in addition, in many cases, personally benefit, politically or economically, from his course of action. In future, people who are possessed of a sound national sense will refer to spies with respect, but will feel the deepest loathing for traitors, and award them the severest punishments.

The traitor did far more damage to the cause of Germany in the War than the enemy's espionage system, in spite of its tremendous extent.

These traitors, whose numbers have already been given, engaged in deliberate treason during and after the War. The figures given are not nearly complete. The poison sinks ever deeper into the race as the chance becomes the slighter of being permitted, by

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the enemy or by politically influenced circles at home, to carry out a national cure and a regeneration of the people.

Those German traitors who, in foreign countries during the War, supported the enemy in his propaganda against the German victory, have gone unpunished.

But when we approach the question of treason, the I.S. slips wholly over to political territory. On such a threshold this description must end, unless all the political questions regarding the result of the War are to be dealt with afresh.,

CHAPTER XVI

LOOKING BACKWARD AND FORWARD

Did Russia secure Germany's plans?—What might have been—
Unbelieving politicians—The spirit in the army—A tragedy
on the day of surrender—A Vice-Chancellor at the front—
The rôle of the secret service in peace-time—The future of
the Intelligence Service.

THE picture which I have drawn shows, against a gleaming background of military devotion to duty on both sides, that there was political fulfilment of duty only on the part of Germany's enemies. Dark colours lend the picture a shameful feature; they show how many traitors there were among our fighting people.

However extensive the enemy I.S. may appear to be when compared with that of the German General Staff, it is beyond doubt that the service working against us was, in reality, still greater. I could only form an impression of it according to the extent to which it came to the knowledge of the German counter-espionage service. It would be valuable if the enemy would now provide exact details of what he actually learned of the German I.S. Up to the present he has only boasted of his own successes while at the same time complaining of the alleged tremendous work performed by the German I.S. in preparing and carrying on the War, though he cannot

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bring forward facts to prove anything about this. The facts would free Germany from the charge of having forced the War, but not from that of having neglected preparations for war and for carrying it on to its final goal—victory. Only the first part of the motto : “ If you would have peace, prepare for war,” was attended to by Germany.

There is now no more doubt that the war party in Russia, which was dependent on France and under the leadership of the Grand Duke Nicholas, had won its game in February 1914 and had made war inevitable. If the German Government had had a political I.S. at its disposal and had known of this, then at least its preparations for war at the last moment might have been different and, above all, the question of war-guilt would, from the beginning, have been dealt with in the light of facts. It is very probable, though it cannot be proved, that, as early as 1913, Russia had, through her I.S., obtained complete information regarding the German plan for advance in West and East in the case of war, and also that Russia had communicated the details to France, but that little credence was given them in Paris because it seemed improbable that the Germans intended to employ such slender forces for the initial resistance to the Russian army. If it is true that the German plan of advance was known, then the early Russian mobilisation and the delay in the French advance are explained. Everything depended upon taking advantage of the weakness of the German army in the East.

The war preparations of the hostile intelligence services were known in Germany but only believed

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by the General Staff. It was political policy, however, to soften hard facts. The people were never told anything about enemy espionage because it was feared that the evil would thereby be increased and an ever-larger number of persons enticed as agents into the hostile service. Now, after the event, it may be doubted if this was the right policy. Our opponents at least went about it the opposite way. Even in peace-time enemy peoples were reared in an atmosphere of hostility towards Germany and warned about the activities of the German secret service. The authorities kept the people free from the dangers springing from their own I.S. and placed the burden on the shoulders of neutrals, thus making systematic and opportune preparation for war. The military I.S. and, with it, the military, were, on the enemy side, political weapons even before the War. But it was otherwise in Germany. The basic difference between the German and the Entente services was that the former was purely military and could not rely on the support of political factors, having, indeed, to achieve its aims in spite of them. In a way, it was not harmful to the German I.S. that, thrown on its own resources, it could concentrate its strength instead of wasting its forces in extent of organisation, as was the case with the enemy. This concentration, however, was only useful at first for the negative aims of the service. The positive side only developed in the victorious course of the military operations. For positive political work the German I.S. lacked the necessary number of agents.

The War freed the military I.S. from the fetters of peace and allowed it to develop freely. But

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even in the War the German secret service remained purely military. The General Staff was forced, under circumstances which could not be foreseen, to reconstruct the service for use against France and Russia, and, as far as England and, later, America were concerned, to build a new system out of nothing.

The fact that this was successful proves that, given the same determination, something could also have been done in economic and political services, and that, with united strength and determined political leadership, much leeway could have been made up and a great deal accomplished.

Instead of that, however, the military I.S. was burdened with the Press Service, and, later on in the War, with the work of attending to opinion among the public and in the army. In carrying out those two duties we obtained no political help; we only achieved political antagonism.

Between the military Intelligence Service and the political policy of the country an ever wider gulf yawned in Germany. The politicians believed that the enemy was ready for peace and maintained that there were possibilities of ending the War, while the military I.S. could never report anything about military weakness on the part of the enemy or a readiness in government circles on the other side to consider a peace by understanding. There were, of course, reports of war-weariness and of slackening of discipline among certain sections of the army. But these stories were always accompanied by the news of stern official measures taken by governments which called themselves democratic but which

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nevertheless—as is quite right—forced their will upon the masses.

Every sign of weakness in Germany, however, called forth no remedial measures ; before it the Government always gave way. The secret service of our enemies could easily learn at which point propaganda could best be employed. It knew how to increase discontent and weakness and how to strengthen false beliefs.

At the front the spirit of August 1914 held till the end. That was the great secret of the successes of the German army. On 28th September 1918 a group of foreign officers were, on their return from the fighting front in France, entertained by Field Marshal von Hindenburg at General Headquarters. The head of the deputation, a colonel of cavalry, used the most generous words in praising the spirit of the troops which the visitors had seen heavily engaged. He declared that their heroic behaviour made final victory certain.

It was on the evening of that same day that Hindenburg and Ludendorff had to come to the decision to end the struggle.

In the homeland half-developed youths were banding themselves together for the purpose of covering the home-coming army and its officers with ignominy and of taking from them their arms which they had carried so gloriously for four long years. On 26th October 1918 I was with the military leaders in Berlin. After my arrival I was seized with influenza, then raging, and had to stay in bed for a few days. During that time I received the visit of a neutral who held a high official position

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in Germany. He told me that the development of events in the country had forced him to give up his neutrality in favour of Germany. He had knowledge of the reports of his country's representatives in France, and he implored the Supreme Command not to give up the fight, because the strength of the enemy was exhausted and Germany could expect no mercy if she laid down her arms. I could only reply that I had just received the news of the resignation of General Luderŕdorff. The belief in peace by understanding had triumphed over the will to hold out.

When the revolution broke out in Germany, and flamed up, too, on the lines of communication, the news was to be heard everywhere that the Red Flag had been hoisted over the enemy's trenches and that, with that revolutionary emblem flying, the English fleet had arrived at Kiŕl. That shows the extent to which false beliefs were nourished in Germany. But how the situation looked from the enemy's side is shown by the statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Fabry, Reporter on the Army Estimates, in the French Chamber in February 1920 :—

“ At the end of the War we saw the German army at a strength equalled by no other and provided with excellent *matŕriel*. What, then, was the cause of its defeat? It was that it had no longer a united nation behind it, imbued with a single mind and a determined will to submit to all necessary war-sacrifices and to continue the struggle. This War has plainly shown that even the strongest army cannot achieve success if the people behind it are not united and firmly determined to fight.”

Even if we make the allowance with regard to

this statement that it was uttered to justify the military demands of the French Government, still the central truth of it stands out clearly.

In Germany people spoke of the collapse of the old system and they celebrated the victory of the new. It seems to me that this new system experienced its first and most severe defeat in its victory over the old régime.

All false beliefs would have been avoided—given goodwill—if the political leaders had been in communication with the Intelligence Service. Then the politicians in the homeland would have been able, even before the War and certainly during it, to see the steel-hard gaze of England and the face of France marked by hate and anxiety, instead of shutting their eyes before these sights. Without news of the enemy or under the influence of news which supported their own points of view, German politicians at home could not have any other opinions than those which were made clear to me casually by a visit of the German Vice-Chancellor, von Payer, to General Headquarters at Avesnes on 25th August 1918. It was his first visit to the front. After the official part of his visit, a conference with the military leaders, was over, I was deputed in the afternoon to show him something of the front. We went to the neighbourhood of the Holnon Wood, near St Quentin, for the possession of which most bitter fights had taken place; we visited an air squadron the task of which was to bomb Paris; we saw detachments of troops and the railways immediately behind the front lines. This was fourteen days after that 8th of August on which the German front gave

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way before the English attack. The Vice-Chancellor was much struck by what he saw and admired the organisation and the security of all that had passed before his eyes. After each admission, he came to the conclusion, however, that it was tragic that such energy and money were squandered on War. He wondered how many schools, hospitals, streets and roads could be constructed for the same expenditure. I called his attention to the uninterrupted and resounding thunder of the guns, and gave expression to my military point of view that for generations we should not be able to return to the works of peace if we did not win the War. The Vice-Chancellor replied that that was merely an opinion and that it seemed to him that we both wanted the same thing but in different ways.

But when to-day certain circles still put their faith in reconciliation as the way on which to go, they should see to it that this road is illuminated by a good intelligence service, even at the risk of losing their own illusions.

The intelligence service is a barometer which notifies the temperature among the nations. Up to the War, during and even after it, that barometer stood at "Storm" for Germany. The more thoroughly the I.S. fulfils its functions in this direction and the more the victorious countries enter into economic, political and, therefore, military competition with each other, then all the more will their intelligence service, brought by war experiences to a hitherto unachieved state of perfection, be used against former friends. And this will be the case especially if the idea of international peace ever makes

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practical progress. It will then be of the utmost importance to establish, by means of an I.S., how far the other nations are in earnest regarding disarmament. The I.S. will not be hit by disarmament, because propaganda, its positive side, would displace military considerations and become more than ever a political weapon. For these reasons the intelligence service stands on the threshold of new tasks. It cannot simply be dismissed with the word "Espionage!" We need not be deceived by the fact that it will continue to be officially repudiated or little spoken of.

"War in Peace"—that is the best description of the present rôle of the I.S. in the competition of the various nations. The greater the degree to which future wars are confined to great Powers which do not concern themselves about a League of Nations intended only for smaller nationalities, the longer the time occupied by war preparations, the more decisive the results of future wars for all countries, the more strongly armed in every way they approach war, the shorter the period of time during which the vast loads of military armaments can be carried, the more technical progress surprisingly presents to one country superiority over another, then the less shall we be able to do without intelligence service. The community of interest of the victorious States has dissolved itself. Each will now endeavour to make use, for his own advantage, of their jointly acquired knowledge. A rivalry of hitherto unknown keenness will begin over the whole area of secret service and its aims will be pursued even more cunningly and determinedly. Just for that reason

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the attempt will be made to veil it in the darkness of secrecy again.

Only that State the political, economic, and military leaders of which co-operate in the work of the intelligence service, can be assured regarding its future. The espionage *en masse* to which France has resorted must be written down as a gross scandal against which there should be joint action, for it is designed to infect other nations with the poison of espionage and treason.

If it is right to believe that in future the intelligence service will gain an importance far exceeding that which it had in peace-times before the War, then it is necessary that our official and military classes, our whole population in general and very particularly the upper classes of society should be taught reticence and be more attentive than was the case before the War in Germany and in the espionage-infected neighbouring States. Now that an intensive military, political and economic intelligence service has, by reason of its successes in the World War, entered the ranks of the official activities of a State, it is opportune to bring this to the knowledge of all nations. The War took counter-espionage from the hands of the police and remitted it into those of the highest State authority. The future will put it into the hands of a whole people. But only a nation with sound national sentiments is capable of this self-defence, and only those governments which sustain these sentiments in the people will be doing their duty and will achieve success in the fight against secret service. Germany has learned that material means for self-defence are

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not sufficient, but that a spiritual safeguard is also necessary.

To this belongs, first of all, the conviction that, in addition to the struggle between domestic parties, there is a struggle between nations. The means used in this fight may be the subject of differing views, but this struggle must put the fight between parties into the background. We can see that, in conformity with the character of secret service, the organisation is everywhere in charge of the military but the control in political hands. The German I.S. was the only one which was deprived of political leadership.

Germany has past sins of omission to make good. She has to cleanse the German name from the filth which foreign propaganda heaped upon it. She has to rectify the admission forced from her regarding responsibility for the War and to free the situation at home from the rule of the French I.S.

France will do everything in her power to retain her position. Her watchword, "Revenge," has been dropped, and its place has been taken by the fear of the vengeance of an oppressed people: Germany's friendship with Russia, as it existed before and during the War, must be prevented after the War; the frontier States' dread of Germany must be nourished; the strength of Germany must be further reduced by the encouragement of domestic political differences and of selfish movements among the various branches of the German race; those parts of the country which were illegally taken from it must be made hostile towards the motherland. And in spite of all these things and the more Germany

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is weakened, she remains the justification for France's military strength.

The Entente Cordiale lost its single aim with the overthrow of Germany. In its place a new grouping of Powers will come. The Russian problem has not been solved either for the Bolshevik rulers or for those great Powers which are interested in the restoration of Russia.

Into a dark future and ahead of developments the intelligence service goes to investigate and to influence. Never before was the time more favourable for its work. This particularly concerns England and the United States. The structure of the British Empire and the immigration and race problems in North America call for the use of the arts of the intelligence service. Far greater than in the past and the present will the secret power of this service be in the future.

CHAPTER XVII

THE STORY OF COLONEL REDL ¹

How a dramatic story leaked out—Colonel Redl's personality—A clever spy-catcher—His "den"—The mysterious letters—An escape and a discovery—Tracking down the master-spy—A strange dinner-party—The sentence of death—Ordered to commit suicide—What Redl betrayed—The effects in the World War—His inhuman acts.

As Colonel Nicolai has briefly referred to the case of Colonel Redl, undoubtedly the master-spy of pre-war Europe, it will interest readers of this volume to hear the full story of that Austrian officer's astounding career of treachery.

In a newspaper of Prague (the *Prager Tagblatt*) on Monday, 26th May 1913, there appeared the report of a football match which had been played on the previous day. The report stated :

"FOOTBALL IN PRAGUE.—Storm I. v. Union V. Score : 5-7. (Half-time : 3-3.) Storm I. was the weaker team, suffering on account of the absence of Wagner and Marcek. Atja alone was not strong enough to withstand the opposition he had to face."

Certainly it was a scrappy report, for it was written, in his annoyance, by the defeated team's captain,

¹ This chapter is by the translator. The story of Colonel Redl originally appeared in the *Sunday News*, and is reproduced here by permission of the editor of that paper.

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who was one of the sub-editors of the paper. Yet with these few lines of small print the story begins of the most sensational espionage drama of modern times. Had Wagner played, Storm I. might have won, but a tremendously thrilling tale would, in all probability, have been hushed up for ever. In the heart of gay Vienna certain tragic events had rushed to an appallingly sudden climax during the latter part of Saturday and the early hours of Sunday morning. Ten people in all Austria knew the full story: the commander-in-chief of the Austrian army, General Conrad von Hoetzendorff, the highest officers of the Austrian secret service and of the War Office, and the chief officials of the Vienna police. The greatest possible precautions were taken to keep the matter secret; each of the ten persons took a special oath not to breathe a word of it; even the Emperor Francis Joseph and the heir to the throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand (whose assassination at Serajevo about a year later was one of the first actual portents of the Great War), were to be kept in the dark. But all the precautions failed because a full-back was absent from his place on a playing-field of Prague!

The captain of Storm I. went on Monday afternoon to look for his football friend, Wagner (a locksmith by trade), in order to inquire why he had not put in an appearance at the match on the previous day.

"It was quite impossible for me to be there," said Wagner to his captain. "The military sent for me."

"And what did they want?"

"Oh, I had to break open some locks—a good few locks, indeed—in an officer's house."

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So Wagner told the whole story, little thinking that it had any importance. In the presence of the commander of the Prague Army Corps, General Baron von Giesl, and several high officers, who had apparently come from Vienna, he had to force his way into a house—he believed it was a general's, and that the general had died in Vienna on Sunday. He had had, too, to open all the drawers, wardrobes, desks, etc., in which large numbers of papers and photographs were found. When they had examined these, the officers were, for some reason, struck with amazement. "How is it possible?" "Who would have imagined it?" Some of the papers, he heard, were Russian, and there were lots of plans. A good deal of money was found. The general must have been very rich, and his house was gorgeously furnished.

"Looking for the will, I should think," concluded Wagner. "At any rate, the general did keep his documents safe. Some of the locks were very difficult to break. Oh, yes, I'll be at next Sunday's match. A thing like that doesn't happen every Sunday."

The captain, no less amazed than the officers, rushed back to his office. So that was the real story behind the official "Vienna Correspondence Bureau's" message which he had dealt with in the course of his sub-editorial work on the previous evening—a message which was in that morning's papers! It told, with regret, of the suicide of Colonel Albert Redl, Chief of the Staff of the 8th Army Corps . . . "a very gifted officer who would have risen to the highest rank." He had gone to Vienna

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"on a professional mission," and "in a moment of depression, brought about by weeks of insomnia, had shot himself." Russian documents! Photos and plans! Suicide! A commission of officers had been specially sent from Vienna to search the colonel's house. Why, the thing was as clear as day. Redl was a spy! The man whose genius was everywhere recognised, and who might soon have been in command of the Austrian army . . . was a traitor!

The captain of Storm I. certainly had got hold of a great story—but he could not use it, in his own paper at least. Were the news to appear in the *Prager Tagblatt*, the police would swoop down and confiscate every copy, suspend the paper, and send to prison as many members of the staff as possible. So he consulted his editor, and this was what appeared in the *Prager Tagblatt* on the Tuesday morning:

"We are asked by a high authority to contradict rumours which have been spread, particularly in army circles, about the Chief of the Staff of the Prague Army Corps, Colonel A. Redl, who, as already reported, committed suicide in Vienna on Sunday morning. The rumours are to the effect that the colonel had been guilty of betraying military secrets to a foreign Power, believed to be Russia. As a matter of fact, the commission of high officers who came to Prague to carry out a search in the dead colonel's house were investigating quite another matter. . . ."

That was all that could be safely printed in a Prague paper. But the public knew what it meant, for newspaper readers in Bohemia had long been forced by a stringent censorship to read not only between the lines but also "behind the paragraph."

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If they read, "Colonel Redl is not a traitor," they knew that that meant, "Colonel Redl is a traitor." Thus Austria-Hungary learned the main fact of the tragedy. But on Wednesday the rest of Europe read a much more definite story, for the captain of Storm I. was the Prague correspondent of a Berlin paper. For two or three days Europe was interested; the affair was a nine days' sensation. Then the story was forgotten. The Great War had to come and go, the Austrian Empire had to fall, and an extraordinary military system had to crumble before, one by one, here and there, documents were found. . . . Only now can the full story be told. Here it is.

Alfred Redl was undoubtedly one of the most brilliant officers of the Austrian army. He was a clever linguist; he had great personal knowledge of the chief European countries; military history was another of his strong points; he was industrious, energetic, efficient, successful. In 1900, when General Baron von Giesl was head of the secret service of Austria-Hungary, he appointed Redl to be chief of the "Information Department" (espionage and counter-espionage). So well did he do his work that when Giesl was appointed to the Prague command—one of the most important in the Dual Monarchy—he insisted on having Redl as the chief of his staff there. For five years (1900–5) Redl was Director of the Intelligence Department, and he made it the most efficient piece of the whole organisation of the Austro-Hungarian army. He caught some of Europe's cleverest spies; he wormed out many of the greatest secrets of several European Powers; he never seemed to fail. Yet, for rather

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more than half the time he held that appointment, Redl was acting as a spy for Russia !

The Information Department (the "Kundschafts Stelle," or, for short, the "K.S.") was an astounding place. If the "K.S." was in the least degree interested in any visitor, his photograph, face and profile, could be taken, his finger-prints registered, and his every word put on a gramophone plate—and all without his knowledge. No matter where the visitor sat—in the hall, in a waiting-room, or in the bureau of any of the officers of the department—a couple of unseen cameras were focussed on him. Soon after he had been shown into an officer's room, a telephone there would ring. In the midst of the conversation the officer would point to a closed cigarette-case on the table and say, "Do have a cigarette." The visitor would take the case and help himself. The outside of the case was treated with minium, and retained (invisible till developed) the finger-prints of the person who handled it. The telephone talk was a "dummy conversation," of course, for the officer had rung himself up by pressing with his foot a knob under the table. If the visitor did not smoke, then the officer would suddenly recollect that a file, lying at the visitor's end of the table, should have been taken to Room —— long ago. He would snatch it up, and with "Excuse me for a couple of minutes," would run out of the room. Another file was then exposed; it was marked "SECRET." Now, few visitors to the "K.S." were likely to be able to resist just a peep into a secret file ! The boards of it were also treated with minium. If the visitor, watched from the next room, resisted that

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temptation, then another ruse would be tried, and another, till at last one was successful. And all the time an instrument was transmitting every spoken word to a gramophone record in the next room.

So great was the efficiency of the "K.S." when Major Redl was promoted to the rank of colonel and became General von Giesl's chief of the staff, that his very name was an incentive to his successor, Captain Ronge, and to the whole "K.S." staff. "Remember Redl!" "What would Redl think?" were, indeed, mottoes in the place, and the department was kept in a high state of efficiency. The legacy which, in this respect, Redl left to the "K.S." was, strangely enough, to be the cause of his undoing—eight years later! The new chief of the "K.S." kept up the tradition of success, and was always on the look-out for methods and plans whereby he could out-Redl Redl. In 1908, when the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary made the European situation uneasy, Captain Ronge and his chief (General August Urbanski von Ostromiecz, General von Giesl's successor as head of the whole Secret Service) had to be more than ever on the alert, and one of the things which Ronge did was to establish a secret postal censorship. Only three persons—Urbanski, Ronge and the officer who was put at the head of the "Black Bureau," as the censorship department was called—knew the real reason for the step. The staff, sworn to secrecy, was told that it was mainly for the detection of customs swindles. Thus the staff paid special attention to letters coming from frontier places! It was by means of this censorship that, during "the annexation period,"

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the Russian military attaché in Vienna, a colonel most popular in society, was found to be engaged in espionage. He could not be arrested, of course, but at a State ball one night the Emperor "cut" him in pointed fashion. The attaché knew from that that he had been found out, and within a week he had engineered his own recall. His successor was also discovered to be spying—yet another success for the "Black Bureau" and the "K.S."

On 2nd March 1913 two letters were opened in the "Black Bureau." They were both addressed:

Opera Ball, 13,
Poste Restante,
General Post Office,
Vienna.

They came, according to the postmarks, from Eydtkuhnen in East Prussia, on the Russo-German frontier. One contained notes to the amount of 6000 Austrian kronen (£240) and the other 8000 kronen (£320). Neither contained any covering letter, so it was natural that they should arouse suspicion. If the money were owing to anyone as the result of an honest business transaction, why had it not been sent in a more usual fashion? And "Eydtkuhnen"! That little Prussian frontier station known to the spies of all the world! Little wonder that the "K.S." was more than usually curious. It was decided, therefore, to discover who the person was for whom the letters were intended. They were returned to the Poste Restante.

On one side of the General Post Office, in the Fleischmarkt, there is a small police station. A wire

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was fixed up between it and the Poste Restante counter, so that the clerk on duty had only to press a button to set a bell ringing in one of the rooms at the police station. He was to do so the moment the letters were asked for, and to be as slow as possible in handing them out. In the police station two detectives were to be ready day and night to rush out the instant the bell rang and arrest the person receiving the letters. On the following morning everything was in perfect order. Only the bell did not ring. A week passed: silence. A month went by: the letters still lay there. April sped; May was running to its close. Strange! The letters, with £560 in them, had not been called for. Then, on the eighty-third day of waiting, on Saturday afternoon, 24th May: "B-r-r-r . . . b-r-r-r . . . b-r-r-r-r."

The bell was ringing.

As bad luck would have it, one of the detectives on duty was out of the room and the other was washing his hands. Still, not very many seconds later, they were both dashing across the Postgasse.

"Oh, you have been long in coming," said the clerk. "The man has just gone—to the left."

The detectives rushed out to the street, to see a taxi-cab at the corner move off. There was no reason to doubt that it carried the receiver of the letters. And not another taxi-cab in sight; pursuit was out of the question. The two men stood where they were for about twenty minutes, talking the matter over, and then a taxi-cab came slowly along the street. One of the detectives glanced at it and started. It was the cab in which the man had driven

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off! They hailed it, and asked the driver where he had driven "their friend"—the man he had taken up at that corner about twenty minutes before.

"Oh, to the Café Kaiserhof."

"Well, drive us there too."

En route, the detectives thoroughly examined the inside of the cab, and found the sheath of a pocket-knife, a thing in bright grey cloth. That was all. In the Café Kaiserhof, almost empty, no one the least likely to be the wanted man was to be seen. Where had he gone? Doubled on his tracks in another taxi-cab? That was the most likely thing, the detectives decided. The only place where he could get a cab was at a stand a little distance away. There the two men learned that a gentleman had taken a cab, about half an hour before, to drive to the Hotel Klomser.

"To the Hotel Klomser, then."

At that hotel the two detectives asked the portier if anybody had driven up in a taxi within the past hour or so. Yes, several; the persons in No. 4, No. 11, and No. 21. Yes, and No. 1 as well. That was Colonel Redl, though he might have arrived on foot.

"Colonel Redl?" asked one of the detectives.
"The great——"

"Of Prague," added the portier.

One of the detectives showed the portier the pocket-knife sheath.

"You may as well take it," he said, "and ask your guests, as you get the chance, if any of them has lost it."

The portier took the sheath, and just then a

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gentleman, in fashionable civilian clothes, came down the stairs and gave up the key of No. 1.

"Pardon me," said the portier to him, "but has the Herr Colonel, by any chance, lost the sheath of his pocket-knife?" And he held out the sheath to the colonel.

"Oh, thank you. Yes, of course, that's mine," said the colonel carelessly, as he took the sheath. "Where did I use——"

- He stopped, and went deadly white. He glanced quickly at the portier, but the man was hanging up the key. Another man was near, apparently engrossed in a newspaper. For a moment the colonel stood still. Did it flash on him that he was cornered—caught after ten years of treachery? He pocketed the sheath, looked slowly round him again, and went to the door. The man with the newspaper rushed to the telephone-box.

"Twelve-three-forty-eight," he said. (It was a number given quickly, because it was the secret number of the State Political Police.)

Meanwhile Colonel Redl was walking away from the hotel.

A few minutes later the chief officers of the "K.S." had, too, learned the news of all that had happened in that exciting hour—how someone had called for the two "Opera Ball, 13" letters, how he had tried to throw off a possible pursuit, how the pocket-knife sheath had been found, and how it had been established that it belonged to Colonel Redl. Colonel Redl! The three officers who knew whispered the name to each other in their blank astonishment. Their teacher, their former chief, their model! Was

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he a spy, a traitor? Captain Ronge, head of the "K.S.," rushed to the G.P.O. to make inquiries. At the Poste Restante counter persons who asked for letters had to fill in a little form :

Nature of packet.

Address on packet.

~ Say (if possible) where from.

He was given the form which had been filled in by the person who had received the two "Opera Ball, 13" letters, and he took it back to his office. From a shelf behind his chair he pulled down a slim, neatly bound volume : *Advice on Espionage Detection*. It was in manuscript, a 40-page document, by Colonel Redl, and was the last thing he had done as chief of the "K.S." In it he had summed up, for the benefit of his successor, his experiences as a spy-catcher ! Ronge laid the little form on one of the pages. Yes ; there was no doubt about it. The writing on the form was Redl's. Captain Ronge sat down and stared at the form and the neat handwriting of the manuscript. Redl ! Redl . . . of all men. Yet . . . there was no proof. He had received suspicious postal packets with large sums of money. But they might not really be for him. It was possible he was simply doing someone a little service in calling for the letters. It was hard to suspect Redl. • Still—14,000 kronen. And from Eydtkuhnen, of all places. That drive from the G.P.O. to the Café Kaiserhof and back to the Hotel Klomser was suspicious. There was a knock at the door. Ronge jumped up out of his reverie:

"Come in !"

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The door opened and one of the detectives entered.

"News?"

"Yes—in fragments," answered the man, with a grim smile, as he took a number of small, torn pieces of paper from his pocket-book.

For half an hour Ronge and the detective worked at putting the pieces together. Then, the work done, they looked in silence at each other. That settled it. Colonel Alfred Redl, Chief of the Staff of the 8th Army Corps, was a spy and a traitor!

What were Redl's thoughts as he stood, just for a few seconds, at the door of the Hotel Klomser? Things must have gone black before his eyes. Then his hand went to one of the pockets of his waistcoat. Yes, his pocket-knife was there—without the sheath. But how on earth had the portier got hold of the thing? Ah, yes, he had used the knife when he was in the taxi-cab to get the money out of the envelopes. And after? Curious. Annoying. Dangerous. He had been very careless. Then it must have flashed on him that he was cornered—surrounded. He turned to the right and walked smartly down the Herrengasse. At the corner of Strauchgasse, where the famous Café Central is, he looked round furtively. Nobody appeared to be following him. Stay; there was that person who had been reading the newspaper in the hall of the hotel; he was coming in the same direction, with another man. They had seen him. . . . When the two detectives reached the corner of Strauchgasse, 60 or 70 yards from the hotel, Redl had disappeared. A few yards down Strauchgasse the men had, on the right, a view down Wallner-

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strasse. The colonel was not to be seen. As Regierungsgasse, down on the right, was barred, the next thoroughfare was the Haarhof, at least 150 yards away on the left. That was too far for Redl to have reached in the time. The detectives thought for a moment. He could only have gone into the Old Exchange Building, which has three exits—two into the Café Central, and one, through a passage, into a large open space called the Freiong. They decided to try the passage to the Freiong, and there they caught sight of their man again. As he reached the square Redl turned his head again, saw the two men, and quickened his pace somewhat.

It is hardly reasonable to suppose that the colonel was trying to escape. He had to solve a question : Was he being followed ? If so, then he had been betrayed or had betrayed himself. In that case his experience at the hotel showed that his identity was known to his pursuers. All he wanted to do was to throw the men off the trail for a while. He had to think things out, to write a few letters, to dine with Pollack, to get back to Prague if possible, and then to—shoot himself ! His immediate task was to get rid of his pursuers. He went off at a good pace down the long Tiefengraben. He could not make a dash for it, so he drew from his pocket some papers. He did not look at them to see what they were ; it did not really matter now. He tore them into pieces and threw them down. The men would certainly stop to pick them up. They did not. Both continued the pursuit. At the Konkordia Platz a few taxi-cabs were standing. It was no use taking one, for the pursuers would do the same. So the colonel passed

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on. But, as he took a slight glance backwards, he saw that one of the men jumped into one of the taxis and went off. The other came on . . . along Heinrichsgasse to the Franz Josef Quai . . . along the canal for a quarter of a mile . . . then down the Schottenring's mile length . . . into the Schottengasse and back to the hotel . . . the shadow followed him all the way. The man was a dozen yards away as the colonel turned in at the entrance to the Klonmser.

Where had the other detective gone?

The taxi-cab carried him back to the spot where the colonel had torn up and thrown away the pieces of paper. The fragments were carefully collected, and, as already mentioned, taken by the detective to Captain Ronge, head of the "K.S." When the bits were put together it was seen that the papers which Colonel Redl had torn up were:

A receipt for the dispatch of money to an officer of Uhlans, Lieutenant Hovora.

Three receipts for registered letters to Brussels, Warsaw and Lausanne. (All the three addresses were well known to the "K.S."!)

What, therefore, had now been established? Briefly, the facts were:

Colonel Redl had received letters, containing £560, from Eydtkuhnen, on the Russian frontier.

The address on one of the registered letter receipts was known as that of the joint office in Brussels of the Russian and French Secret Services.

The Lausanne address was that of one of the foreign headquarters of the Italian Secret Service.

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The address in Warsaw was one of the principal "intelligence" bureaux in Western Russia.

With that information in his possession, Captain Ronge went to report to his chief, General August Urbanski von Ostromiecz.

Just about that time Colonel Redl reached the Hotel Kłomser, to be greeted in the hall by Dr Victor Pollack, one of the chief legal authorities in Austria, and the colonel's colleague and collaborator in court proceedings in connection with espionage cases. They were great friends, and the greeting was cordial.

"We dine at the Riedhof," said Dr Pollack gaily, and the colonel excused himself for a little while in order to get into evening clothes.

One of the detectives overheard what had been said; he reported to headquarters and was given his instructions. At the Riedhof he saw the manager, explained his object, and then, later, disguised as a waiter and acting the part perfectly, he received the two guests and served an excellent dinner in a private room. Pollack was in his most jovial mood, and Redl, at first, tried to cast the haunting fears out of his mind. His last dinner! That thought must have flashed across his brain. . . . He had played for ten years, and now he had lost. He must face the grim music. Only, he would rather face it in Prague. Pollack might help him in that matter. Soon Pollack noticed that his companion had become nervous and distracted, and that he was not eating. What was the matter? Then Redl began to tell his friend of mental troubles, of moral lapses, of various misdemeanours. He was doing things while

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he was not really responsible for his actions ; he had most probably done many things of late of which he was not aware. Could Pollack not help him ? To get back to Prague as quickly and as quietly as possible was the main thing. (The " waiter " heard nothing of this.) Why, of course, Pollack was ready to do anything for him. It was clear his friend was suffering from a psychological disturbance—a really distressing business. He would ring up a friend and see what could be done. His friend happened to be Herr Gayer, the chief of the police ! When, just as the door of the telephone-box was pulled to, the " waiter " heard a familiar number asked for—his chief's home number—he was more puzzled than ever. Was the great lawyer working as a detective in the case ?

Herr Gayer was not at home ; he was still at his office.

" Ah," said Dr Pollack when, at last, he heard Gayer's voice, " you are working late, my friend. This is Pollack."

" Good evening. I'm just waiting for some developments in a rather important case."

" Well, I am dining with Redl——"

" Yes. At the Riedhof, isn't it ? "

" But how do you know ? "

" Oh, by chance."

" Well, Colonel Redl has apparently suffered a psychological disturbance, and he has been talking all the evening of various delinquencies which he has committed. Overwork, probably. He asks me to see to it that he goes back to Prague and that the journey should be as comfortable as possible.

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Could you provide him with a companion? Captain Walther would do very well. Can you arrange it?"

"But it is impossible to do anything to-night. Calm the colonel, and tell him to come direct to me in the morning. I'll do all I can for him. Good-night."

"Good-night."

"Let us go," said Dr Pollack, entering the room. "I am sure I shall be able to arrange matters for you."

The "waiter" was still more puzzled as he heard the words. The famous lawyer had rung up the chief of the police, and then told a spy and traitor that something would be "arranged" for him! Was the whole thing going to be hushed up?

There was another disturbed dinner in Vienna that evening. At the Grand Hotel, General Conrad von Hoetendorff, commander-in-chief of the army, was entertaining a number of friends. Half-way through the meal a card was brought to the general: General August Urbanski von Ostromiecz.

"Well, any sort of good news?" asked the general, when he met the head of the Secret Service in the hall.

"Can I speak to you privately?"

"Ach, so urgent and interesting? Let's go into that corner."

In the corner Urbanski told the story of Redl. There was no doubt now about the colonel's treason. It was now for the commander-in-chief to say what should be done. General von Hoetendorff went white as chalk, and for minutes he was silent.

"The scoundrel must be caught——"

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"He can be arrested at any moment."

"And we must hear out of his mouth the extent of his treason. Then"—a minute's pause—"he must die. Immediately."

Again the general was silent.

"No one must know the reason for his death. Am I understood?"

"Perfectly."

"Redl. Of the 8th Corps, too. Just the very point where treason may be so deadly. My God! If Plan 3 has gone!"

There was another minute's silence. The commander-in-chief's face showed he was in agony. Then he pulled himself together.

"Everything must take place to-night," he said in steady, clear tones.

"Certainly."

"Call together four officers. Well, say you, Ronge, Hoefer and Wenzel Vorlicsek. Report direct to me. To-night, mind."

"At your orders . . ."

At 11.30 Colonel Redl, having taken leave of Dr Pollack, entered the Hotel Klomser, took his key and went slowly to Room No. 1. At midnight there was a knock at the door.

"Come in!"

The door opened and four officers, in full uniform, entered. Redl was sitting at a table, writing. He rose and bowed.

"I know why you come," he said in slow, quiet tones. "I have spoiled my life, and I am writing letters of farewell. I hope you will give me an opportunity to depart this life."

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"Have you any accomplices?"

"No, none."

"The extent and duration of your activities——"

"All proofs will be found in my house in Prague."

"Have you a revolver, Colonel?"

"May I ask you to get one for me?"

None of the officers carried a revolver, but the colonel was told that one would quickly be brought. The four officers whispered among themselves for a few seconds, and then, bowing, they withdrew. A quarter of an hour later one of the four returned and handed a Browning revolver to the colonel.

"Thank you. Good-night."

"Good-night."

Leaving one of their number to keep within sight of the hotel door, the other three officers went to the Café Central. They ordered coffee and sat there without talking. Every half-hour the man near the hotel was relieved. And so the night passed—till 5 a.m. Then one of the detectives who had followed Redl was called to the Café Central. He was given an envelope, addressed to Colonel Redl, and instructed to take it to the hotel and inform the portier that it was imperative that he (the detective) should deliver it personally to the colonel. The detective was warned what he might find. In case he found the colonel dead, he was to return without raising the alarm. The detective went to the Klomser. He knocked at the door of Room No. 1 and received no answer. He turned the handle and the door opened. The light was full on. Colonel Redl lay in the middle of the room. He must have stood in front of the large mirror and fired a bullet

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into his brain. The blood had oozed out on to the carpet. The detective withdrew, closed the door and slipped past the sleeping portier. Five minutes later the portier was aroused by the ringing of the telephone-bell.

“Hotel Klomser?”

“Yes.”

“Please request Colonel Redl to come to the instrument.”

“Who is there?”

“Never mind. Do as I ask.”

So the portier found the body, just thirteen hours after the two letters addressed to “Opera Ball, 13,” had been called for at the G.P.O.! The discovery was immediately reported to the police, and a high police official—it was Herr Gayer himself—and a doctor were soon at the hotel. They investigated matters. Redl had been dead for some time; near his right hand was the Browning revolver. On the table were two letters—one to his brother and the other to General Baron von Giesl, commander of the 8th Corps—and a half-sheet of notepaper on which was written, in a firm hand:

“Levity and passion have destroyed me. Pray for me. I pay with my life for my sins.—ALFRED.

“1.15 A.M.—I will die now. Please do not permit a post-mortem examination. Pray for me.”

The colonel’s servant, Josef Sladek, a faithful Czech, was beside himself with grief. He seized the chief of the police by the arm.

“No,” he cried, “it is not suicide. It is murder. The revolver does not belong to my master. Four men paid a mysterious visit to him

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at midnight. Someone came half an hour ago. It is murder."

Herr Gayer took the man into a corner and whispered a few words into his ear. That little matter was settled quickly. What was whispered no one ever knew, but scores of newspaper men on the following day could not worm a word out of Josef Sladek.

The body was removed a few hours afterwards, and two days later Colonel Redl was buried—one witness was present—in the Central Cemetery in Vienna in grave 38, row 29, group 79.

Now the task of the authorities was to discover what Redl had betrayed—and the discoveries were to be truly sensational. One thing he had done was to cost Austria-Hungary hundreds of thousands of men on the hills of Northern Serbia before many months were over.

Within a quarter of an hour of the discovery of Redl's body, General Conrad von Hoetzendorff had been informed, and before an hour was over a special train was carrying a commission, consisting of a colonel and a major, to Prague to conduct an investigation in the dead officer's house. That search was carried out, as I have already stated, in the presence of General Baron von Giesl, commander of the 8th Corps, the headquarters of which are at Prague. Redl's house was furnished with extreme luxury, and among the first things to be established was that, three years previously, he had bought a large estate. Receipts showed, too, that he had, in five years, bought no fewer than four of the most expensive motor-cars. In Vienna he owned a large house. It

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was known that he had "private means," but receipts showed that he had lived like an extravagant millionaire. In his wine-cellar were 160 dozens of the finest French champagnes! Then, from various documents, it was learned that, in less than a year, he had received from Russia about 60,000 kronen (about £2400) for his services as spy in the pay of Russia. That amount was ten times the pay of a colonel, but it was evident that the documents discovered did not give nearly the full amount. It must have been five or six times that figure, for the Russian Secret Service was always particularly liberal.

Odds and ends of things he had betrayed to Italy; some material had gone to France; but his relations with these countries were indirect. It was clear that—

He had acted for ten years as Russia's chief foreign spy.

He had made a speciality of denouncing to the Russian authorities persons acting as spies in Russia.

He began to spy in 1902.

What had he betrayed?

From the great mass of letters, copied documents, codes, photographs, plans, secret army orders, mobilisation schemes, reports on the state of railways and roads, precise statements regarding the equipment of the army, etc. etc., it was quickly evident that there was very little he had not betrayed. And to Russia, the great potential enemy! It was established, too, that the blood of many Austrian and Hungarian Secret Service agents abroad was on his hands. Some had been Redl's friends and his colleagues at the "K.S." Cold-bloodedly, he had

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sacrificed them to make his position as a spy in Russian service more secure. Surely a more dastardly form of crime it would be difficult to imagine ! His position as chief of the espionage and counter-espionage department of the Secret Service, which he held from 1900 to 1905, made it quite easy for him to furnish that information. Thus the preliminary and hurried investigation had revealed a tale of unparalleled treachery. It showed that the whole military position of Austria-Hungary had been " given away."

" Plan 3 "—the thought of it, as already mentioned, flashed to the mind of the commander-in-chief of the army, General Conrad von Hoetzendorff, as soon as he heard of Redl's treachery. " Plan 3 " was the complete scheme for military action against Serbia should Austria-Hungary go to war with that country ! Every detail, down to the last man and gun, was fixed : how the necessary forces would be moved, where some were stationed, and where others would be mobilised, the points at which Serbia would be attacked, etc., were fully outlined in descriptions, plans, statistics, maps. " Plan 3 " was the masterpiece of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff.

It is said that Moltke had to be roused from sleep to hear the news of the declaration of war in 1870. " Take down File No. — from shelf No. —, and act on the instructions you find in it," he said. And the battle thinker turned round and went to sleep again. It was Conrad von Hoetzendorff's ambition to be another Moltke. When the war with Serbia, which he regarded as inevitable, came, he had merely to say " Plan 3," and a staff lieutenant could set the

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whole plan of campaign in motion. And Redl had sold "Plan 3" to the Russians! That was to say, the Serbians knew all about it!

Von Hoetzendorff knew he would have to remodel the whole vast scheme. That was a matter of astounding difficulty, because into "Plan 3" almost every ounce of the military wisdom of the Dual Monarchy had been put. The plan might be altered, but still its main features would have to remain very much the same. The Serbian General Staff, with that brilliant soldier, Marshal Putnik, at its head, had had an insight into the mind of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff. For months Putnik had been pondering over "Plan 3." He had, indeed, known it by heart long ago. He could easily see where the changes would occur. What good use the Serbian commander made of his knowledge was to be seen in the early stages of the Great War. To the surprise of the whole world, Putnik and his wonderful army drove back, not only one Austro-Hungarian invasion—but three! Thrice the Austro-Hungarian army tried variants of "Plan 3," and thrice Putnik checkmated it, and inflicted tremendous losses on the invading forces.

One of the most remarkable of the discoveries made in the examination of Redl's papers was the case of his betrayal of a Russian colonel. The Archduke Francis Ferdinand had been on a visit to St Petersburg, and had been so well received at the Russian Court and by the Russian statesmen that he requested the Austro-Hungarian military attaché, who accompanied His Royal Highness to Warsaw on the return journey, to reduce espionage in Russia

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to the greatest possible extent so as not to annoy the Russians. The attaché left the train at Warsaw and stayed in that city for two days. While he was there he received the visit of a Russian colonel, who offered him the whole plan for a Russian military attack on Germany and Austria-Hungary. In spite of the heir apparent's instructions, the attaché could scarcely refuse such a "good thing," and he came to terms with the Russian. When Redl heard of the deal he immediately took action. The plans, of course, came first to him, as he was the head of the espionage and counter-espionage department of the Secret Service; he substituted for them a set of "spoof" plans so as to make it obvious, in the first place, that the attaché in St Petersburg had been badly "sold." He was recalled. Redl returned the real plans (which no one, except himself and the military attaché at St Petersburg, had seen, and no one at all had studied) to the Russian authorities, and provided them with the name of the treacherous colonel who had sold them. The Russian colonel, of course, committed suicide on hearing of his betrayal. For this Redl received £4000!

In this case Redl rendered good service to the Russians. Not only did he keep the Russian plans a secret from the Germans and the Austrians, but he prevented both from knowing anything about a considerable number of Russian army corps. Years afterwards a well-known Austro-Hungarian statesman declared: "If the General Staff of the Dual Monarchy had known of the existence of these army corps, our generals would have seen the extreme danger of a quarrel with Russia, and would have been

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able to prevent our courtiers from driving us into war in 1914. Hence our war fever and our defeat. That villain, Redl, denounced every Austro-Hungarian spy in Russia and delivered our secrets to the Russians."

The biggest espionage case in which Colonel Redl, as chief of the espionage and counter-espionage department, was involved, was the sensational one known as the Hekailo-Wienokowski-Acht affair, the full and tragic story of which is now told for the first time. Documents found in Redl's house showed how, at the very beginning of his career as a spy and traitor, he was nearly betrayed. Only his coolness and the great skill with which he played his double rôle of spy and spy-prosecutor pulled him out of an exceedingly difficult and perilous position. Even the advocate engaged for the prosecution came within an ace of suspecting him. The whole story of the case is a tale of inhuman callousness. In 1903, when Redl had just begun his activities on behalf of Russia, a young man named Hekailo, who held the position of a clerk in the army administration at Lemberg, was arrested on a charge of misappropriating funds. An inquiry resulted in his being released, and he immediately fled the country. Two months later, Colonel (then Major) Redl called on Dr Haberditz, an eminent Vienna advocate generally engaged for military cases. Dr Haberditz had conducted the inquiry into the Hekailo case, and was interested and astonished to hear that Redl alleged that the man was guilty of espionage on behalf of Russia, and that he had, most likely, betrayed the plans for the co-operation of Germany and Austria-Hungary in

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marching against Russia via the Thorn region. Redl declared that he had discovered Hekailo's whereabouts from an intercepted letter which Hekailo had sent to a friend in Lemberg, saying that he had settled down in Curitiba, in Southern Brazil, under the name of Karl Weber. As a result, Hekailo's extradition was demanded on the ground that he had committed extensive thefts; it was agreed to. (He could not be extradited, of course, as a spy.)

Hekailo was put on trial at Vienna. Redl produced most damaging proofs against him—photographs, letters, drawings and various documents sent to the address of a governess in the family of one of the officers of the Russian General Staff in Warsaw. Among the documents was proof that the above-mentioned plan had been betrayed. Redl declared that it had cost about 30,000 kronen (or £1200) to obtain possession of these proofs.

Both Haberditz and Redl tried countless ways to make Hekailo confess, but in vain. At last, in reply to a question put to him by Redl, he said :

“Major, how could I obtain these plans? Only someone at General Staff Headquarters in Vienna could obtain them and sell them to the Russians.”

Little did Hekailo know how near he had come to the proper solution of the case !

Under severe pressure Hekailo gave the name of one of his accomplices—Major Ritter von Wienckowski, stationed at Stanislau. Next day Redl and Haberditz went to Stanislau and had Major von Wienckowski arrested. Half a ton of documents was seized and the identity of the third person in the case established—Captain Acht, personal adjutant

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of the commander at Lemberg! When all three men were in the dock and the case had become a highly sensational one—a special verbatim report was prepared for the Emperor—Redl's attitude suddenly changed, and, as far as Wienckowski and Acht were concerned, he was almost their defender instead of the expert witness against them. As a result, Redl and Haberditz became less friendly, and eventually their relations were so strained that the advocate went to Redl's superior, expressed his suspicions, and demanded that someone else be employed in the case instead of Redl. But the advocate's suspicions were ridiculed. Then, two weeks after, Redl changed his attitude, and again became the merciless person he was before. The three defendants, in the end, were sentenced, one to eight years and two to twelve years in prison.

Now, why did Redl change his attitude twice in the course of the case? The papers found in his house tell the reason why, and a grim story it is. It was Redl who sold the plans in question to the Russians. In addition to his "fee," he demanded that the Russians should make it possible for him to have a big espionage case in Vienna. The reasons for such a wish are obvious. Now, as Hekailo had fled to the wilds of Brazil, he was no longer of any use to the Russian Secret Service, so the Russians put Redl on the man's track and provided the necessary material to convict him of treason. (The 30,000 kronen which Redl said, the proofs cost him, really went into his own pocket.) From the Russian point of view, however, the case became serious and important as soon as it involved Wienckowski and

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Acht, two of the best spies in the Russian service in ~~an~~ the frontier region. The Russian military attaché in Vienna, therefore, paid Redl a visit and told him that he must secure the acquittal of the two officers.

Otherwise . . .

Redl knew that he could look for no mercy from his Russian "employers," so, as already mentioned, he tried ~~hard~~ to influence the court in favour of Wienckowski and Acht. He saw that it was impossible ~~to~~ do anything, however, and so he had to come to terms with the Russians. He managed to do so, and the Russians agreed to sacrifice the two officers. On what terms? In court, when the case was nearing its end, Redl had occasion to refer to a certain incriminating document which had been secured, he said, at great cost. A Russian major (on the General Staff at Warsaw) had secured it and sent it to him. The major was a man who, Redl added, had done a great deal of good work for Austria. The theft, however, had been traced to the major; he had been tried by court-martial, found guilty and hanged. What really happened was that Redl, to persuade the Russians to agree to the condemnation of Wienckowski and Acht, had undertaken to betray a spy to the Warsaw military authorities and to provide the evidence of his guilt. The ~~major~~ was the person whom Redl betrayed and sent to his death in accordance with this villainous agreement!

Such is the story of Albert Redl, master-spy.